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	Abstract 
A Philosophy of Weather:  
How We Learn in an Elemental, Aesthetic Environment 
LeAnn M. Holland 
 
 This dissertation investigates, through weather metaphors in nature writing, how outdoor 
learning can be transformative. Although we have a robust history of books, essays, and poetry 
about experiences in weather-rich environments, education as a theoretical and applied field still 
lacks a philosophical foundation upon which to improve and expand outdoor pedagogy. Rather 
than proposing that the hermeneutical study of weather metaphors will lead to prescriptive 
lessons outdoors, this research aims to reveal the philosophy of transformative learning 
immanent in our experiences. With an increased philosophical understanding of the aesthetically 
transformative dimensions of outdoor experience, when our senses are most exposed, educators 
may take the next step of exploring what these experiences might do for the holistic education of 
students. This dissertation’s recognition of the aesthetic experiences students have in weather-
saturated spaces promises to generate a richer definition of an effective learning environment.  
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A change of weather is sufficient to recreate the world and ourselves.  





“Wind from the Sea” by Andrew Wyeth, 1947, National Gallery of Art 	




The inquiry at hand began years ago when I was sharing a coffee with a close friend. In 
mentioning my interest in the value of learning in nature, that friend told me the story of her 
undergraduate environmental sustainability professor Lindy B. Biggs of Emory University. Dr. 
Biggs opened her first lesson on the first day of that class with a challenge to her students: Think 
of your earliest life memory where you felt truly moved by something. After a brief pause, Dr. 
Biggs polled her students, asking them to raise their hand if the memory they brought to mind 
was something that happened outdoors (what I presume to refer to a primarily non-built, non-
artificial, literally “out-of-the-door” environment). Without fail, the majority of her students 
raised their hands to attest to the early impact moments outdoors have on our lives. I repeat this 
story in my mind when I begin every new school year, every teaching assignment, and every day 
outdoors. Surely there must be something spectacular happening to us outside of built classrooms 
to provoke such memorable, transformative learning events.  
Unlike various types of “change,” which happen to students incrementally, psychologists 
like Jack Mezirow use the term “transformation” to mark seismic learning events, or “shifts” 
rather than steady steps. Transformational change, then, is defined as a major alteration in the 
way that a person senses, perceives, or understands the world and the new internal 
representations of life and thought that he or she creates as a result of that seismic shift. 
Transformational change only happens through a process of learning, so we can comfortably 
presume to call any transformational change transformational learning. Transformational 
learning is often manifested in a person’s macro-organizational thinking about his or her culture, 
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societal role, aspirations, values, norms, or assumptions. This is not, however, to be confused 
with transactional change, when a person merely alters or exchanges micro-organizational facts 
or systemic functions, and it moves beyond informational learning (e.g., the “banking model” of 
education).1  
In this process of carefully defining terms, Mezirow introduced – with a subtle but 
notable switch of suffixes – a particular formulation of transformational learning known as 
transformative. According to Mezirow: 
 
Transformative learning is learning that transforms problematic frames of 
reference—sets of fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning 
perspectives, mindsets)—to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, 
reflective, and emotionally able to change. Such frames of reference are better 
than others because they are more likely to generate beliefs and opinions that will 
prove more true or justified to guide action.2 
 
 
Within transformative learning experiences, we can have the positively focused experience of 
transforming problematic frames of reference. Unlike “transformational learning’s” generalized 
view of change, “transformative learning” is the experience of growth by shifting troublesome 
assumptions, maybe even opening avenues for future change. Mezirow explains how 
transformative learning is better than simple experience or transformational change because it 
makes the learner more receptive to a perspective that he or she will ultimately find to be “truer” 
or better “justified” in guiding future behavior.3 That is, in transformative learning, the change is 
eventually accepted as positive, not just change for the sake of doing something different.  
																																																								
1 Interestingly, Mezirow’s distinction between transactional and transformational learning 
parallels political scientist James MacGregor Burn’s discussion of different leadership styles. 
 
2 Italics added. Mezirow, 2003. 58-59. 
 
3 Mezirow, 1990, 14. 
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 According to Mezirow, the positive change or “perspective transformation” at the heart 
of transformative learning has three dimensions: psychological (relating to changes in self-
understanding), behavioral (changes in lifestyle), or convictional (changes in beliefs). However, I 
add a fourth dimension to this list – the aesthetic.4 This fourth dimension is what the American 
education system so often fails to engage.5  
Aesthetics is the field of philosophy that studies the ways in which humans experience 
the world through their senses.6 I would add that this includes physical & mental faculties, 
human emotion and affect. Within aesthetics is the subfield of environmental aesthetics that 
concerns research relating to the spaces of aesthetic experiencing. In other words, environmental 
aesthetics is the field of philosophy that studies the ways in which humans experience world 
environments through their senses.  
I focus on outdoor environments, so I will examine about the more specific subfield of 
outdoor aesthetics more often than the general field of environmental aesthetics. In Chapter II we 
discover that current research promotes embodied, otherness relations, and place7 as additional 
																																																								
4 My proposed aesthetic dimension is similar and partially inspired by Michael Polanyi’s tacit 
dimension.  
 
5 Classroom educators work to assist in the transformation of students in all mental areas 
(psychological, behavioral, and convictional), yet Mezirow and many American philosophers of 
education misconstrue the arrangement by which a student always learns: necessarily through the 
physical senses. It may be the case that no transformation can be complete without a subsequent 
transformation of the student’s body, nor can any psychological, behavioral, or convictional 
transformation be fully realized without at least some activation of the aesthetic dimension. 
 
6 Carlson, 1-2. 
 
7 I question the role of place in describing aesthetic experiences in the sections on Gretel Ehrlich 
briefly and John Muir in detail, because it inadvertently overemphasizes landscapes or regions in 
experiencing, and places are imagined as bound or somehow restricted, much as the historic 
aesthetics of gardens or the environmental picturesque were regimented so that they could be 
analyzed and reproduced by followers of William Gilpin in the British Romantic Era. 
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qualities that go hand in hand with aesthetics in our sensual perceptive experience of outdoor 
environments. Notice also that aesthetics, as I use the term here, assumes brain/mind/body 
indivisibility. Thinking, judging, perceiving and feeling all coincide in aesthetic experiencing.  
 We have long known that experiences outdoors can be healthy, meditative, satisfy our 
need for recreation or play, or give us a consciousness of place, but we cannot yet seem to 
answer how it has transformative learning power. When it comes to what we are learning from 
the outdoors, these experiences above all else highlight the aesthetic dimension. According to 
Mezirow, these relative dimensional changes can only “stick” if the person is aware or 
consciously reflecting on the improvements being made. He describes how transformative 
learning is frequently the result of a “disorienting dilemma,” triggered by a major life crisis or 
transition, and may even be the result of accumulated smaller transformations over time, the 
learning is only solidified during the primarily rational, conscious process of coming to grips 
with the experience of change.8 This is correct, but Mezirow did not address the thesis that 
primary, physical and aesthetic experience is necessary before we can come to reflect. I posit that 
the aesthetic dimension is crucial to transformative learning, and that like the other dimensions 
that are typically considered strictly intellectual, aesthetically transformative learning experience 
ought to be equally recognized, philosophized, and encouraged as the other deep (i.e. 
transformative) types of learning. How might educators accomplish this? This may seem 
obvious. Transport a classroom outdoors! 
Unfortunately, good education is not so easy. First, effective teaching involves something 
																																																								
8 Mezirow, 2000, 21. He describes ten steps to transformative learning: 1. Disorienting 
Dilemma, 2. Self-Examination, 3. Sense of Alienation, 4. Relating discontent to others, 5. 
Explaining Options for New Behavior, 6. Building Confidence in New Ways, 7. Planning a 
Course of Action, 8. Knowledge to Implement Plans, 9. Experimenting With New Roles, 10. 
Reintegration. 
 	 5 
more intentional than simply moving a class. Second, we recall the contradiction mentioned 
previously. It is not easy to find the time, space, support, and research justification to do even 
that, to move a class. Our world values human-centric progress in the form of active, concrete 
intellectual results, yet our experiences draw us longingly back to the outdoors. If indeed our 
early memorable moments are often contextualized outdoors, why do we live, eat, work, and 
teach predominantly indoors? Might the field of education lack attention to a pivotal learning 
experience of greater-than-strictly-intellectual value? In a world where the cutthroat, fast-paced 
life is privileged, how is it that our first transformative moments, those that are a challenge to 
explain and so far today from being “figured out,” can so often contradict the productivity-driven 
lives we adopt in adulthood? It is remarkable to me that Dr. Bigg’s students and my own have 
this early connection to something that is neither constructed nor controlled. This testimony says 
something worthwhile for early childhood through to adult education. There is a deep-seated 
value; our experiences are telling us that we have a primordial connection to the outdoors.  
I can see that humans have a connection to the outdoors, but that still does not answer 
why the outdoors is so educationally transformative. Again, Mezirow’s dimensions might offer a 
way to explain what I am noticing. Learning experiences outdoors can spark psychological, 
behavioral, convictional, and aesthetic transformation. Moreover, because learning experiences 
outdoors can be multi-dimensionally transformative, the outdoor environment stands the chance 
of being one of the few spaces that can change a person entirely, mind and body: The outdoors 
can holistically educate. Outdoor learning is memorable to us, because it offers an exception to 
the field of philosophy of education’s historical tendency to focus on the intellectual mind alone. 
This dissertation proposes that substantive evidence that outdoor learning can transform 
aesthetically, and quite possibly holistically, saturates historical nature writings. The trouble is 
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that we are conditioned to dismiss nature writing like that of Henry David Thoreau, Mary Oliver, 
Annie Dillard, or John Muir as beautiful but only anecdotal renderings of nature. Herein I take 
another look at classic travel monologues, nature poetry, and aesthetic descriptions of 
experiences in nature and see them instead as robust, trustworthy evidence that an aesthetically 
or holistically transformative experience can and does occur outdoors. 
 
 
Further Clarification on Transformative Learning 
Theorist of andragogy Peter Willis notices that transformative learning theory over recent 
years has developed two distinct approaches.9 The first is transformative learning that is the 
outcome of critical thinking (a la Mezirow). The second is transformative learning acquired by 
non-rational thought. It is this second approach led by researchers like John M. Dirkx that I find 
most promising. According to Dirkx, transformative learning could just as accurately be labeled 
“soul work.” Calling upon famous psychologist Carl Jung’s theory of the conscious and 
unconscious mind indicating whole psychological development, Dirkx considers both rational 
and non-rational work done on the soul (his holistic term for the human self – run by the 
conscious ego but also allowing non-surface meaning-making) as integral. But it is Dirkx’s 
excessive talk of “ego” that has adult learning theorist Stephen D. Brookfield desiring a public 
model of transformative learning. Brookfield reasons that no transformative experience can be 
entirely egocentric because all experience is laden with socio-political undertones. That is, no 
																																																								
9 Willis, 212. 
 
 	 7 
transformative learning experience will be only for the benefit or growth or narrative of the 
singular inner self.10 All transformations involve the social world and our representations of it.  
M. Carolyn Clark argues that transformative learning can just as likely involve non-
cognitive ways of knowing. One’s learning might skip the cognitive thinking step that Mezirow 
touts, instead manifesting itself directly within the knowledge of our bodies, and she means 
bodies to be the brain or mind and corporeal physical self as one whole unit. According to the 
theory of ways of knowing, all learning is embodied knowing, meaning that knowledge stems 
from what has been sensed and taken in – learned – literally, by the body that includes the 
brain.11 Only in and through our neurological (and thereby cognitive), sensory, affective bodies 
can we rationally reflect on that experience, but not before some episode of physical processing.  
Clark is describing, essentially, Dewey’s distinction between secondary and primary 
experiencing, respectively.12 In education we often get carried away theorizing the intellectual, 
cognitive activities of learning while failing to honor the primary experiences upon which those 
secondary experiences are founded. Learning is a reciprocal relationship not of mind and body as 
if those functioning roles of the same single unit were separate (which they are not) but of the 
oscillating primary and secondary experiences of one mind/body system. By storing knowledge 
in the body, imprinted on fingertips after touching a stove that is too hot, and formed into files of 
synapses in the brain, learners keep an essential continuum of experiences that in the language of 
Dewey live fruitfully in future experiences. 
																																																								
10 Brookfield, 132. 
 
11 Clark, 426-427. I use mind or brain interchangeably, often choosing in this research to call this 
single embodied unit as the “mind/body,” using the slash to indicate holism rather than dualism.  
 
12 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 15-17. 
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Psychologist David Kolb identifies a common thread of learning as a inherently tension- 
and conflict-filled process in the philosophies of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Jean Piaget and 
Lewinian models in psychology.13 Rather than say that transformative learning happens through 
an innate process, Kolb suggests that a successful learner needs four types of abilities in order to 
fully transform: the ability to experience concretely, the ability to reflectively observe, the ability 
to form abstract conceptualizations, and the ability to actively experiment.14  
By conceiving a multi-ability approach to transformative learning, the experiential aspect 
of learning is more wholly developed in Kolb’s theory. Kolb requires the learner to do more than 
see and live the transformative experience; he or she must physically and mentally embody the 
experience. For Kolb, all learning is experiential, and knowledge is created only by the 
transformation of human experience.15 Therefore, it is not the transformation itself that is key, 
but the interaction and transactional relationship between humans and their environment – the 
transformation of the experience – that commands learning. John Dewey says this well in Art as 
Experience (1934): 
Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and 
environing conditions is involved in the very process of living…Oftentimes, 
however, the experience had is inchoate. Things are experienced but not in such a 
way that they are composed into an experience. There is distraction and 
dispersion; what we observe and what we think, what we desire and what we get, 
are at odds with each other. We put our hands to the plough and turn back; we 
start and then we stop, not because the experience has reached the end for the sake 
of which it was initiated but because of extraneous interruptions or of inner 
lethargy. In contrast with such experience, we have an experience when the 
material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it 																																																								




15 Ibid., 38. 
 
 	 9 
integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other 
experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem 
receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating 
a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or 
taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a 
consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with 
it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience.16 
 
In this passage, Dewey is distinguishing the “general stream” of everyday experience, which 
cannot be subsumed into any sort of complete idea from the times that we can recognize 
ourselves as having an experience, a type of experience that we can “integrate” and “demarcate” 
in our memories. I see this as the difference between moving about our lives without making 
note of anything new, and those moments that we can distinctly remember learning something. 
This can be identified in Kolb’s idea that transformative learning is about transforming the type 
of experience itself into that which is an experience, an event in life that ends in a feeling of 
consummation. 
Another Deweyan scholar, Philip Jackson, gives us perhaps the most well known 
philosophical discussion of transformation in his 1986 book The Practice of Teaching. Jackson 
notices as Mezirow does a few years later, two significant categories of learning in 
developmental psychology. But rather than apply them to development theory, Jackson sees 
them as varying traditions of pedagogy. He names these traditions the mimetic and the 
transformative. We can already see the precursors to the transactional versus transformative 
polarity mentioned in the previous section. Jackson’s label mimetic comes directly from the 
Greek word “mimesis,” meaning imitative, like a mime mirroring the moves of her partner. The 
mimetic tradition stresses the importance of pedagogical method, the actual mirroring or 																																																								
16 Dewey, Art as Experience, 554. 
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imitative act that the student uses to learn, what technique the teacher employs, to pass on the 
information. Knowledge in the mimetic tradition is presented rather than discovered, which 
means that the origin of knowledge is always the teacher or the one making use of mimetic 
transmission.17  
 In contrast, Jackson’s transformative tradition of education is all about discovery. The 
teacher need not be the source of knowledge; often, it is unclear where in reality knowledge 
originates.18 Transformative education might demand confusion, risk, spirituality, or 
metamorphosis. As Plato in the Republic describes in Book X, mimesis becomes secondary 
when we reason that knowledge can come from a more primary source. The transformative 
process, on the other hand, is less prescriptive, more about modeling persuasion rather than 
compliance, and use of open-ended narrative.19 Of course, there are problems with the 
transformative pedagogical tradition as well: it can be seen as pretentious (a student needs to be 
completely transformed by education), few teachers want to admit to doing this to their students 
(transformation implies great responsibility and power), and the methodology is vague.20  
Jackson concludes that both pedagogical traditions are necessary and are rarely as 
detached from each other as they might immediately appear. I agree that artful teaching involves 
both in turn. Yet, the elusive character of transformative pedagogy makes it especially 
challenging to study. How and why does it happen? How do we philosophize something that is 
in essence defined by its subtlety? 																																																								
17 Jackson, 117. 
 
18 Ibid., 120-122. 
 
19 Ibid., 124-125. See also Clark on narrative usage, 435-437. 
 
20 Ibid., 128-129. 
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Although her article is meant to be an exposition of the issues present when therapy is 
prescribed by education,21 Aislinn O’Donnell adds an excellent section entitled “Unpredictable 
Pedagogical Encounters.” Here O’Donnell promotes pedagogical opportunity for unpredictable 
therapeutic encounters in lieu of forcing students to be exposed in the present. That is, teachers 
cannot impose transformation upon students in a particular time and space. O’Donnell uses 
philosophical study and dialogue in prison settings as an example of how some students are 
moved to transform, while others are not. She explains that some students may require support in 
order to incorporate a learning moment into their conscious experience or “work through it” 
further.22 She suspects that at times these moments can simply be too much for students to 
handle alone. Students and teachers alike face these transformations. There are some events that 
we may never be able to apprehend. In this light, O’Donnell characterizes learning as “an 
unending and open-ended pedagogical dynamic through a shared love of, and interest in, subject 
matter.”23 Where does this leave educators? Is there anything that we can grasp for certain about 
transformative learning?  
O’Donnell’s answer lies in the “atmosphere” of feeling.24 Unlike Mezirow, O’Donnell 
argues that the only pedagogical element we can control is the creation of a learning atmosphere 
or space to move in; we cannot control student rationalizations.25 While one part of the 
educator’s job may be to exercise phronesis, or practical wisdom, by recognizing teachable, 																																																								
21 Jackson also finds that therapy has significant crossovers with pedagogy, 129. 
 
22 O’Donnell, 277. 
 
23 Ibid., 278. 
 
24 More shall be said on atmospheres of emotion in Chapter II. See also Griffero. 
 
25 Ibid., 278. 
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insightful, unpredictable events on the cusp of learning, stepping in to support and encourage that 
student to a transformative state, this may all happen in such a fleeting way that the educator 
cannot possibly detect the shifting winds of change. Here she falls back on Dewey’s language of 
“undergoing” (the act of doing or experiencing something) as better than interventional methods 
of teaching. Practical wisdom in the moment is the best possible action. No single, all-purpose 
model of pedagogy will do. 
Perhaps the unpredictable pedagogical space that O’Donnell promotes leads us further 
into an examination of whether the term “transformative learning” can be pinned down at all. 
Michael Newman argues that we should abandon the name transformative learning for the more 
straightforward and colloquial designator “good learning.” Giving learning a positive value 
rather than a nebulous state allows Newman to break down nine characteristics.26 This renaming, 
he posits, would also help us avoid the tricky situation of transformative versus instructive 
learning.  
Although I appreciate Newman’s attempt to make pedagogy more clear and concise, 
there is much more to transformative learning than merely “good learning.” We struggle to 
understand this concept because it is worthy of struggle. The encapsulation of human learning in 
profound events or moments is more than can be described with a basic value adjective. In much 
of what follows, I explore ways of supporting the idea of transformative learning, rather than 
viewing it either as an unassailable model from educational theory or as a clearly impractical 
ideal for educational practice. 
 																																																								
26 Newman, 51. The nine characteristics are: instrumental, communicative, affective, 
interpretive, essential, critical, political, passionate, and moral. In different acts of learning 
different aspects will dominate, but when all nine are present we will have, with all the 
ambiguity the word implies, good learning. 
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A Map of the Research 
This dissertation research follows a standard form: introduction, literature review, 
methods, data, analysis, and conclusion. However, within each chapter is an important element 
of the bigger philosophical picture, the argument for a modern philosophy of learning in weather. 
Here I will sketch a map of the chapters, pointing out the major element in each. First, in this 
chapter, the “Here” from the “Here and Now,” one should see that this has been a project long in 
the making for me. Although Mezirow and Dr. Biggs demonstrate the general reasons for my 
interest in investigating aesthetic experiences in weather-rich environments, they do not explain 
the actual methods and basis for the research as it is presented here. As such, consider this 
chapter a mere outline of what is to come, a teaser of the issues present, and the considerations 
that led me to propose the importance of this work. 
My reader will notice the unusual choice of introductory and concluding chapter titles, so 
the purpose should be made promptly evident. In the chapters “Here” and “Now” I establish 
what I believe Edward Mooney would consider a “philosophy of presence.”27 Chapter I, “Here,” 
is intended to set the scene, not as a place for learning but instead an environment for learning to 
be heard, like a voice echoing in a vast space. I describe the setting of this type of learning, 
identify its role in outdoor experience, and then complete the study with a conversation of the 
temporal reality of our time on Earth, what might promise positive change, and what we might 
introduce in the now, drawing the present setting “here” to the present time “now.” 
A study of nature writing to extract the presence of philosophical learning requires a clear 
idea of the power of the aesthetics, both aesthetic experience and language like metaphors that 
describe aesthetic experiencing. An aesthetic experience is essentially an embodied experience. 																																																								
27 Mooney, 2016, 63. 
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It does not require material beyond that of ordinary life; even the smallest moments (“spots of 
time,” William Wordsworth called them) can be aesthetic and potentially transformative. 
Aesthetic experiences happen when the student increases attentiveness toward his or her body 
during primary experiencing, so in this way, the experiencing itself is qualitatively different 
because it is also infused with secondary experiencing. The activation of our faculties and 
functions generates an experience, according to Dewey.28 That is, we form a memorable 
moment, a consummate experience of the mind/body operating as it always does, but with the 
added aspect of constructive growth, also known as learning. Aesthetic experiencing, therefore, 
can lead to aesthetic learning. Chapter II elaborates upon the role of aesthetics in learning 
outdoors through a review of the research literature. 
Chapter III introduces the reasons behind this dissertation’s utilization of metaphorical 
language and weather talk in nature writings. Instead of viewing writing about aesthetic 
experiencing as nothing more than an expression of feeling, artistic and fascinating, but illogical 
(in the sense that it is overly emotional), I take it as a principal communicative mode by which 
outdoorspeople can convey their embodied experience outdoors. I have spent hours pondering 
what inspires so many people to through-hike thousands of miles on the trail, living months to 
years outdoors, often postponing, supplementing, or even rejecting classic educational choices 
like a college degree. Along the Appalachian Trail in Massachusetts, there is a rock with this 
inscription by Thoreau that notes this inclination. It reads, “It were as well to be educated in the 
shadow of a mountain as in more classic shade. Some will remember, no doubt, not only that 
they went to college, but that they went to the mountain.” In some ways, I am one who went to 
the mountain too, but the mystery of how and what I am learning still remains. What makes my 
																																																								
28 Dewey, Art as Experience, 554. Also described in Dewey’s Experience and Nature, Chapter I.  
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time outdoors so different from my time indoors? When I have stood at the edge of a cliff on a 
windy day, felt the icy air creep into my nose on a frosty morning, or fallen asleep fascinated by 
the loud and rhythmic sounds of crickets or whippoorwills, I have often thought of the struggle I 
would face in describing what I had learned from those sensations. For something so ineffable as 
trying to share the experience of how one feels in one’s own body in the natural environment, 
nature writers are able to accomplish quite a lot. We need only to recognize their efforts as 
serious and intentional.  
A key example that comes to mind of the under-appreciation of aesthetic nature writing 
as indicative of transformative learning is the dismissal of “weather talk,” or metaphors of the 
weather added into a conversation, as banal. For example, when a person says that the weather is 
“gloomy” or “moody” today, he or she is making a statement about how the environment makes 
them feel. It is more than a conversational quip – it is the aesthetic affect of the environment on a 
person. It is the manifestation of a person’s learned relationship with the non-human world. We 
use what words we have to bring our aesthetic experience to life. Likewise, we talk about our 
“sunny” dispositions as if we are the gigantic, flaming sun itself, or talk of hard-to-read people as 
“cold,” like frigid weather in winter.  
Before I returned to school to work on this dissertation, I was a sixth grade Language 
Arts Teacher on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in Mission, South Dakota. Mahpiya (mah-
ghpee-yah) meaning “cloud or sky” in Lakota was the first or middle name of many of my 
female students. I was struck by the prevalence of names like Mahpiya that related to weather, 
animals, or experiences outdoors. Although it is certainly a lovely sounding name, it is popular 
because it means something to them. The weather words to Lakota people are constant, present 
metaphors for life. Listening to and teaching Lakota folklore that was laced with representations 
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of nature and metaphor, I learned to see that certain words bear testimony to aesthetic 
experience. If aesthetic experience is embodied, then aesthetic language like metaphor is the 
expression of bodily experience on paper. 
Aesthetic language is used on purpose, because no other type of explanation, gestural or 
linguistic, can suffice. Plain talk (analytic phrasing, without aesthetic languages like poetry or 
metaphor) cannot hold the same feeling, weight, or illustrative value. Thus, just as Hegel noticed 
that Persian art uses repeated geometric shapes to symbolize the sacred concept of infinity, so too 
does poetic or aesthetic language signify something otherwise indescribable about our learning 
experiences in the outdoors.  
This dissertation project investigates selections from naturalist accounts that exercise 
weather metaphor to determine in what way their words might reveal an aesthetic learning 
experience outdoors otherwise unaddressed in philosophy of education research. Chapter IV 
explains the methodological details of environmental hermeneutics, some of the decisions that 
were made in advance of the project launch, and clarifications to keep in mind while 
contemplating the nature writers’ discourses on transformative aesthetic learning experiences in 
following chapters, V and VI. 
I expect that the fifth and sixth chapters may be the most rewarding and the most 
challenging of this research to process, because there are more observations and questions in this 
data set than there are answers. But I am reminded that this alone is not a problem, given the 
subject matter and the abstraction of experience, as we have learned from Dewey, which exists 
implicitly in these learning moments. With each nature writer’s text sampled, I have gone 
through the work of highlighting, dictating to paper, considering, questioning, and interpreting 
their words in light of what appear to be their samples of outdoor aesthetic experience. As you 
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will see, and as I suspected in advance of this work, much of what I discover overlaps the 
common use of “weather talk.” But the thesis does not stop there, of course. I probe each quote 
to see what it might reveal to us about an experienced outdoorsman or woman’s experience of 
truly learning in a weather-saturated environment. What caused their interest? What did they 
learn? What can they replicate of that moment, if anything?  
Included throughout this chapter with the seven principal texts are a collection of my 
personal memories and journal entries captured while reading the primary sources. I include 
them, not to bias my research, but rather to pay tribute to the personal spirit of this work. The 
data set is, after all, a collection of personal memories from other outdoorspeople, broken open 
and exposed to all our readers. Sharing my own thoughts is both an attempt to give thanks for 
their openness by exchanging some of my own private experience, and it is also opposes the 
stance that what is personal or subjective is automatically unfit for research. Actually, according 
to the hermeneutical principles upon which my research methodology is based, my subjectivity is 
not a problematic bias, but an expert’s strength in properly “hearing out” the nature writers’ own 
tales. In our similar, collected experiences perhaps we can draw out some measure of normativity 
upon which an educational theory might be founded. That is, at least, the point of my inclusion 
of the vignettes and photographs you will discover within these pages. Chapter VI is a 
continuation of this process and an accumulative drawing-out of the important notes and 
arguments that the nature writers appear to be making. Here I use the data to inform my own 
philosophical sensibilities and outline what might be seen as the result of aesthetic outdoor 
learning experiences, which is a better pedagogical understanding of learning in different 
environments.  
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The dissertation is concluded in Chapter VII, where I explain what we might now expect 
from future research on weather-rich learning. This is also where I evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research that has been presented, with an eye to how we, as educators, can see 
a new tomorrow with a greater knowledge of that which makes learning truly meaningful and 
holistically transformative, such as an environment that is rich in weather. With this, I take the 
argument one step further to acknowledge the ethical, eco-justice, and climate-change 
educational ramifications of re-envisioning a learning environment as a pedagogical choice.  
One might assume, given its emphasis on the outdoors, that this study ought to begin by 
clarifying the difference between what is indoors versus outdoors (or to distinguish human nature 
from environmental nature), but the aesthetic experience I elucidate resists binaries. In offering a 
more complete philosophical picture of learning outdoors, I find that the differences are 
superficial, or that it is misleading to dichotomize the outdoors versus the indoors as American 
educators do. Rather, it is my greatest hope that this research will posit the viable theory that our 
choice of classroom environment falls on a range scale of options from an artificial, lab-like 




Qualities of Transformative Learning Experience Outdoors 
 
In my introductory chapter, I posited that there is an aesthetic dimension to 
transformative learning outdoors, but this is not the terminology other researchers in the field 
have adopted. In this chapter, I explore published literature that relates to this idea. Specifically, I 
investigate what research has shown is educationally transformative about our experiences 
outdoors.  
This chapter is a review of the literature on transformative learning from psychology, 
philosophy of education, classical philosophy, and aesthetic philosophy. I argue that except for 
one emerging area in philosophy called “elemental philosophy,” which is addressed in depth in 
the last section of this chapter, nature writing, poetry, and art are the genres that have come the 
closest to characterizing the distinctive learning experience that appears to frequently happen 
when outdoors, exposed to the weather. The research on aesthetics being expressed through 





 Immediately, some popular studies come to mind.29 Research on the “benefits” of the 
																																																								
29 One should note that none of these studies uses the term “nature” as its primary construct. This 
omission is likely due to the incredible challenge we have today with defining this term. See 
Christina M. Gschwandter, 82-99, and W. S. K. Cameron, 102-120, for an elaboration of the 
complicated history of this word. For this reason, I avoid relying on “nature” as a concept in my 
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outdoors is circulated online to support non-profit organizations and initiatives aimed at outdoor 
education. For example, in 2012 the Children and Nature Network, a famous non-profit 
organization, published a 46-page report that compiles research from multiple disciplines. The 
studies listed show a wide range of reasons for why nature is beneficial. Coming from the 
outdoor education community, I can attest that many of these findings are already widely 
accepted as fact. For instance, a British study cited by the Children and Nature Network 
compared reported emotions and attention/concentration between subjects completing an activity 
in a natural versus a human-made environment and found that the natural environment correlates 
to reduced negative emotions.30 This research and similar studies have inspired a new field of 
environmental architecture called biophilic design (building green space into human-made 
environments). Similarly, author Richard Louv wrote two nonfiction books titled Last Child in 
the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder and The Nature Principle, each 
filled to the brim with studies akin to those collected by the Children and Nature Network. 
 In 2004, Stacy Taniguchi wrote her Educational Leadership and Foundations dissertation 
as an answer to what makes for meaningful learning outdoors. Grounding the theory of her study 
in John Dewey’s definition of meaningful learning as, roughly, reflective experiences, she 
followed thirteen students during a semester-long Wilderness Writing Program. She qualitatively 
compiled the students’ journal entries from trips outdoors and concluded that there was a pattern 
across the students’ entries. Learning outdoors happened through the process of students feeling 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
research, instead choosing the more direct term “outdoors” as anything that is predominantly 
non-indoors and non-artificial. I reiterate this explicit choice frequently in my dissertation. The 
only exceptions to this rule are my use of “nature writing” to refer directly to the formal literary 
genre and my Chapter VI analysis of Wordsworth on Nature. 
 
30 Charles and Loge, 3-4. 
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awkward, then something akin to sublimation31 (which she considers a purification of sorts32), 
and lastly, experiencing a reflective group reconstruction of their perspectives. Sublimation 
sounds strikingly like the process of transformation I elaborated upon in the previous chapter. 
 Laura Galen D’Amato and Marianne Krasny published a comparable study in the Journal 
of Environmental Education, 2011. They conducted 30-90 minute interviews with 23 participants 
of an outdoor adventure education program (e.g., Outward Bound or National Outdoor 
Leadership School). Their qualitative interview results indicated that participants experiencing 
personal transformations attributed those transformations to the following factors: separation 
from normal life during the course, extended time spent outdoors, the community of course 
participants, and the intensity and challenge of the course.33 Of these attributes, only one in 
particular addresses the outdoor environment directly, but that is not to say whether it is more or 
less important than the other factors, or what precisely the philosophical impact is of the outdoor 
environment. It proves only that a correlation between transformative learning and the outdoors 
is possible.  
As close as the popular education and environmental studies are to demonstrating that the 
outdoors is a unique environment, the research lacks philosophical foundations. This 
philosophical literature gap means that we must probe the specialized field of philosophy of 
education research on the outdoors, which centers on four primary responses to the question of 
what is transformative about outdoor experience. These responses argue that outdoor learning is 
embodied, cued into an awareness of otherness, about finding a place, or an amalgamation of 
																																																								
31 Note the shared etymology of sublimation with the Kantian sublime. 
 
32 Taniguchi, 93. 
 
33 D’Amato and Krasny, 242-247. 
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these factors due to being peculiarly aesthetic (which I argue implies an aesthetic dimension of 
transformative learning outdoors). 
 
 
Responses from Philosophy and Education  
Outdoor Learning is Embodied 
Michael Bonnett implores educators to recognize that “human nature” and our 
indissoluble relationship with the organization of non-human nature (the environment around us) 
is a crucial foundation for pedagogical conversations. Identifying four ways in which educators 
use the word nature, Bonnett concluded that we might think of nature most completely as a “self-
arising.” In 2008 Ruyu Hung continued in this naturalizing spirit, invoking Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and “ecophilia” to claim that loving nature is a matter of self-love and 
world-love, because both the natural self and nature that is other than ourselves must be 
acknowledged at the same time. Being corporeal is the very condition by which our natural 
reason meets with our natural physicality in the world. Thus, like Merleau-Ponty, Hung argues 
that we cannot conceive of learning at all without subsuming the idea of being a body in the 
world, or the “Flesh of the World.” 
Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine coined the term “eco-phenomenology.” Eco-
phenomenology is based on the twofold claim that (1) an adequate account of ecology requires 
the methods and insights of phenomenology and (2) phenomenology is a study of the 
interrelationship between organism and world in its metaphysical and axiological dimensions.34 
Their thinking is that if we bring to light a perspective on the world as intricately entwined with 
																																																								
34 Brown and Toadvine, xii-xiii. 
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the human body’s presence in that world, then many of the philosophical disparities left by the 
environmental nature versus human nature debate are resolved. 
Embodiment, a vital aspect of eco-phenomenology, implies a focus on experience. In the 
introduction to their edited volume Brown and Toadvine explain, “Phenomenology takes its 
starting point in a return to the ‘things’ or ‘matters’ themselves, that is, the world as we 
experience it. In other words, for phenomenologists, experience must be treated as the starting 
point and ultimate court of appeal for all philosophical evidence.”35 However, eco-
phenomenology is not the only route that philosophers of education have taken to explain the 
benefits of the outdoors.  
Some philosophers stress that the term “embodiment,” even without a commitment to 
phenomenology, has the necessary pedagogical weight. For example, Clarence Joldersma 
promotes a “radical embodiment model” of education: a framework that understands brain 
development and neuroscience as completely “enmeshed in sensorimotor dynamisms, even if 
there is no overt sensorimotor activity.”36 While standard notions of embodiment recognize brain 
activity as both mental and physical, radical embodiment additionally requires the broader 
understanding that the environment that interacts with the human body is equally essential. 
Therefore, a pedagogy based on radical embodiment would acknowledge the body and 





35 Ibid., x. 
 
36 Joldersma, 268. 
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Outdoor Learning is About Place 
Most recently, the phenomenological conversation of nature and embodiment has 
evolved to a discussion of what, specifically, is this “other” environment. Most of the research on 
philosophy of education in the outdoors focuses on an orientation toward where we educate as 
fundamental in what students learn. This orientation is termed “placefulness.” Huey-li Li, Chris 
Moffett, Robbie Nicol, Andrew Stables, Jan Masschelein, David A. Greenwood, John Kitchens, 
Alun David Morgan, Hung and Bonnett, have each made marked contributions in this area.  
Similarly, all of twentieth-century Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore’s classes were 
modeled after the indigenous tapoban or “forest school,” which meant that they were 
intentionally held outdoors. He believed that full cultivation of the senses in youth would never 
happen, nor would education be balanced on a world-view, unless they were exercised in a place 
that allowed child “improvisation without the constant imposition of the ready-made.”37 
O’Connell deferentially describes Tagore’s educational paradigm as, 
Likening the subconscious mind to a tree that absorbs its nutrients from the 
surrounding atmosphere… The starting points were the local environment and the 
natural world. With these in mind, Tagore formulated a curriculum that would 
revolve organically around nature, with classes held in the open air under the 
trees, providing for an unstructured appreciation of the plant and animal kingdoms 
and seasonal change.38  
 
 
For Tagore, it was as if students’ minds were soaking up the “nutrients” of their classroom 
environment. But like vitamins and minerals for our bodies, impure ingredients alongside natural 
nutrients, foreign substances that are present because of human alteration to their structure or 
product tampering, might just as easily harm. He intended the classroom environment to be free 																																																								




of any unnecessary or physically imposed constraints. In essence, he hoped by modeling the 
tapoban to use only the “organic” aspects of the environment.39  
 
Outdoor Learning is Awareness of Otherness 
Bonnett and Hung’s articles also share the common theme of embodiment implying 
“otherness.” After all, if I am to accept my natural body, I must presume everything outside of 
my body is “other-than-me” or not I. This is an ancient philosophy that dates back to tantric 
Buddhism. Recognition of my natural embodiment requires recognition of nature.40 However, 
Mauro Grün clarifies that this merely a distinction, not a dichotomy. Grün believes one common 
problem philosophy has adopted from Cartesian-Newtonian assumptions is the dualistic attitude 
toward nature. “Nature” is treated as if it is a wholly different object apart from human beings. 
To de-objectify nature, Grün calls upon Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Gadamer found 
that ancient Greek language expressed a sense of things retaining a certain air of dignity. Nature, 
another “thing” in language, does not bend for our thought. Our thought, Grün says, “suffers 
nature.”41 Consequently, nature is not an object for us to project upon and alter but a mysterious 
and informative other for us to meet and appreciate as integral to our selves. Nature as an object 
may be fundamentally disrespected without moral retribution. However, nature as “an other” 
garners our respect.  
																																																								
39 Whereas all of the other aspects of current research on outdoor learning apply readily to the 
theory I outline in this dissertation (i.e., embodiment, awareness of otherness, and aesthetics), 
there are several issues with place as a central concept for philosophy of education that I will 
return to in my Chapter VI discussion of John Muir. 
 
40 This is also Sallis’s thesis in The Return of Nature. 
 
41 Grün, 163. 
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Shortly after these philosophers launched discussions in the field of philosophy of 
education about nature as otherness, Australian scholar John Quay published a 2013 article in the 
Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor Learning arguing that self, others, and 
environment, the three most commonly identified elements in phenomenology, over-simplify our 
pedagogical goals. Outdoor education should be more than activities to recognize otherness, he 
suggested. It should actively teach ways of being in the world. Nathan Bell poses a similar 
argument by quoting Ricoeur’s ethics of the self as “aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others 
in just institutions.”42 Bell adapts Ricoeur’s Good Life for environmental ethics to be a life 
wherein the student develops the ethical responsibility of being with and for others; that is, 
identifying oneself with the shared environment in which we must all live.  
Then there is the interpretation of otherness as “other than one’s own identity,” or 
thinking apart from the self, of which Jan Masschelein’s work is a notable example. Although it 
does not focus on the outdoors per se, his pioneering research on the educative experience of the 
flaneur, the 18th-century French tradition of wandering and experiencing city streets, 
subconsciously breathing in the fashion, industry, reverie, or adventure of the journey, does 
theorize how students encounter otherness in a non-classroom environment. Masschelein tells us 
that when walking, students can become “consciously aware” of and “attentive” to the 
inescapable reality of living.43 The idea is for the student to step, literally, outside of one’s self 
and into another’s world. He titles this method of teaching a “poor pedagogy,” because it does 
not require more method and planning but less. A poor pedagogy leaves the curriculum open-
ended, like the meandering pathways we walk, free at any time for a learning transformation. 																																																								
42 Bell, 142. 
 
43 Masschelein, 2010, 44. 
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The student is expected to notice in others – other things and people passed – new ideas and new 
information. 
 
Outdoor Learning is Aesthetic 
After revisiting the above research, I am struck yet again by John Quay’s argument that 
all of the eco-phenomenological talk of self, others, and nature lacks a distinction between 
whether those parts are part of a “simple versus a total whole.” By this Quay means that the 
research that talks about interconnectivity cannot adequately account for the variety of 
experiences students have with their being in the world.44 Dewey, he points out, calls this 
distinction aesthetic versus reflective experience.45 The aesthetic experience is one wherein a 
student is submerged in a state of simply being. For Quay, the aesthetic experience is the very 
definition of outdoor learning. Like Quay, Richard Shusterman believes that aesthetic experience 
is key, but he worries that even those educators that strive to provoke student aesthetic 
experience can take the body for granted. His term somaesthetics acts as a reminder that, in 
aesthetic experience, the body is the “locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and 
creative self-fashioning.”46 I presume that all aesthetic experience is somaesthetic experience. 
Lawrence Buell attempts to highlight the prominence and importance of aesthetic themes 
in Henry David Thoreau’s nature writings. In his book The Environmental Imagination: 
Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture, Buell describes Thoreau as 
the quintessential American theorist, with Walden at the heart of American ecological concerns. 
																																																								
44 Quay, 143. 
 
45 Ibid., 149. 
 
46 Shusterman, 2. 
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Buell introduces Thoreau’s nature writings as more than enchanting nonfiction. He sees 
Thoreau’s book as a creative undertaking in order to imagine a more “ecocentric” world. Herein 
I think we have found the closest project yet to the central question of my research. In re-reading 
the classic nature writers as innovative environmental philosophers, Buell is commanding that 
we subsequently utilize their ideas to re-imagine the modern relationship between mankind and 
non-human nature. Buell’s research, therefore, merges many of the ideas of this literature review 
(otherness, embodiment, etc.).  
Although he did not underline the value of his research for curriculum and instruction, 
Buell discovered a unique link (perhaps the link) between transformative learning theory and the 
outdoors: aesthetic philosophy. And his research draws us closer to the fire. For all the brilliant 
scholarly writing over recent years, we still land desperately far away from being able to 
characterize transformative learning outdoors with any definitiveness. The unsung heroes of 
environmental hermeneutics, nature writers and poets like Thoreau, John Muir, or Wordsworth, 
have already added to philosophical theory. The gap in research is instigated only by our typical 
distraction of analyzing nature writers’ work as creative renderings rather than seeking to 
illuminate their pedagogical undercurrents.  
Jeffrey Wattles published a 2013 article in the Journal of Aesthetic Education that is an 
example this research on the rise, entitled “John Muir as a Guide to Education in Environmental 
Aesthetics.” Although Wattles teaches his article’s content to art students only, the nuggets for 
philosophers of education shine brightly throughout. Wattles writes: “Muir did discover one of 
the missing pieces in the contemporary philosophy of what it means to be human, though he did 
not state it as a philosopher would. ‘I think that one of the properties of that compound which we 
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call man is that when exposed to the rays of mountain beauty it glows with joy.’”47 
Also buried far from our primary field in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
1998, Holmes Rolston III published an enlightening piece on the aesthetic experience of forests, 
insisting that aesthetic experience does something for a student that studying the science of trees 
cannot. “Science, however necessary, is never sufficient,” Rolston argues, “Forests must be 
encountered. Forests are constructed by nature, and science teaches us how that is so. Yet forests 
by nature contain no aesthetic experience; that has to be constructed as we humans arrive. 
Knowledge of the forest as an objective community does not guarantee the full round of aesthetic 
experience, not until one moves into that community oneself.”48 Who does Rolston cite as the 
source of these ideas about the learning value of forests? Why, none other than our friends Muir, 
Wordsworth, and Thoreau. 
To some extent, researchers have discovered that the answer to this inquiry can be 
constructed by appealing to unruly aesthetic concepts such as the sublime, awe, unpredictability, 
corporeal vulnerability, aporia, epiphany, etc.49 One well-known example is Immanuel Kant’s 
version of the sublime in nature from his Critique of the Power of Judgment. Basically, there are 
three phases of an aesthetic judgment of the Kantian sublime: (1) identification or apprehension 
of something sublime in nature, (2) rupturing of the human imagination and subsequent 
																																																								
47 Wattles, 70. 
 
48 Rolston, 161. 
 
49 See citations for each concept, respectively: Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment; 
Rowen, “A Retrieval of Awe”; O’Donnell, “Unpredictability, Transformation, and the 
Pedagogical Encounter”; Vlieghe, “Judith Butler and the Public Dimension of the Body”; Fahy, 
“The Quality of Confusion”; and Jonas, “Education for Epiphany.” 
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discomfort as we struggle to comprehend when we are experiencing, and (3) a pleasurable 
feeling as we reason is restored to us and we transcend the experience of nature.50  
Unlike beauty, Kant observes there are no objects of the sublime; it is formless, meaning 
that it is only through our perception that the sublime appears to be an object (this is called 
subreption). Kant also observes that an experience of the sublime can be both pleasurable and 
unpleasant, which he calls its contrapurposive quality. In a sublime experience our faculties at 
first seem to have failed, and we clearly see our cognitive limits, especially the limits of our 
imagination because we cannot imagine how or why something so sublime can and does exist. 
However, in actuality, our human faculties are only stretched by the sublime. This seems to us to 
be contrary, or “contra,” to our human interests, or “purposiveness,” in that it reveals a human 
struggle to regain a sense of rational order about the world. It is counter to our human interests to 
feel limited or restricted. Fortunately for mankind, Kant solves this uncomfortable issue by 
concluding that the human faculty of Reason is a supersensible faculty. This means that despite 
temporary challenges, the experiencer will eventually come to realize once again that she has 
ideas that are even more incredible than the baffling sublime in Nature (for example, humans can 
rationally conceptualize big ideas like the absolute or infinity). 
There are three defining features of Kant’s philosophy of aesthetic judgments of the 
sublime. First, Kant says that our judgments of the sublime are purely disinterested, because the 
sublime is not something that humans can make or bend to our purposes. As such, we can openly 
judge the sublime from a position of relative neutrality. Second, aesthetic judgments of the 
sublime are purposive without a purpose (contrapurposive too). Purposive without a purpose 																																																								
50 Kant identifies two types of sublime, the mathematical and the dynamically sublime. I focus 
on the dynamically sublime only, as that it the one Kant eventually connects to aesthetic 
education and morality. 
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describes how humans can subsume Nature under our faculty of Reason, but Nature is not 
something we can put to use. The sublime, then, is an end in itself, and we approach it open-
mindedly, without any interest in putting it to our devices or having any “intentions for it”. Our 
approach to sublime judgments, then, must come from a position of disinterestedness. Third, 
aesthetic judgments of the sublime are universally valid, or express universality. By this Kant 
means that when judging the sublime in nature, humans can still recognize that other humans are 
capable of having this same sort of sublime experience, sublime judgment, because other humans 
also possess the faculty of Reason. And yet again, this third feature (universality) can exist only 
if we assume the position of disinterestedness. 
Emily Brady clearly explains that experience of the sublime is an educative experience,51 
thus planting it firmly in philosophy of education’s ballpark. Typically the default goal of 
aesthetic education is greater aesthetic sensibility in the form of aesthetic appreciation,52 but I 
believe there is more we can aspire to teach. In philosophical contrast, I would say that origins of 
the sublime do exist beyond our mental representations; however, I agree with Kant that these 
origins are not simply objects in the world. By this perspective (the view that there is a sublime 
source outside of our subjective selves), I allow that what we judge to be sublime, like the 
weather, is somewhat independent of us.  
Unlike Kant, I posit that the weather is purposive with a purpose. However, the purpose 
of something sublime is distinctly non-human. This is why I believe non-human nature holds 
inherent knowledge that we can learn but cannot control or mold to our purposes. Kant would 
say that we cannot know these “objects” of the sublime, but I suggest that we can come close to 																																																								
51 Brady, 35-39. 
 
52 Carlson, 21. See also Brady, 6-9. 
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it and that we are compelled to seek their knowledge, we just cannot subsume the information 
that we learn to any familiar logical structure, so it appears as if it does not have reason at all. I 
argue that this is a common egotistical error, one that Kant and Wordsworth famously make but 
new-age thinkers like Dillard appear to resist.53 This is a vital difference in aesthetic 
philosophies, because it means that for my research, aesthetic education can be more than an act 
of teaching for taste or appreciation of non-human nature. It means that non-human nature holds 
value and knowledge in and of itself and implies that we might be able to teach our selves or 
others how to learn from these non-human sources of value and knowledge. 
Philosophers of education who focus on theorizing outdoor learning also choose to coin 
their own terms instead of adopting historical concepts like the Kantian sublime (i.e., eco-
phenomenology, embodied cognition, experiential learning or education, placefulness, etc). But 
none of these concepts alone (as it is currently defined) adequately examines or mollifies my 
query's demands.54 We see that the problem is either that the transformative language has not 
been applied to outdoor experience, or that outdoor research has not philosophized its 






53 See also Hitt and my Chapter VI Wordsworth discussion of spots of time. 
 
54 Due to the proliferation and conflation of these many terms, I select precision over 
convenience by generalizing the subject of my research to its applicable adjectives and nouns. 
This results in an awkwardly wordy but semantically accurate and broad search for what I shall 
call “transformative learning experience in weather-rich environments.” I note this again in my 
philosophical methods, Chapter IV. 
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The Need for an Aesthetic Philosophy of Weather 
Sallis, Tagore, Masschelein, Wattles, Buell, and Rolston have all launched projects that 
intimate to some extent the transformative outdoor learning experience, attempting in bits and 
pieces to draw together the concerns of my research. However, with any project researching a 
possible aesthetically transformative dimension, one of the greatest challenges is collecting the 
data. The options are either to experience it for one’s self, or to trust the narratives of others. 
Aesthetic experiences outdoors may become transformative, but how will we identify the 
evidence? Since I have already done much of the former, what remains is a look at how aesthetic 
experience in the outdoors can be researched through conventional use of language.  
Art. The beginning of this chapter dedicated a portion of discussion to the distinction 
(but not dichotomy) between aesthetics of art and that of the natural environment. I have already 
shifted the central topic to that of Nature. Unfortunately, this will not do as a modern subject 
because of the significant definitional rifts and confusion that surrounds this term in the 
academic world of environmental philosophy (and in fact, in our ordinary understanding of 
nature). After all, what is nature? Is it human nature, or anything natural? Are lab-created food 
products that perfectly match the molecular structure of the originals, natural? Is wilderness 
natural? Suffice it to say that these are questions that would occupy a long research career. Many 
philosophers have addressed elsewhere the convoluted results of working with “nature” 
conceptually. Consider this short list of recent titles: The Death of Nature, The End of Nature, 
Against Nature, Reinventing Nature, The Social Creation of Nature, The Trouble with 
Wilderness, Interpreting Nature, and The Veil of Isis.55  
																																																								
55 See Sallis, Force, 152, for his summary of reasons for problematizing our current concept of 
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 In lieu of nature, philosopher John Sallis offers a more specific interpretation of the 
environmental aesthetic factors as The Elements. Water, air, earth and fire. Sallis, an expert in 
Greek translation and ancient philosophy, argues that we have reached a point in our history of 
thought where we must revise and perfect initial and longstanding misinterpretations of our 
philosophical foundations. He calls this the “Return of Nature” at first, but clarifies it further as a 
“Turn to the Elemental.” Sallis is referring to philosophy’s need to shift from the loosely defined 
version of the Greek concept of nature to the detailed representation of the four elements in 
Greek philosophy.  
 
Yet if today, in what borders on post-phenomenological thought, there is a certain 
solidarity with the Greek beginning, it is because in the turn to nature the Sache 
[in its Hegelian treatment] has proved to involve the elements in a sense akin to 
the way they were thought by the early Greek thinkers. More precisely, such 
thought proposes to distinguish between natural things and the elements of nature 
and construes the elements in their specific character as elemental. In addition, it 
will be necessary to take up the classical distinction in the form in which, heedless 
of all the questions, reservations, even comedies about it that abound in the 
Platonic dialogues, it was passed down in the history of philosophy and rendered 
entirely unproblematic…Having thus dismantled the very frame of the classical 
turn, this thought to come will shift its focus to the elemental in its distinction 
from – and its relation to – natural things. The ancient order of intelligible and 
sensible (στοιχεῖον) will be replaced by the dyad of elements and things.56 
 
It is an incredible breakthrough to make note, as Sallis does, that the original philosophical 
translation of the ancient Greek concept στοιχεῖον as nature has been largely unquestioned. If we 
are to revisit the issue, he says, we would call nature not by the “intelligent” versus the 
“supersensible” (as in oxymoronically “nature beyond nature”) but rather describe it by the 
physical and very real experiences of the four elements. Instead of debating the term nature or 
trying to demand that as a concept it holds all ideas at once, Sallis says that through a turn to the 
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elemental, environmental philosophy would “cease to be bound to the classical paradigm” and 
would face, 
 
A reattuning through which discourse…would be drawn beyond the structures of 
thinghood and brought into closer accord with the character of the elementals as 
encompassing, indefinite, gigantic, and peculiarly one-sided…Through such 
discourse a way would be opened for addressing nature in its elemental bearing 
and for understanding how the lives of humans – and not only of humans – are 
both driven and sustained, both exposed and sheltered, by the elements.57 
 
I can immediately appreciate the language that Sallis employs. The words “exposed and 
sheltered” speak to the phenomenological experience of outdoor learning. Elemental philosophy 
has a number of advantages that should be preserved in any new aesthetic theory. The presence 
of the sky makes it clear that elementals are intimately linked to the invention of time and space, 
because of the sky’s day to night changes, its indefinite expanse (i.e., air versus breath versus 
what appears above the horizon line), and its distinct seasonality (fall, autumn, spring, winter in 
most places are mediated by the tide of the sky).58 Within this example we see that elements 
cannot be bound in the way that things, even the minutest things, are controlled.59 Sallis says 
“elementals are gigantic, if not simply monstrous, in their extent,” they pervade the environment 
in a way that art and other objects cannot.60 Also, elements are concurrent, not things which can 
be pieced apart by a moment in time.61 Unlike an individual object, the elements layer and trace 
																																																								
57 Ibid., 80. Even Sallis struggles to drop the term “nature” as a descriptor for the elements, as it 
has such a historically engrained language. 
 






61 Ibid., 79. Sallis says that the four elements essentially are time. 
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each other in ways that resist categorical separation. They are revealed other objects, i.e., erosion 
of a rock or the wind shaking a tree, but they are not present as discrete forms. Even fire, which 
appears most distinguishable, cannot be seen from any one side or called away from its continual 
reaction with the oxygen in the air that fuels it. This leads to Sallis’s final point: The elements 
have no single perspective or side.62 They are encompassing, intersecting, overlapping, and 
enveloping – in their relationship to humans and to each other. 
 In my article “An Element-ary Education” I find evidence for a Greek recognition of 
learning in the elements in Plato’s Phaedrus just like Sallis finds evidence of the four elements in 
the Timaeus.63 Sallis articulately synthesizes this finding: “Gazing upon the sky above and the 
earth beneath, the philosopher beholds not only the cosmic order but also fire and water and 
earth and air – that is, what we (though not Plato) call the natural elements. If philosophical 
vision were to remain reflective even in this regard, then the solitary philosopher would be 
brought back to a vision of self as situated amidst the elements, as engaged by force of necessity 
in comportment to the elements.”64 Humans need a sense of the elemental to have a sense of 
anything, because the elements have and always will precede us and the world as we experience 
it; all elements exist regardless of whether we are exposed to them or consciously sense them.65  
 Similarly, David Macauley cites Henry Beston’s The Outermost House as evidence of the 
importance of creating an elemental philosophy, “The world today is sick to its thin blood for 
lack of elemental things, for fire before the hands, for water welling from the earth, for air, for 
																																																								
62 Ibid. Sartre contemplates the phenomenological experience of sides in The Imaginary. 
 
63 Sallis, Force, 148. 
 
64 Ibid., 148-149, original emphasis. 
 
65 Ibid., 171, 173. 
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the dearth earth itself underfoot,” and Frederick Woodbridge’s Essay on Nature, “I suspect that 
even today when the most erudite ask what is the nature of anything, they are haunted by the 
answer, ‘of earth,’ ‘of water,’ ‘of air,’ or ‘of fire’ – the solid, the flowing, the gaseous, the 
caloric.”66 To complement the work done by Sallis, who sees evidence for an elemental 
philosophy in classical literature, Macauley begins the process of expanding elemental 
philosophy to a smattering of nature writers (including a few names I also consult like Abbey, 
Emerson, and Thoreau). And, he inadvertently uncovers learning in the elements, although he 
does not recognize it by name, when he says,  
 
We might even discover something of value in all of the ambient elements. Both 
mundane and extraordinary encounters with elemental realms have enduring 
implications. They leave something of themselves on our imaginations and 
outlooks. Stone hardens our resolve. Clouds give us license to drift and to dream. 
Air conducts our voice; water channels our language and each gives shape to our 
corporeal form. Ice and snow teach us about the transience of sensuous things. 
Heat and cold temper our characters and help forge our cultural identities and 
temperaments.67 
 
These are truly brilliant observations by Sallis and Macauley, and they mark a vital shift in 
philosophical thought and history, but like Tonino Griffero and Eduardo Cadava, I remain 
unconvinced by the choice of the four ancient elements as a central aesthetic to use in working 
with environmental ideas. What Macauley describes above are almost entirely elements not of 
wind, air, fire and water, but of modern weather. The “elemental” is a beautiful term, to be sure. I 
have be enraptured with its elegance myself, even before I encountered Sallis’s argument for 
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elemental philosophy.68 And although I shall diverge from Sallis from this point on, the essence 
of his argument holds true.  
 First, it must be stated that the four elements have been largely disproved by physical 
science in the modern age.69 Second, the precise number of elements is arbitrary. Does the 
element air include the blueness of the sky reflected in water? Is a hot day basically a “fire” day? 
Is “flesh” an element of earth or water? Can there be more than elemental perception in our 
sensory experiences? These are difficult questions, and in the English language, unnatural and 
stubbornly trivial to debate. It is one thing to revise an ancient translation, but quite another to 
impose an ancient framework upon a modern understanding of physical phenomena. An 
elemental philosophy does much of the heavy lifting by taking us from simply nature to the 
elements of nature, but it cannot singlehandedly deliver an aesthetic argument to the conclusions 
we need in ethics and pedagogy. 
 Griffero instead makes a case for a philosophy of Atmosphere. He claims that the 
strength of atmosphere as an aesthetic theory comes from its omnipresent familiarity to us.70 We 
rarely notice atmosphere in our philosophies, because it is such a pervasive part of our world 
understanding. He offers the example of the common phrase “there is something in the air,” 
words used to describe both an emotive situation and, literally, the atmos as exhalation or vapour 
in the sphaire, earthly sphere or globe. Griffero is on track to offering an aesthetic that appeals to 
																																																								
68 I titled my 2015 article “An Element-ary Education” while in search of a term to encompass 
these emerging arguments. 
 
69 Macauley confronts this very problem when he cites Hegel in The Philosophy of Nature: “The 
concept of the four elements, which has been commonplace since the time of Empedocles, has 
been rejected as puerile phantasy…No educated person is now permitted, under any 
circumstances, to mention [it].” As cited in Macauley, 3 (originally from Hegel, paragraph 281). 
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a classroom environment, but he struggles to narrow atmosphere into a workable theoretical 
concept. Griffero states, “atmosphere, paradoxically, can be everything and nothing, a bit like 
‘air;’” however, I think we should strive for an aesthetic that can be recognized as indeed being 
something between everything and nothing.71 It has much of the same historical attachment to 
the mimetic that art struggles to shed, and very little direct empirical association to 
transformation. Weather is known to be changeable and physically tangible, two things that 
atmosphere as a concept does not quite have the flexibility to demonstrate. 
Atmosphere struggles with the same over-subtlety as Cadava’s alternative aesthetic of 
Climate. There is significance in Cadava’s realization that “like the movement of Emerson’s 
writing, the tendency of nature to incline or drift away from understanding can be read in the 
word climate. Derived from the ancient Greek word klima, it refers not only to a latitudinal zone 
of the earth but also to an inclination or slope. Climate therefore refers to both what falls from 
the sky and what falls away from understanding,”72 but patterns over time are more difficult to 
feel in a present-moment experience, and to sense a transformative learning experience as 
something, the aesthetic feeling needs to move as quickly as the modern lives we live. How can 
we talk about shared experiences if the aesthetic concept itself is foreign to our ordinary 
language? Weather talk is a folk-language. We talk about the weather daily, but climate theory is 
left to the scientists and news reporters, which I think indicates that what we are looking for is 
something more readily accessible, like an aesthetic of Weather. 
We need an aesthetic philosophy of weather, because it is the only thing that is unique to 
the outside, non-human world, and it is the only thing that we cannot have an outdoor experience 
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without. An environment might be missing trees, buildings, art, animals, landscape, or a tangible 
atmosphere or climate, but there is always the feeling of weather in outdoor experience. This is 
not to say that weather is “better” than other choices, only that it is my preference as an aesthetic 
for this research project, because weather has the familiarity and affective qualities of 
atmosphere but the technicality of climate.  
When I think of an aesthetic of weather, I think of Fabiola Cabeza de Baca Gilbert’s 
poignant experience of rain: 
 
Science has made great strides. Inventions are myriad. But no one has yet 
invented or discovered a method to bring rain when wanted or needed. When I 
was a child, prayer was the only solution to the magic of rain. As I grew older and 
I began to read of the discoveries of science, I knew that someday the Llano 
would have rain at its bidding. On reaching middle age, I am still praying for 
rain.  
 
My mind still holds memories of torrential rains. Papa would walk from room to 
room in the house watching the rain from every window and open door. I would 
follow like a shadow. My heart would flutter with joy to see Papa so radiant with 
happiness.  
 
Often before the rain was over, we would be out on the patio. I would exclaim, 
"We are getting wet, Papa!" "No, no," he would say. He wanted to feel the rain, to 
know that it was really there. How important it was in our lives!73 
 
 
In this brief narrative, she highlights many of the reasons why we ought to advance an aesthetic 
philosophy of weather. Although weather is a common feature of our natural environment, it is 
non-human, cannot be manmade, and is immanent. Moreover, as I discuss in the next chapter, 
there is a long-held practice of weather metaphors and weather talk that can already reveal 
unique qualities of our experience learning in weather. 
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Chapter III 
Truth in Weather Talk 
 
In this chapter I explore the language of nature writing by suggesting that nature writers 
have tapped into the underappreciated subgenre of “weather talk.” Nature writers’ specific 
attention to weather talk centralizes around descriptions of aesthetic experience that I believe 
hold significant learning value. Actually, one might say that these nature writers carry with these 
aesthetic ideas the truth that is inherent in weather talk, in the choice of conceptualizations, 
metaphors, anecdotes, and descriptors.  
The supple notion of truth that I am using here is not a correspondence, propositional, or 
coherence theory of truth. It is not attached to any formal philosophical conceptualization, but it 
still must be addressed, because there is a sort of truthfulness that these seven nature writers 
carry in their words, a kind of “true to life-ness” and seriousness about their philosophical 
writing that makes us take pause and contemplate it as expressing something fundamentally real 
about human experience. Unfortunately, it is too often the case that we do not take metaphorical 
language seriously enough to bring it to our philosophical discussions of truth as we so easily do 
with talk of morals and politics. Miguel de Beistegui argues for a “sense of metaphor rooted in 
the very structure of experience and not simply a rhetorical trope” in relation to Marcel Proust’s 
written metaphors.74 “The work of metaphor is more ‘true,’ then, than what’s achieved in a 
realist description because it captures in an image and fixes for all eternity a unique relationship 
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between the present and the past, between sensation and memory.”75 This chapter’s focus on 
truth dramatizes my conviction that there is something deeply real about weather talk. 
 
 
The Necessity of Metaphorical Language  
Language permeates our daily meaning making. The inescapable presence of language 
and our heavily populated social world leads us to desire to express even the most difficult ideas 
with words. After all, we want to be able to share the meanings that we make. But if learning is 
so deeply embodied in our selves and through our environment that we may not be able to 
manage a lexicon large enough to suit it, more challenging ideas like an “aesthetically 
transformative dimension” will undoubtedly stretch the limits of our words. Thankfully, humans 
have the ability to make connections between multiple intricate source domains of cognitive 
content. This power is housed in the practice of metaphorical language.  
Philosophy that applies metaphorical language might be designated “lyric.” Jan Zwicky 
posits that lyric philosophy “sets aside historical associations with Romantic poetry in order to 
pursue what might be called its deep epistemological structure” Instead of logic or mathematics, 
the properties of lyric philosophy are resonance and integrity, what Zwicky declares to be a 
linguistic reprieve.76 She adds that “those who think metaphorically are enabled to think truly 
because the shape of their thinking echoes the shape of the world,” because a good metaphor is 
“attempt to tell the truth, to get at the shapes of what-is.”77  
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It is worth adding I.A. Richards’s point that “a word may be simultaneously both literal 
and metaphoric, just as it may simultaneously support many different metaphors, may serve to 
focus into one meaning many different meanings. This point is of some importance, since so 
much misinterpretation comes from supposing that if a word works one way it cannot 
simultaneously work in another and have simultaneously another meaning.”78 For this reason, I 
cannot claim that all of the metaphors I notice in this research are only metaphors and not also 
literally intended. This is the genius of reading lyrical philosophy, as we get both direct and 
indirect meaning from it. Although it may mean that I miss some angles as I attempt to analyze 
others, there is power in that process too, in how we can continue to learn more about ideas from 
rereading metaphorical writing. 
Paul Ricoeur supports a comparable philosophy of metaphor in his book The Rule of 
Metaphor. Ricoeur writes on Max Black’s Models and Metaphors that “integration of model and 
metaphor, in other words, of an epistemological concept and a poetic concept…is completely 
opposed to any reduction of metaphor to a mere ‘ornament.’”79 Moreover, “One must say that 
metaphor bears information,” or as I propose earlier, carries truth, “because it ‘redescribes’ 
reality.”80 
Metaphorical language, or just “metaphor,” is mankind’s solution to the limitations of 
lexicons. In the popularly cited book Metaphors We Live By, linguist George Lakoff and 
philosopher Mark Johnson explain that metaphors are used in speech, thought, and writing to 
cross the boundaries between one meaning and an entirely new and otherwise seemingly 
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incompatible second meaning. Through metaphor, an ocean can describe a plethora of choices 
(“the menu offered an ocean of options”) or a mood can be bright and hot (“his disposition is 
sunny”).81 Metaphors allow conventional language to characterize ineffable concepts and 
accommodate extraordinary experiences.  
Simply speaking, metaphors allow for “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing 
in terms of another,” but that is where the simplicity ends.82 Metaphors are able to spatially 
orient, characterize, reveal or obscure, reflect cultural value, express ontology, and personify the 
unfamiliar. Lakoff and Johnson identify three general types of metaphors: structural, 
orientational, and ontological. Structural metaphors help us to understand the characteristics of a 
concept. By highlighting particular aspects of one concept, we can illuminate subtle aspects of 
another. The structural metaphor of a “foggy memory,” for example, can be reworded with the 
verb “is” to represent “a metaphor for” something.83 When we look at this phrase, “fogginess is 
[a metaphor for] memory,” we can recognize that fog is characterized by reduced vision, and 
memory is characterized by a “vision” or accessibility to images of the past. Thus, a “foggy 
memory” would tell us that our perception of the past is currently occluded. 
Orientational metaphors also reveal a characteristic of one concept by means of another, 
but in particular, they are related to spatial, such as linear or circular, vertical or horizontal 
																																																								
81 Peter Howie and Richard Bagnall interpret Mezirow’s transformative learning theory as its 
own “beautiful metaphor.” Instead of reading the word “transformative” as merely an adjective 
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separate domains that combine the conceptual and extended metaphors of what is 
“transformative” to that which is a “learning experience,” 822-823.  
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orientation in the world.84 How humans orient concepts, even entirely abstract concepts that lack 
experiential grounding, indicates the very deep influence of culture on metaphors.85 Land areas 
are especially poignant orientational metaphors, as they are already operational on a spatial plane 
(e.g. indoors or outdoors, inside, etc.).86 Since orientational metaphors are limited in purpose, 
they are rarely recognized as figurative.87 The omission of orientational metaphors is 
understandable, because “merely viewing a nonphysical thing as an entity or substance does not 
allow us to comprehend very much about it.”88 
In contrast to the elusiveness of orientational metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson’s third type, 
ontological metaphors, are “so pervasive that they are usually taken as self-evident.”89 When we 
need a metaphor to assist in conceptualizing things that are not discrete or bound, we turn to 
ontological metaphors to give these ideas form and structure. Ontological metaphors categorize 
and “impose artificial boundaries” on physical phenomena.90 In this way, we are able to make 
the world around us conform to our embodied viewpoint, which is phenomenologically-speaking 
the only perspective human senses can obtain. Adding structure to abstract concepts with 
ontological metaphor is more freeing than it sounds, though. Ontological metaphor makes it 
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possible for an otherwise ungraspable idea to convene with concepts already at our cognitive 
level. 
There are used and unused portions of every concept in a metaphor.91 In other words, 
there are parts of our usual gestalt of a concept that may be active in the metaphor, while other 
parts are not. For instance, starting with the metaphor “theories are buildings,” a person’s gestalt 
of “buildings” might include doors, rooms, walls, foundation, construction, or blueprints. 
Immediately that person would aim to identify one of these elements of a building that is 
commonly used in metaphors. It is likely that the initial understanding would involve relating the 
outer structure of a building to the literal idea of the structure of a theory. The most used aspects 
of a gestalt compose literal metaphors. But not all metaphors automatically point to the most 
used or literal aspects. Lakoff and Johnson note three kinds of “imaginative metaphors,” which 
go beyond the fastidious conventions of literal language use.92  
First, some imaginative metaphors extend the typical used parts into greater detail (e.g. 
“bricks and mortal” rather than “foundation”). Second, other metaphors may exercise typically 
unused aspects of the concepts (e.g. rooms). The third kind of imaginative metaphors completely 
break the conventional mold, inviting new ways of thinking. These rebellious metaphors are 
called novel, and I take them to be a linguistic expression of transformative learning.  
Lakoff and Johnson appear to support the prospect of novel metaphor as expressive of 
transformative learning through their example on love: “What we experience with [novel] 
metaphor is a kind of reverberation down through the network of entailments that awakens and 
connects our memories of our past love experiences and serves as a possible guide for future 																																																								
91 Lakoff and Johnson, 52. 
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ones.”93 A metaphor can stress some aspects of activity in ways that our conventional conceptual 
system does not make available. And so, as a “possible guide for future” experience, novel 
metaphors may act to shift our conceptual perspectives. Other advantages of novel metaphors are 
that they reorganize experiences, specify important conceptual details, refresh meanings, affect 
human action (e.g., if “love is work” we will try harder than if think “love is madness”), and add 
personal touches to what would otherwise be rote cultural dictation.94 However, changing or 
adding metaphors is not commonplace. More often than not, it is the unspoken job of culture to 
gain and lose metaphors over time.95 Artistic mediums such as poetry or literature endeavor to 
make novel metaphors, but aesthetic experiencing itself is not limited to the art world. In 
principle, novel metaphors can be generated by thorough attention to environmental sensations.96 
In “A Poetics of Teaching," David Hansen points out two objections to Lakoff and 
Johnson’s theory that metaphors state reality, in other words, that truth is based on 
understanding. The first objection, launched by Gaston Bachelard, is that metaphor lacks 
“directness.”97 As Plato argues that art is mere imitation in the Republic, metaphor is like a third 
degree removed from the form of the object or the experience itself. Hansen manages to find 
multiple instances where Bachelard himself relies on the power of metaphor to move theory – 
clearly metaphors have deep-seated communicative value.98  
																																																								
93 Ibid., 140. 
 
94 Lakoff and Johnson, 141-145. 
 
95 Ibid., 145. 
 
96 Ibid., 236. 
 
97 Hansen, 127. 
 
98 Ibid., 128. 
	 48 
Hansen identifies a quote from Nietzsche wherein a second objection to Lakoff and 
Johnson’s overall claim that truth is based on understanding and objective truth is a myth might 
be raised.99 Nietzsche suggests that truth can be easily warped by metaphor, making it an utter 
illusion.100 Lakoff and Johnson might respond by saying this is an irrelevant concern, because the 
real significance of metaphor lies in the process of trying to understand how its reality could be 
true, not whether or not it in fact. It is the impetus to learn sparked by imaginative language 
operating in an unfamiliar way that makes metaphor essential. “It is as though the ability to 
comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or touching or hearing, with 
metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor is 
as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious,” Lakoff and Johnson 
write in their Afterword, p. 239. For research on something like aesthetic experience that cannot 
be contained in a single semantic field, a collection of metaphors from seasoned outdoorspeople 
could yield prize data. 
 Scholars have already used linguistic science to make sense of challenging aesthetic 
concepts. For example, in Homo Ludens, J. Huizinga analyzes the aesthetic nature of play by 
examining how humans construct our languages around it. Stanley Cavell in The Senses of 
Walden and Lawrence Buell in The Environmental Imagination each explore literary devices 
used by Henry David Thoreau to express complicated themes. Edward Mooney in Wilderness 
and the Heart compares Henry Bugbee’s writing to “lyrics” like the “lyrical philosophy” 
developed by Jan Zwicky, and Peter Larkin in “Maculate Exception” identifies Wordsworth’s 
use of “spots of time” (an idea that bears an uncanny resemblance to transformative learning 																																																								
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experience) as a metaphor that describes aesthetic experiencing.101 Considering these projects 
that amplify aesthetic writing and other great scholarly work published in the past two to three 
years on nature walks, atmosphere, and the way we speak about the weather,102 there is 
significant room to make the argument that we already have the tools and materials for 
theorizing this strange and inexplicable experience. 
 
 
Meteorological Practice as Processing Not Forecasting 
 According to Oxford English Dictionary, meteorology is a branch of science concerned 
with the processes and atmospheric phenomena of weather and climate, usually referring to the 
practice of trying to predict of forecast the weather. But meteorology is only commonly 
associated with future weather prediction, not always related. In the other cases, meteorology is 
the practice of processing what is presently happening in the atmosphere. This is the type of 
meteorology my research emphasizes, the mode of seeing what is, not what might be. This is an 
art, a practice, a process, we so often neglect.103 The practice of reading the weather is the very 
same tradition of environmental hermeneutics to which this study’s methodology adheres. 
What I mean by meteorological practice is similar to what we mean when we talk about 
the medical practice. There is certainly a physical science to medicine as there is to 																																																								
101 Wordsworth’s writing is further evidence that we employ an array of words to describe 
transformative learning. 
 
102 For further reading see books and articles by Frédéric Gros, Alexandra Harris, Izabela 
Żołnowska, Cynthia Barnett, Richard Mabey, John Sallis, Laura Redniss, and Roger Gilbert.  
 
103 Clarification: Art is not to be contrasted with science. The colloquial phrase “teaching is an 
art, not a science” I believe is a misunderstanding of the functioning role of poetics in all science. 
In the next chapter we will explore the overlaps of meaning making in linguistic science and 
poetic metaphors. 
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meteorological forecasting, but in practice the concern is for the current system’s functioning. If 
a person comes in with a stomachache, it is the doctor’s goal to diagnose and treat the present 
condition before preventative measures can be taken. The example of medical practice is 
imperfect, though; because when the example is taken one step further the goal is for the doctor 
to help the patient avoid future stomachaches, whereas for educators, the eventual goal is to 
boost student transformative aesthetic learning experiences in weather. 
Meteorological practice as processing also follows in the footsteps of the ancient Stoics. 
For the Stoics, philosophy was a way of life.104 Instead of the concept of morality where there 
are good and bad decisions to make, rights and wrongs to evaluate, the Stoics believed in ethics 
as it originates from the Greek work ethos and self-care. An ethics of self-care is a progressive 
striving for virtues and a better, more examined life.105 Through daily rituals like journaling or 
reflection, known by Foucault as spiritual exercises or askesis, the Stoics aimed to not only act 
and make wise decisions but also to continuously train their minds/bodies to live more 
ethically.106 Muir, Thoreau, and Dillard exemplify nontraditional philosophers in their focus on 
ethics and philosophy as a way of life, a philosophical pathway that nicely complements 
hermeneutical study. The practice they are involved in aims to recognize learning when it 
happens and avoiding predictions or prescriptions for future action that might misappropriate the 
meticulously individualized processes of learning and experiencing. 
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A Study in Environmental Hermeneutics 
 There is an elaborate history behind my choice of methods for this project. When I first 
began the preliminary research I immediately recognized this as a study in environmental 
philosophy, but this is much too broad a field to offer direction. Thus, I turned to aesthetic 
philosophy, a field that is often split in two between the subject of art and the subject of nature. 
Choosing the latter as better related to the environment out-of-doors, there is then the challenge 
of what particular dimension of the aesthetics of nature I study. Traditionally, the dimensions 
most philosophized are those of taste: the beautiful, the sublime, and the picturesque. This study 
falls squarely in the middle, with Immanuel Kant’s idea of the sublime as its influence. However, 
the Kantian sublime of the 1700s can be only compared, as we learned in my review of literature, 
to the experience of transformative learning that I envision; it is never quite exactly the same sort 
of experience.  
Instead of choosing a current dimension of aesthetics of nature, I propose a re-
characterization of the aesthetics of elemental philosophy, framed by a new aesthetic theory of 
weather. Historian of aesthetic philosophy Allen Carlson would say that the elements then are 
my “object” of philosophical study. However, I want to further push the boundaries of modern 
aesthetic philosophy by balking at the common principle that aesthetics must be analyzed with an 
object in mind. In the aesthetic experience I identify, there is no set form to wrap the eye around, 
because it is, like the Kantian sublime, a wisp or a feeling, not the classically defined judgment 
of taste such as beauty alone might be. John Sallis explains that if we are to see aesthetics in this 
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way, “All [philosophy] would hinge on declaring: though all things are earth, earth is not a 
thing.”107 That is to say that unlike most aestheticians, I am not aiming for a theory of how to 
appreciate the natural environment but rather a philosophy of how it is, in reality, experienced. 
Although all things are made of these aesthetic qualities, the aesthetic is not simply a quality or 
material object. One might recognize this as a more eco-phenomenological stance, which would 
be correct only in part, because again, this is first and foremost a study in the aesthetics at play in 
an experience, not only the embodied experience itself.  
So here we reach another sticking point: If I want to view aesthetics from the subjective 
position, not as objective form, how can aesthetics be framed at all? What is the product? In 
other words, I face the age-old problem of literally everything on earth becoming material for 
aesthetic valuation. It cannot be correct to say that all things are beautiful, sublime, or 
picturesque. Under these conditions, it no longer matters that I wish to focus on the environment, 
because the argument runs away from itself immediately. Carlson calls this the nonaesthetic 
critique, as in everything becomes aesthetic, so any proper concept of aesthetics is negated 
entirely.108 However, Carlson and I find the nonaesthetic reduction “deeply counterintuitive.” He 
cites human reactions toward sunsets or birds in flight and says, “The Western tradition in 
aesthetics, as well as other traditions, such as the Japanese, has long been committed to a 
doctrine that explicitly contradicts the nonaesthetic conception…that anything that can be 
viewed can be viewed aesthetically.”  																																																								
107 Sallis, 174. Henry Bugbee expresses a similar sentiment in The Inward Morning, “…What 
would be distinctive of philosophical reflection, thus conceived, would be bound up with the idea 
of experience itself: Perhaps in all strictness we would have to realize more and more that 
experience is not a subject-matter susceptible to objective representation and deliberate control” 
(58, original emphasis). See also Bugbee, 151, on according “due weight to aesthetic experience 
in our interpretation of reality.” 
 
108 Carlson, 9. 
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Concerning the art-based approaches, it is argued that they do not fully realize the 
serious, appropriate appreciation of nature, but distort the true character of natural 
environments…”109 Indeed, applying the landscape model, for example, flattens the environment 
into mere scenery. A deep aesthetic experience outdoors cannot exist if the effect is the same as 
standing indoors looking through a window, which I fervently argue is not equivalent because of 
the constituent weather. But with a touch of American pragmatism in the mix, a la John Dewey’s 
later works, there is I believe a convincing way that one might conceptualize an experience-
centered aesthetic theory without falling down the regressive path to nonaesthetics. The 
environment must be valuable in and of itself.  
With the subject of an environmental aesthetics traced to its starting point, I have now to 
choose a method of exploration. For this, I return to environmental philosophy and the just 
recently formalized subfield of environmental philosophy, environmental hermeneutics.110 As 
argued by Mark Johnson in The Meaning of the Body, aesthetics is an examination of meaning 
making. 
 
Aesthetics is properly an investigation of everything that goes into human 
meaning-making, and its traditional focus on the arts stems primarily from the 
fact that arts are exemplary cases of consummated meaning. However, any 
adequate aesthetics of cognition must range far beyond the arts proper to explore 






110 Environmental hermeneutics is treated as the “third phase” of environmental philosophy. 
Clingerman, 11.  
 




Since I take aesthetics to be the descriptor by which we discover meaning in our experiences, 
then the final piece that remains in my philosophic methodology is a process for how one might 
locate that aesthetic meaning. This process is Gadamer’s inspired conceptual interpretation 
method of hermeneutics. Environmental hermeneutics is based on the claim that there is no 
“unmediated encounter with nature.”112 Instead of debating the reality of nature in and of itself 
(i.e., what is noumenal), hermeneutics tracks the usage history of the terms surrounding the 
concept of nature, interpreting how we experience it. Again, this reveals my commitment to a 
pragmatic and eco-phenomenological view of our outdoor experiences, the strong position that 
the point of a study is not to analytically “divide and conquer” but to reveal and illuminate the 
materials of experience as they are presented to us, in this case, through a hermeneutic reading of 
nature writing, in all its contextual and historical depth. Collecting accounts of aesthetic outdoor 
experience can help to identify unique learning that happens during those moments in time. 
  
 
Identifying Aesthetic Experiences in Nature Writing  
 Pioneer of the environmental literary field of ecocriticism Lawrence Buell, in The 
Environmental Imagination p. 7-8, explains that the 18th to 19th century foundational genre of 
nature writing in antebellum American and European literature has four features that distinguish 
it from other scientific or reportorial environmental texts. These characteristics are listed here. 
1. The nonhuman environment is present not merely as a framing device but as a presence 
that begins to suggest that human history is implicated in natural history. 
2. The human interest is not understood to be the only legitimate interest. 																																																								
112 Clingerman, 5. 
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3. Human accountability to the environment is part of the text’s ethical orientation. 
4.  Some sense of the environment as a process rather than as a constant or a given is at least 
implicit in the text. 
We can see that a common feature in nature writing is the prominence of the environment as a 
textual character in its own right, not as a standard literary setting. While the writer may speak 
from a traditionally human, first person narrator (often the author him or herself), the topic of the 
book and the strong portrayal of the environment is more than mere scenery. Frank Stewart in A 
Natural History of Nature Writing argues that nature writing’s emphasis on personal knowledge 
conjunctively allows nature, as in human nature, to know itself.113 Stewart hypothesizes that 
“nature writers past and present help us to understand in the most intimate fashion how our ideas 
about nature and our beliefs concerning the physical facts of science configure and disfigure the 
world that is not us.”114 Beyond nature writers’ messages to their readers, we see in their intimate 
notes (more on the intimacy of aesthetic experiences at the end of this chapter) that the 
environment mirrors the each writer’s own nature and ecological role. It is for this reason that I 
take the genre of nature writing to be an authoritative source for representative accounts of how 
humans learn in, of, by, and from the environment. 
As to the choice of texts, my goal was to pick works by well-regarded and known nature 
writers for the purpose of making their points more accessible to my readers, who might have 
already studied their work. This might prevent the possible objection that an obscure author is 
not archetypical of human time spent outdoors. I hope it also allows my reader to recognize the 
opacity of the aesthetic experience I delve into, because it shows how often we have read these 
																																																								
113 Stewart, 233. 
 
114 Ibid., 219. 
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texts without honoring their unusually educational nature. In the last chapter, I explained that 
these nature writers were also chosen for their philosophical inclinations toward askesis and 
living an ethical life of self-care. These seven writers are beautiful expositors of philosophy as a 
way of life in the tradition of wisdom seeking, where learning is not reducible to knowledge 
bites. 
Unfortunately, I have found that using only the most famous writers greatly limits the 
number of woman-authored texts I can examine. To combat this limitation, when possible I 
include a female voice in the discussion, even if she is less known. By offering a wider range of 
voices, when possible, while still distilling the data to a manageable volume, I am actually 
allowing for a better understanding of typical human experience outdoors, because the 
environment is not only interpreted as masculine. As for whether or not the points drawn from 
the far-ranging texts agree with each other, their commensurability is examined throughout the 
exposition. I recognize also, and must make crystal clear in advance, the most regrettable 
limitation of choosing only these seven canonical nature writers whose writing is already widely 
circulated and accepted in environmental studies. A second research project (proposed in 
Chapter VII) must be conducted that incorporates and exclusively analyzes the experiences of 
non-white, minority men and women and highlights their critical contributions to the 
presuppositions I make here in my small starter sample set.  
In the subsection below I discuss my research methods for locating aesthetic experiences 
in nature writing as well as some clarifying remarks on my treatment of these experiences in my 





My data collection involved close reading and examination of seven texts by a selection 
of philosophically minded nature writers: John Muir, Edward Abbey, Mary Oliver, Gretel 
Ehrlich, William Wordsworth, Henry David Thoreau, and Annie Dillard. Rather than analyzing 
nature writers’ work as creative renderings, I was influenced by Buell’s historical reading of the 
nature genre (Thoreau’s works in specific) as cultural commentary. Herein I aim to illuminate 
the pedagogical undercurrents, the “philosophy of life” as Hadot might say, of this genre. By re-
reading the classic nature writers as innovative environmental philosophers and educators, my 
goal is to conceptualize those learning experiences outdoors that seem to have become, for the 
reasons detailed in Chapters V and VI, perceived as transformative by these learners. 
 The challenge, of course, was to limit the scope and number of texts for a manageable 
project while at the same time selecting and perusing a significant sample size to permit robust 
theorizing. In order to ensure that my reading of the texts was rigorous and directed, I had beside 
me a bulleted list of my personal observations from many months living outdoors to compare to 
the authors’ experiences and a list of questions that I was hoping the text would answer. Here is a 
sampling of the questions I asked each text: 
 
- For this author, what is an example of a transformative experience outdoors? I will 
find a sample selection from the text where the author draws out an aesthetic 
experience outdoors in great detail.  
- What does he or she describe happens during that moment? I make note of the words 
that the author uses to illuminate the experience.  
- What features make it educational? Does the author make note of how it is helping 
him or her to grow? I note words that indicate positive change. 
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- What transformative learning dimensions are engaged by the experience? I look at 
the words indicating positive change and explore whether they suggest that the 
transformation is psychological, behavioral, convictional, aesthetic, or holistic (all of 
the above). 
- How does the author feel it differs from other learning experiences? I examine the 
author’s choice of language to see if he or she considers this to be an especially deep 
or unique moment, or rather, something ordinary and everyday. 
- How does the author use metaphors or analogies with weather to bring their 
experience to light? Reflecting on the answers to the previous questions, I consider 
the language choices the author made. How did they feel that this experience was best 
represented? Is the weather referenced directly or indirectly? If not, what other words 
does the author use to portray transformative learning outdoors? 
 
Again, I borrow the anti-dualist research attitude from John Dewey’s first chapter of 
Experience and Nature and second chapter of Art as Experience, with the intention of 
reinforcing Dewey’s argument that, save for heuristic purposes, the mind cannot be separated 
from the body and secondary experience cannot be separated from primary experience. Although 
it is helpful to clarify experience by describing it as primary or secondary, and I make many 
statements that philosophically shape our thinking about education in order to better understand 
it, neither Dewey nor I are stating that we should imagine two radically, or ontologically, 
divorced types of experience. Consider that secondary experience can be integral in the original 
experiencing, just as primary experience must be revisited and recalled to allow for secondary 
experiencing. I mention this point because it can be too easy to incorrectly view my research as 
the pinning-down of ideas that up until now we have respected as utterly ineffable; in other 
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words, as if I am trying to make the “wild” philosophy of the outdoors pragmatic to the point of 
rigidity. I am conspicuously aware of this concern and do not wish to detract from any of the 
wonder or mystery of the outdoors. But I also know this to be patently impossible. No attempts 
to clarify and understand the outdoors could ever remove its uncontrolled qualities. Dewey, 
Thoreau, and all our other nature writers have tried to bring a philosophy of transformative 
learning outdoors to life in parts, yet none have “ruined” the outdoor experience for us. Fear of 
harnessing its educational power should not prohibit philosophical research. It is perhaps this 
concern that has, up until now, prevented us from conceiving of the importance and prominence 
of transformative outdoor learning. Thus, I cannot say it enough: There is a difference between 
hermeneutically drawing out the features of an experience and explaining away that experience 
with words. My project is entirely the former. 
 
Literal and Metaphorical Expressions of Experience 
As explained in Chapter III, words are key to this research. It is through the written 
account of outdoorspeople that I make some sense of transformative aesthetic learning 
experiences in weather-rich environments.115 The questions that I asked, the quotes that I found, 
and the research that I drew upon, require an acute attentiveness to metaphorical language. 
Metaphor is essential, because nature writing has a long tradition of exercising it to make 
meaningful philosophical points. Furthermore, as argued by Zwicky, Ricoeur, de Beistegui, and 
																																																								
115 Jack Turner argues in his book The Abstract Wild that humans need direct contact with  
wilderness in order to ethically acknowledge it as deserving respect and care. In Turner’s view, 
literary narratives like John Muir’s cannot adequately represent primary experience. Brian 
Treanor defends Muir’s nature writing by citing philosophical evidence of the value of narrative. 
See Treanor, 182-188. 
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Lakoff and Johnson in the last chapter’s discussion, metaphor is a constituent way of thinking 
and feeling aesthetically.  
In my data collection, I model the method of metaphor interpretation that Lakoff and 
Johnson use in Metaphors We Live By. Phrases found in selections of nature writing might be 
arranged as simple sentences, with the verb “is” as a substitute for “is a metaphor for” (e.g., from 
“a cold reception” to “cold is a metaphor for reception” to “a gathering of people has a climate”). 
From this position, I looked to identify the type of metaphor at work (i.e., structural, 
orientational, or ontological). While Lakoff and Johnson admit to a focus on conventional 
metaphor,116 I do rather the opposite, searching almost exclusively for ideas defined in nature 
writings through the employment of novel ontological metaphor. I concentrated on locating 
novel ontological metaphors: first, because they break with conventional, cultural language about 
the environment (and conventional language is already known to us), and second, because 
ontological metaphor is best poised to handle the perceptual complexities of expressing a 
transformative learning experience. I focus on the writers’ use of weather metaphors, also known 
as “weather talk,” as literary indicators of aesthetic experiences.  
The interpretive method is necessary for pursuing my research question, because the 
experience in question has never been conceptually defined. Painting a portrait of this 
philosophically “new” type of experience from nature texts requires careful study and “reading 
between the lines” of each writer to see if original details may be noted. Only then can I honestly 
depict the final picture’s unprecedented curves and colors. This methodology strongly simulates 
the process used by Stanley Cavell in The Senses of Walden, David Abrams in The Spell of the 
Sensuous, and Lawrence Buell in The Environmental Imagination. 
																																																								
116 Lakoff and Johnson, 139. 
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While at first glance reading the human perspective on the outdoors might appear 
anthropocentric, my overall research goal is not. My understanding of the outdoors, like many of 
the nature writers’ I read, is based on the recognition of humans as only one aspect of the 
environment. Our learning outdoors is a window into our relationship with non-human others, 
animals, plants, and non-living things. Selecting and viewing texts is a subjective process, but 
this can be a research strength instead of a weakness, as it allows me to read the authors 




Honoring the Intimacy of Aesthetic Experience 
 I am struck by a comment once made to me by Paul Standish. He proposed that a kind of 
careful integrity hangs over nature writing as it does with other artforms. If nature writing is over 
explained, it simply morphs into something else entirely to protect itself, like the Veil of Isis, 
nature’s true nature likes to hide. Nature writing, then, is personal, deep, subjective, and private. 
It is intimate and needs to be described likewise.117 Take, for example, reading a book review 
before you have read the book, or being told that the Mona Lisa is frowning when you always 
thought she smiled. “Insight is earned, to be sure, but it is not steered, and it must find its own 
articulate form,” explains Henry Bugbee, “such a philosophy will not be set up like the solution 
of a puzzle, worked out with all the pieces lying there before the eye. It will be more like the 
																																																								
117 See Mooney’s Lost Intimacy for a detailed discussion of how intimacy in nature writing 
relates to American philosophy. 
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clarification of what we know in our bones.”118 The effort to pinch an experience into analytical 
form can dissolve the experience itself. So, like Bugbee, I make this methodological commitment 
to the integrity of nature writing: 
I am going to try to be faithful to the intimations I have had: That the reflection 
worth indulging doesn’t know where it’s going, just s the life that is lived 
underlies anything the individual is able to patent for himself. There need be no 
obscurantism in this; if philosophical truth is engendered in depth, we must not 
expect it to come to light except out of relative obscurity.119 
 
Note Bugbee’s use of the words “faith” and “intimations.” Mooney clarifies this as the call for 
philosophers to be sensitive to the intimacy of the experience and to have faith and patience that 
there is meaning within the words, even if they at first appear obscure or unfamiliar.120 Bugbee 
uses rivers as a metaphor of articulating intimacy: 
 
It seems there is a stream of limitless meaning flowing into the life of a man if he 
can but patiently entrust himself to it. There is no hurry, only the need to be true 
to what comes to mind, and to explore the current carefully in which one 
presently moves. There is a constant fluency of meaning in the instant in which 
we live. One may learn of it from rivers in the constancy of their utterance, if one 
listens and is still. They speak endlessly in an univocal exhalation, articulating the 
silence.  
 
This calls to mind something Max Picard has to say: Spring does not come from 
winter; it comes from the silence from which winter came and summer and 
autumn.”121 																																																								
118 Bugbee, 33-34; 35. 
 
119 Bugbee, 35. 
 
120 Mooney, Lost Intimacy, 223-224. Interestingly, it is also in this book that Mooney himself 
comes quite close to identifying learning in weather and the questions of this dissertation, when 
he writes, “In forty days and nights of snow among the trees deep in the Canadian Rockies, 
Bugbee knows himself to have been instructed for life. We want a sense of the source of 
instruction. A capacity of rivers to teach or of falling snow to transform a soul,” 43. 
 





This is how I aim to illuminate these texts – with time, reflection, walking, birding, and my own 
journal entries and photographs – with patience, listening to what at first seems like only 
silence.122 Of course, I have some hurry to keep up with the pace of life in New York City, but 
Bugbee’s passage gives some sense of the ways in which I have tried to consciously slow down 
my thought to appropriately match the experiences as they unfold. It is not the usual course of 
argumentative thinking; it is instead, as explained through my method of metaphor interpretation, 
a matter for maintaining a way of thinking that is within itself aesthetic, lyric, poetical. My 
philosophical methodology adheres as well as possible to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s declaration in 
his posthumously published book Culture and Value, “Philosophy ought really to be written only 
as a poetic composition.”123 
																																																								
122 Edward Mooney is influenced by this quote from Basho’s Knapsack Notebook, 9, “mountain 
shelter or a hut in the moor become seeds for words, a way to become intimate with wind and 
cloud. Listen recklessly.” 
 
123 Wittgenstein, 24. Translated from the German, “Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur 
dichten.” It is interesting to note that this quote was originally a journal entry, evidence that 
Wittgenstein followed the ethical tradition of philosophy as askesis discussed in Chapter III and 
VI. Emerson also makes a similar statement: “But none of them [Miller, Locke, Manning] owns 
the landscape. There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can 
integrate all the parts, that is, the poet,” Nature, 38. Emphasis added to highlight how Emerson 
lists poetry and the environment in one smooth breath. 
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Chapter V 
Articulating the Aesthetic Experience Outdoors 
 
 Since it is has been established herein that learning experiences can be framed by 
aesthetic experiences – even primed by aesthetic experiencing outdoors – there is no more timely 
a mission now than to determine how those experiences are manifest. And there are no greater 
experts than nature writers, who spend lifetimes seeking to express the deep meaning of these 
transformative outdoor experiences. Each of these seven selected nature writers and their seminal 
texts gives us a new angle on the weather and, as grounding for my thesis, a fundamental 
demonstration of the truth to the argument that we do experience transformative aesthetic 
learning in weather-rich environments. 
In the next two chapters, the bulk of my research passages and data, I have read through a 
handful of the most famous publications in the genre of nature writing. From each text, I borrow 
a theme from the writer and demonstrate how these themes centered on weather are pervasive 
and pedagogically relevant to an understanding of transformative learning experiences outdoors. 
These chapters are intended, in response to Wittgenstein’s call for philosophers to make poetry 
of their work, to constitute a mode of lyrical philosophy introduced by Zwicky, and which I take 
to be the best way to honor the professional nature writer’s eternal challenge of putting to words 
the patently ineffable, the poet’s challenge of representing and transcribing reality. I insert 
vignettes from my personal journals of the writers’ themes as they emerge to illustrate how 
universally familiar some of these experiences may seem to seasoned outdoorspeople, and also to 
highlight how context, history, and personal differences create unique features of these 
experiences for each writer. 
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Edward Abbey and Relentless Heat 
 When I began this research journey, I thought there could be no better expression of 
aesthetic learning experiences in the outdoors than Thoreau’s Walden. Then I “met” through this 
study Edward Abbey, a park ranger in Arches National Monument, Utah, in the 1960s, and a 
philosopher by training and nature. In his book Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness, 
Abbey introduces his primary teacher, as old as the world: the sun. To say that the sun is a theme 
in his book is no stretch at all – he talks of little else! Still, from an outsider’s perspective on the 
genre of nature writing, it may seem almost ridiculous to imagine the sun as a teacher – almost 
blasphemous to those of us who have devoted our lives to the study of education. But imagine 
the sun in a different light (literally), as the central figure in every human’s life. The sun is there, 
day and night, whether it is obvious or not; but often, it is the most observable constant on earth. 
This is evidenced in the shock factor of stories like Ray Bradbury’s “All Summer in a Day,” 
which shows that only in a dystopian world, an unnatural extreme, can we imagine a life never 
seeing the sun. And if we can call the planet “Mother Earth” colloquially, without a second 
thought, then why not the sun, Teacher?  
 Concerning that “different light” that I previously referenced, Abbey understands the sun 
as omnipresent, overwhelming, but also revealing and direct: 
 
The sun reigns, I am drowned in light. At this hour, sitting alone at the focal 
point of the universe, surrounded by a thousand square miles of largely 
uninhabited no-man’s-land – or all-man’s-land 124  – I cannot seriously be 																																																								
124	In the Swedish language there is an equivalent concept of “allemansplats,” or literally “all 
man’s place,” which dictates that any land in Sweden can be traversed or camped on by any 
citizen (“the freedom to roam”), so long as no trace of human usage remains. When Abbey uses 
this phrase, we see that he is coming to the understanding that ownership of the Arches is shared, 
even though humans are not present. Perhaps he is losing his possessive control over the park 
(introduced on p.5 of Desert Solitaire), but it is more likely that by this phrase, Abbey means that 
all wild creatures/objects, broadly, have a right to roam this place. 
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disturbed by any premonitions of danger to my vulnerable wilderness or my all-
too-perishable republic. All dangers seem equally remote. In this glare of 
brilliant emptiness, in this arid intensity of pure heat, in the heart of a weird 
solitude, great silence and grand desolation, all things recede to distances out of 
reach, reflecting light but impossible to touch, annihilating all thought and all 
that men have made to a spasm of whirling dust far out on the golden desert. 
(132, emphasis added) 
 
Here Abbey makes the direct metaphor that “sunlight is water that can sweep over and drown a 
person.” How does this help us to understand his experience of the sun as Teacher? It 
demonstrates how fully immersed he is in the “lessons” it teaches. In particular, the sun in the 
desert, how it drowns the land, Abbey says, is bright and radiant but devoid of life. He uses the 
word “brilliant” to describe this sunlight across the sands, which is interesting, because brilliance 
can be defined as either an intense luminosity or intelligence.125 I do not think that this double 
entendre is an error. Rather, it leads to the important question: How can sunlight be both “empty” 
and “brilliant?” The answer lies in the last sentence of Abbey’s paragraph, the end-cap to an 
extended metaphor of the sun. He says that in this sunlight all things pull away from human 
grasp (physically) and understanding (mentally). We cannot conceive of it, because the sunlight 
reflected across the desert causes an “annihilation of thought.” But again, the extinction of 
thought is not unintelligent; it is merely the difference between what man can control (formal 
linguistic thought) and what the sun can express (the impalpable aesthetic). 
 It is also fascinating to analyze Abbey’s description of sunlight as “pure heat.” Consider 
that purity is the completeness of one type of thing. For example, pure bliss would the complete 
experience of happiness. If there is to be a “pure heat,” we must define “heat:” In the desert, pure 
heat for Abbey must be the complete lack of any water or moisture in the air. A dry heat would 
be pure. Keeping in mind that water is life-giving, it is marvelous to think of anything lifeless as 																																																								
125 This theme of intelligence is one that we will return to many times over, notably in Thoreau. 
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“pure.” This metaphor rubs purity against our modern sensibilities, calling it out as something 
that can be problematically non-diverse or stagnant. Yet, we recall that Abbey begins his 
paragraph with a metaphor of the sun to water: capable of drowning a person. Perhaps, then, 
Abbey means that the pure heat of the sun is something that can choke us? He is saying that we 
can have the feeling of drowning when experiencing the complete absence of water. So, is 
Abbey’s teacher an ironic murderess, drowning us in dryness? Most certainly – the sun can kill. 
Herein lies one major difference between the historical American public schoolteacher and 
Abbey’s. Teachers should not kill, we think. For Abbey, the elements of nature are only 
powerful teachers in their capacity to be completely disinterested in human existence. Abbey’s 
teacher is so concerned with the truth, that she is utterly impartial to the thoughts of man. The 
sun is the most serious teacher there is. 
To be drowned in sunlight such that we cannot see anything manmade. This metaphor 
seems to make instinctual sense, because vision is often central in experiencing, and we know 
sight to be easily influenced by light. After all, we only see when a light is “on.” Otherwise, we 
flounder around in space, not able to find or grasp anything for certain. We may run into a table 
or knock over a vase, but we would not be able to tell for certain what that was, because 
manmade objects rely on a plane of existence that can be “read” by the eyes of man. Even the 
concepts in our mind are actualized by visual standards such as words and pictures. If the 
manmade light is turned off, or the overly bright sun obscures our fallible eyesight, we can no 
longer rely on what was built by sight to maintain any such dialogue with us. Plato makes use of 
this common metaphor in the Allegory of the Cave. The sunlight outside the cave blinds the 
philosopher-king at first, until he or she learns to “see the truth” instead of simple manmade 
objects (that may deceive) by transforming his or her senses to comply with reality. 
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Socrates’s seemingly antagonistic discussion style in Plato’s dialogues is a teaching tool 
not unlike the sun’s method of pure neutrality. To get at the truth, the point after aporia, after 
blindness and blankness, some brashness and prying at man’s soul is necessary.126 Accordingly, 
we can read in Abbey’s sunlight passage a description of an aesthetic experience akin to aporia 
before truth seeking. Abbey is just beginning to transform into an active learner while in 
weather. 
Another unique feature of Abbey’s philosophy of learning is that he focuses on the sun as 
something not merely for the eyes, but as a revealing multisensory aesthetic. Overwhelming 
basic sight with light requires humans to adapt to a non-vision-based relationship with the world, 
and it can refresh other sensory connections we make, while distancing us from the usual 
assumptions we make via vision. When bright light removes the presumptive powers of vision, 
humans can no longer immediately take the images of manmade objects for granted. We “see” 
much more than what is in front of us, because one sense (vision) is no longer in command. 
Abbey is not talking about a single candle or spotlight in the room, but rather, an overarching, 
dominating feeling of brilliant and pure light. This is not something that can be turned on or off 
with a switch; it is an atmospheric condition of the sun. (The theme of blinding light appears 
repeatedly in Desert Solitaire. For this reason, we shall also return to it again in the subsection 
“Clarity and Drugs.”) 
 In much the same way as Abbey describes the sun as an extended conversation on water, 
he also describes moonlight in terms of its relationship to sunlight. Note the crossover, with what 
follows, between the adjectives “light,” “reflected,” and “illuminated” (as in “brilliant”): 
 
																																																								
126 See Holland for an analysis of the impact of the sun in Plato’s Phaedrus. 
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In the mixture of starlight and cloud-reflected sunlight in which the desert world 
is now illuminated, each single object stands forth in preternatural though 
transient brilliance, a final assertion of existence before the coming of night: each 
rock and shrub and tree, each flower, each stem of grass, diverse and separate, 
vividly isolate, yet joined each to every other in a unity which generously includes 
me and my solitude as well.  
 
Or so it seems at the moment, as my fire dies to a twist of smoke and a heap of 
rubies, and for a moment I think I’ve almost caught a falling star: there is no 
mystery; there is only paradox, the incontrovertible union of contradictory truths. 
A falling star which melts into a vapor as I grasp it, which flows through my 
fingers like water, like smoke. (99, emphasis added) 
 
 
It “flows through my fingers like water,” Abbey writes, and we understand now from our 
analysis of his extended metaphors of the sun that water is a precious and impossible commodity 
in the desert, an impossible reward. This is quite possibly my favorite passage in all of my 
research. We witness Abbey explicitly learning now: he is beginning to recognize more clearly 
what he is gaining, and how he is growing under the sun. We can see this elsewhere in the text 
when Abbey says frankly that: “…[his position as a Ranger allows] a sense of time enough to let 
thought and feeling range from here to the end of the world and back; the discovery of something 
intimate – though impossible to name – in the remote” (39).127 He recognizes how “vaporous” 
these lessons are: as life giving as water but as dissipating as smoke. He is “discovering 
something intimate – though impossible to name.” He is coming to the realization that an 
aesthetic feeling is a graceful brush with a new sort of knowledge. For someone as well read as 
Abbey (a young Master’s graduate who secured a government job with no credentials beyond 
book-learning) his literary embrace of aesthetic experience’s learning value is fundamental. 
																																																								
127 One might also note here that his position title as “Ranger” reflects his word choice of 
“thought and feeling” that “range” a space and time, as Abbey himself roams the park. His mind/ 
/body span all acceptable room to the borderlands of the remote. When one part of his 
physicality moves, he finds the rest of his being attached. The reference to intimacy also relates 
back to the discussion in Chapter IV. 
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Alpenglow and Limelight128 
First, the sun does not have just one straight, flat setting – bright - like a building’s 
fluorescent lighting system. It changes like an amorphous mass: elusive one moment, or 
stingingly bold, or the origin of another type of light altogether, not merely sunlight anymore. I 
have experienced two types of atmospheric phenomena that I replay in my mind’s eye as I read 
these nature writings. I remember camping a night in the Ansel Adams Wilderness of California 
during my 2012 John Muir Trail solo thru-hike. I had staked my tent into the dusty puce dirt 
under a canopy of stunted pitch pines. From the rock outcropping outside my tent vestibule 
something nuclear was happening to the air. The sky was emblazoned in a florid light over the 
mountains, a result of the pure summit air meeting the hot, sleepy sun. I bore witness to the most 
literal alpenglow.129 
                         																																																								
128 This formatting change and similar ones throughout Chapters V and VI indicate a passage 
from the journal that I kept while reading or rereading the selected texts for this research. The 
photographs are my own, meant to accompany the vignettes. 
 
129 John Muir sees alpenglow in the Sierras and says about it that the “peaks were inspired with 
the ineffable beauty of the alpenglow, and a solemn, awful stillness hushed everything in the 
landscape,” 121-122.	
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Second, I don’t know it to have any name, but I have been outside often before or after a 
storm when the ground – not the sky – seems radioactively aglow. I remember seeing this 
atmospheric phenomenon over the Patagonian pampa, when crepuscular rays spotlight the 
earth, illuminating an emanating, pulsating lime green base, and I have seen it over the tall 
grass prairie fields behind my parents’ homestead property in western Minnesota. It seems as if 
the nitrogen, ripe in the air, has caused the grass to burst into citrus flames. It used to be the 
case in theaters that a performance could be bathed in an intense white light by heating a 
cylinder of lime, viz. “limelight.” I humor myself with the thought that the phrase “in the 
limelight” in fact originates in the experience of traversing land ablaze in this ground-glow.   
                         
 
Listening for Music 
While viewing a phenomenon of light it is not uncommon to feel a sense that its eerie 
bands of color are “calling” out, almost like a voice or song seeping note by note from the sky, 
especially when the light is so dense that you cannot notice anything else. Think of moments 
walking out of a building into the “blinding light,” so pervasive that you cannot move or think 
about anything contrary in the moment. It is the same feeling as someone blasting their stereo 
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early in the morning, or a cacophony of bird songs right through your window and into your ear 
like a rude alarm. Abbey describes this repeatedly in Desert Solitaire as the sun’s “music,” 
saying, “June in the desert. The sun roars down from its track in space with a savage and holy 
light, a fantastic music in the mind (82).” Abbey’s novel ontological metaphor here is that the 
sun’s light descending is music in the mind. What could “music in the mind” mean? I think here 
of Zwicky’s claim that philosophy is lyric; that is, our best thoughts must flow like music. If, 
music is a lyrical philosophy brought to mind, Abbey is suggesting with this metaphor that the 
sun can stimulate the best philosophy. Music is not a literal song with words but rather a feeling 
emanating from the “savage and holy” sunlight that alights lyrical ideas.  
 Abbey holds true to this metaphor fifty pages later. Although he seems to treat the sun as 
a horrible, “savage” character on his landscape, he respects it nonetheless, and looks on it 
contemplatively. After living in the park and under the sun for a few months, Abbey even admits 
that he has learned to listen for the sun’s music: 
 
I listen for signals from the sun – but that distant music is too high and pure for 
the human ear. I gaze at the tree and receive no response. I scrape my bare feet 
against the sand and rock under the table and am comforted by their solidity and 
resistance. I look at the cloud. (136) 
 
He is looking for a response from the sun, or at least something that the weather can tell him, but 
he is getting nothing in return. Instead, to console himself and his curiosity, he deflects his 
attention to the things that do answer back to him: the sand under his toes and the cloud in the 
sky. That is not to say, however, that the sun does not have an answer ever for Abbey, only that 
he looks to it often but finds that many times it evades his questioning gaze. Why won’t the sun 
sing? Abbey says that he suspects that the physical form is how things in nature communicate 
with man, since that is the only shared language we have (27). With that said, Abbey could not 
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have been expecting the sun to “sing” per se. He wanted it to show him something physical. I do 
not suppose that the spiritual, but fervently non-religious Abbey would call the sun’s music a 
“sign from God,” but we might imagine the physical response to look somewhat similar to that. 
Perhaps Abbey is looking for a ray of light, or event something much more subtle, like for his 
attention to be drawn to the halo-lit outline of a bush on the horizon that sparks another idea. It is 
likely that the sun’s music is a physical representation for Abbey such as how what 
intellectualists read in books inspires them. Sometimes it is not being actually told something 
aloud that matters, but rather a physical representation of an idea that is sensed from shared 
physical presence. The sun is there, Abbey is there, and therefore they can communicate, albeit 
nonverbally. The example that Abbey offers is his repeated “conversations” with the juniper tree 
near his Ranger station/trailer. 
Again, Abbey knows that the sun’s language is nonhuman, intangible, but he seeks it 
anyway. Why? Herein is the crux of my question about outdoors learners in general. What could 
make someone want to live outside, without more shelter than a thin sheet of tarp, or hike for 
months on end alone? I think Abbey is driven to listen by the same drive that sparks a through-
hiker to go on trail, sparks a researcher to collect data, or sparks a child to sit in excitement 
before a school day lesson. Humans can often feel when transformative learning is nigh, when 
we are on the cusp of some important knowledge.130 Abbey has an ear for the sun’s music now, 
and he is straining to hear it. He has become so dedicatedly studious that he sees the sun’s voice 
as a vocational calling, almost expecting the music to come to him like the voice of God (i.e., the 
sun, “disembodied intelligence”):  
																																																								
130 Willa Cather narrates in My Antonia: “We left the classroom quietly, conscious that we had 
been brushed by the wing of a great feeling,” 198. This illuminating quote is featured again in 
my next chapter. 
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 … [In] the secretive little side canyons I half expect to see not only the 
cottonwood tree rising over its tiny spring – the leafy god, the desert’s liquid 
eye131 – but also a rainbow-colored corona of blazing light, pure spirit, pure being, 
pure disembodied intelligence, about to speak my name. 
 
If a man’s imagination were not so weak, so easily tired, if his capacity for 
wonder not so limited, he would abandon forever such fantasies of the supernal. 
He would learn to perceive in water, leaves and silence more than sufficient of the 
absolute and marvelous, more than enough to console him for the loss of the 
ancient dreams. (176, original emphasis) 
 
 
Months into his desert season, Abbey is on the brink of finding what I hope to find in this study, 
but he does not quite make it to the conclusion. He says that man ought to “learn to perceive in 
water, leaves and silence more than is sufficient of the absolute and marvelous.” His use of 
“learn” here is another interesting word choice, since it is true that humans need to learn methods 
of taking in knowledge, for example, when listening or note-taking. Abbey’s research indicates 
that the type of listening he takes himself to be doing is a learning how to perceive aesthetic 
experience in nature.  
The absolute and marvelous that he speaks of is philosophical truth, I believe; what is 
“more than enough to console” our dreams about answers to our greatest questions. Abbey is 
coming to know transformative aesthetic learning, but I think he is saying quite blatant weather 
words without still being able to synthesize weather itself as the provocative feature (like 
Socrates and afternoon sun in the Phaedrus). He becomes more aware of this explicit connection 
between learning and weather as the book unfolds. Abbey’s initial obliviousness is a critique that 
could be launched for a great many of our nature writers here, although it is simply sufficient that 
they recognize the outdoor aesthetic experience at all. I will take the responsibility of 
demonstrating just how obviously weather-centric their observations of this aesthetic are, and 																																																								
131 In the desert, cottonwood trees can only grow next to reliable water sources. 
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therefore, why we must step forward to propose a philosophy of weather learning, grounded first 
in their hard work documenting such moments. There are times that Abbey does come close to 
this thesis, though. He comes into his aesthetic senses by noting that there is “something in the 
air:” 
 
Something strange in the air. I go to the weather stations and check the 
instruments – nothing much, actually, but a rain gauge, an anemometer or wind 
gauge, and a set of thermometers which record the lows and highs for the day. 
The little cups on the wind gauge are barely turning, but this breath of air, such as 
it is, comes from the southwest. The temperature is fifty-five or so, after a low this 
morning of thirty-eight. It is not going to snow after all. Balanced on a point of 
equilibrium, hesitating, the world of the high desert turns toward summer. (38) 
 
Abbey is noticing the “strangeness in the air” and he is racing to investigate what his body could 
tell him yet his instruments could not. Abbey knows that he is sensing something beyond simple-
structured knowledge, again, a philosophy more attuned to lyrics than systems. He has noticed 
that the weather has actually stabilized, and one cannot help at this moment feel a tinge of pride 
that Abbey has come to know his world there so well that he can sense the very moment of the 
turn from winter into summer. He has discovered what ages of Native American healers and 
land-workers have already known – that there is a skill to sensing weather in the earth that goes 
beyond our common knowledge set. That is because this skill is a form of physical learning that 
we have not yet acknowledged exists, nonetheless researched. Abbey’s hesitation shows that he 
is at the early stages of acquiring this ancient way of knowing the non-human environment. 
 
Clarity & Drugs 
 
The wind will not stop. Gusts of sand swirl before me, stinging my face. But there 
is still too much to see and marvel at, the world very much alive in the bright light 
and wind, exultant with the fever of spring, the delight of morning. Strolling on, it 
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seems to me that the strangeness and wonder of existence are emphasized here, in 
the desert, by the comparative sparsity of flora and fauna: life not crowded upon 
life as in other places but scattered abroad in sparseness and simplicity, with a 
generous gift of space for each herb and bush and tree, each stem of grass, so that 
the living organism stands out bold and brave and vivid against the lifeless sand 
and barren rock. The extreme clarity of the desert light is equaled by the extreme 
individuation of desert life-forms. Love flowers best in openness and freedom. 
(26, emphasis added) 
 
Abbey tolerates the discomfort of the heat and wind in his face, because the world seems “lit up” 
just for him. In his “alive” state, he philosophizes about the placement of the plants, and 
generalizes his observations to a wider analogy of the world. And he notes the “extreme clarity 
of the desert light” (the sun) that gives shape to each individual living object on the earth before 
him. The world is “alive in the bright light.” Then, seemingly out of thin air, he declares that in 
“the extreme clarity of the desert light” he has learned that “love flowers best in openness and 
freedom.” Love? I cannot hide my puzzlement at this claim. How did Abbey make the leap to 
love flowering in a desert? It appears to be such an offhand statement, an afterthought, yet we 
know Abbey by now to be anything but careless with his observations. 
In the sunlight, each living object takes on its own whole shape and form, each with its 
own shadows and atmospheric space. The crisp sunlight allows each creature and plant to be 
fully seen. This witnessing is care – it is love.132 Love, after all, is the opportunity to be 
witnessed as a living thing, a creature, and a relative in the world family, a person.133 It is like 
saying, “There you are! I see you.” The sunlight highlights the space each object needs for life; 
therefore, the sun is showing Abbey what love requires, even though the weather, the sun itself, 
is non-loving.  
																																																								
132 Noddings, 219. 	
133 Hansen, “Bearing Witness,” 29. 
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With all this talk of love, let us now return to the “rational” argument. The aesthetic 
experience outdoors that Edward Abbey articulates appears, by his writing, to have a haphazard, 
spontaneous quality to it, as if it can only happen in a free moment. It seems nebulous and wild, 
unordered, and unsolicited. But this cannot be the case. Transformative learning does not just 
happen; it is groomed and encouraged through freeform but intelligent means.134 There is a 
certain degree to which all experience is a form of learning indirectly by the environment, but 
intelligent learning, the type that I would argue transforms us, requires a measure of 
intelligence.135 This does not always need to materialize in the pedagogical planning or a 
directed curriculum, as teachable moments are available at any time, but it does demand some 
sense of secondary experience or reflection going hand in hand with primary experience (as 
explained in Chapter I, the active and passive elements combined according to Dewey.136 
Abbey is taking a theoretical and educational thought experiment and making it robust 
philosophy by distinguishing this experience he is having as in part, traditionally Kantian and 
Stoic (in regards to its opinion of the sublime and nature, respectively), and fastidiously original.  
 
Men come and go, cities rise and fall… the earth remains, slightly 
modified…Turning Plato and Hegel on their heads I sometimes choose to think, 
no doubt perversely, that man is a dream, thought an illusion, and only rock is 
real. Rock and sun. 
 
Under the desert sun, in that dogmatic clarity, the fables of theology and the 
myths of classical philosophy dissolve like mist. The air is clean, the rock cuts 
cruelly into flesh; shatter the rock and the odor of flint rises to your nostrils, bitter 
and sharp. Whirlwinds dance across the salt flats, a pillar of dust by day; the 
thornbush breaks into flame at night. What does it mean? It means nothing. It is as 
																																																								
134 Mezirow, 2000, 21. 
 
135 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 19. 	
136 Ibid., 139. See also Dewey, Experience and Nature, 15-17. 
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it is and has no need for meaning. The desert lies beneath and soars beyond any 
possible human qualification. Therefore, sublime (194). 
 
As if to drive in the point of burgeoning consciousness of weather, Abbey invokes the elements 
as teacher again (e.g., “under the desert sun,” “clarity,” “mist,” “air,” “wind”). Even in the 
paragraph directly following this passage, Abbey starts with the words “the sun.” He is becoming 
more and more explicit.  
The clarity of the elements (the sun for Abbey) and the experience under the elements’ 
dominion (anywhere out-of-doors) can be described as nothing less than a stimulant drug: 
 
Dehydration: the desert air sucks moisture from my every pore. I take a drink 
from the canvas water-bag dangling near my head, the water cooled by 
evaporation. Noontime here is like a drug. The light is psychedelic, the dry 
electric air narcotic. To me the desert is stimulating, exciting, exacting; I feel no 
temptation to sleep or to relax into occult dreams but rather an opposite effect 
which sharpens and heightens vision, touch, hearing, taste and smell. Each stone, 
each plant, each grain of sand exists in and for itself with a clarity that is 
undimmed by any suggestion of a different realm. Claritas, integritas, veritas. 
Only sunlight holds things together. Noon is the crucial hour: the desert reveals 
itself nakedly and cruelly, with no meaning but its own existence… A single 
cloud floats in the sky to the northeast, motionless, a magical calescence of vapor 
where a few minutes before there was nothing visible but the hot, deep, black-
grained blueness of infinity… Life has come to a standstill, at least for the hour… 
temporarily free from the force of motion and process and the surge toward – 
what? Something called the future? I am free, I am compelled, to contemplate the 
world which underlies life, struggle, thought, ideas, the human labyrinth of hope 
and despair (135). 
 
“Noontime here is like a drug.” What does this mean, presently? Take out the analogy and phrase 
it as a metaphor, which we see in the next sentence: “The light is psychedelic, the dry electric air 
narcotic.” Now here is something metaphorically grounded, ripe with information. Our 
comparison is noon = drug, and by this, we know that Abbey means that the noontime sun is like 
(or is, metaphorically) a drug. Then he explains further that the “light is psychedelic” and the 
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“dry, electric, air is narcotic.” This gives us a great deal of information about his experience in 
the afternoons. What are things that we can relate to that are “psychedelic” or “narcotic?” This is 
where we begin. 
I had my wisdom teeth surgically removed many years ago, which I understand to be a 
relatively common occurrence for adults these days. So let us together recall an experience of 
that sort: waking up and out of surgery, in a white room, mouth stuffed with cotton, throat dry to 
the bone, fingers immobile, only eyes on the prowl as the anesthetic wears off. The brightness is 
revoltingly intense, as if you have just awakened after what you expected to be a long, permanent 
death. Shapes move and rotate, although you know things to be stably placed. Things begin as 
bright but blurry, then as you rouse, they become intensely clear. Your environment is white and 
simple, perhaps a recovery room, and each object is vividly present. Psychedelic, indeed, yet 
your brain is still extraordinarily functional. Things seem psychedelic in that you feel strangely 
like you are “split” from that moment, but also the light is rousing, so you know yourself to not 
be entirely unconscious.  
The dry, electric air is narcotic. Now this requires some further pause. It can be easy to 
think of drugs as tools that take us out of reality, but Abbey is telling us that the noontime light is 
making him sharper, brighter, like the displayed objects around him. I see this as an extended 
metaphor: in order to understand where he is going with the drug-alias, we have to understand 
that he is first dehydrated. “The desert air sucks moisture from my every pore.” This is, in and of 
itself, a sort of drug-induced state, because in dehydration our bodies rely on core nutrient 
elements to retain functionality. In our process to pull out whatever water remains, we become 
lethargic, sleepy, disoriented: many of the characteristics one might have of a drugged state, but 
certainly not one of being heightened like Abbey is describing. That is, this is how people 
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describe themselves while still partially hydrated…Take it a step further, to the sort of massive 
and all-encompassing thirst that Abbey notes, and one’s neural connections begin firing more 
rapidly and hormonal responses kick in, which results in nothing less than a hyper-stimulation. 
This – not a second earlier – is where Abbey must reside. The light, so bright that at first it may 
blur out everything, blind us, when our rods and cones settle, they are indeed functioning at a 
higher visual state. Not only is Abbey seeing something vividly anew, his physical body is 
supporting these existential conclusions. The air feels electric to Abbey, perhaps because his 
heart is beating slower, possibly causing him to feel the very pulse of his blood as if it is 
electricity rising up in him. Does science ruin this learning experience? Certainly not! In fact, it 
stands to support Abbey’s learning, evidencing what Abbey can only notice and describe without 
fully understanding. It is a marvel of the human body that the conscious self, brain, and body can 
so fully commit to the environment holding it. 
Abbey says also that the sun “holds things together.” We cannot so easily see science 
stepping in here, as if the light is melting objective molecules together, but that need not matter. 
Abbey, remember, is focusing on the brightness of the sun, the intensity of the light being like a 
stimulant drug. Without a bright enough light, none of the details and hypersensitivity and hyper-
vision that Abbey is citing could be in play. Imagine a dim light instead in this scenario, like a 
sunset, with shadows cast all over the desert, obscuring sides of objects in ruddy shadows. It is 
obvious that only with light that is completely, utterly white could Abbey’s sight be as sharp as it 
is, leading him to say that the noontime is the time of “clarity, integrity, truth.” The desert sun 
has “lit up” the earth such that Abbey feels he can suddenly see it as it never was seen before – 
totally exposed, totally visible, totally there to be witnessed. Through clear light Abbey receives 
an honest display of the desert, and through this integral display, a truthful sight materializes. 
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The truth (as in the reality he that he sees) at noontime is the simple truth that these other things 
around him exist. But what a powerful philosophical deduction this is to feel in full force, with 
one’s body 100-percent involved in the exposure. Other than one cloud, everything in front of 
Abbey and behind Abbey is frozen or in slow motion, allowing him to examine it all. The sun is 
altering his sense of time, just like a drug, giving him the opportunity to ignore the minutes and 
focus on contemplating the microseconds long enough to see them as they are. 
 
                         
The Vacant Lot, or A Zenith                    
I have felt, like Abbey, the ache of change, the shift of transformative growth outdoors. I 
like to think of this, quaintly, as my earliest memory, to the point that I have come to assume it is 
so, but it must have been scrambled one day in the recesses of my brain. Perhaps it came to be so 
via its importance rather than factual history, because now I realize that I must have been at the 
very least four or five years old when it happened (not so early). To be truthful, I am not even 
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sure if it is a memory of a single moment, or rather what I have consolidated from several 
childhood seasons.  
 When I was young, my family had a split-level home on a nice yard, where my dad and 
his brother had once grown up, at the end of a sullen and forgotten cul-de-sac, at the end of a 
dying factory town. Our neighbors were the Helgesons, a lively retired couple with long-gone 
kids, the Affields to our left at the court entrance, who minded themselves and kept a neat and 
bounded home, and a vacant, hedge-rimmed lot kitty-corner to ours and adjacent to the 
Helgeson’s that later in my youth became the elderly Christianson couple’s new building site. 
But before it was theirs, I had staked my claim, occupied by a small homestead that I had 
constructed in my dreams. 
The round, paved bulb of the cul-de-sac road pointed to the north and to an empty golf 
course driving range now engulfed in the weeds and prairie grasses that are attracted to 
disturbed but relatively abandoned plots of land. Besides the seasonal mowing by the golf course 
staff to keep the ticks and mice out and the unused area “presentable,” the grasses were left 
entirely to their devices. My parents tell me of the days when the golf course was booming, and 
my grandmother complained of the golf balls hitting the side of her new house and windows. 
Even twenty years later, I could still find an errant ball or two nestled in our yard near my 
bedroom window, the same room from where my boy father must have watched the golfers 
practice.  
On the Red River, the natural border of Minnesota (my dad’s land) and North Dakota 
(my mom’s), just a few hundred yards off the backend of Christianson’s lot, the seasons are 
always defined. Winter is cold, summer is hot, and spring and fall transition with rain and 
leaves. I was in the vacant lot in every season. My mom would send us out of the house when the 
 	 83 
air was stiff inside and the open windows alone could not do our lungs justice, and my brother 
David, just a year and a breath older than me, would tow me in our red wagon into the infinite 
nothingness of the grassy lot. I thought I was running away from home with David to live off the 
earth and to never return indoors. (Only as an adult, telling this story to my mom, did she point 
out that both us kids were always within easy eye and earshot from the second-story living room 
window where she sat and watched afternoon Days of Our Lives and stitched curtains and 
dresses.) We would sneak Saltine crackers, sandwich meat, and Poptarts “for the road” from the 
lazy-Susan tucked in the back corner of the kitchen – an easy reach for child hands – and take off 
at a run with the loaded wagon, lest we be caught snatching provisions meant for family meals.  
David and I would always begin at first by the wagon and the cul-de-sac, talking about 
building shelters and hiding from Mom, but then David would grow restless and want to play 
hide and seek in the grass (without me) and suddenly disappear without warning. To retaliate, I 
would grab the blueberry Poptarts (his favorite) and run to the opposite end of the lot, tripping 
over the long grasses as they bent and stretched and swayed like dry corn stalks after harvest. 
One after another would pop up in front of me, towering cream breakers of four or five feet tall, 
and I would dive into one with my whole body, arms and legs getting scraped by the stalks like 
tiny elephant grass blades, and my face pelted with a thousand tiny grain-like and whiskered 
seeds that twitched and lurched off the tips of each blade. Barley-shaped seeds dusted my fine 
blonde hair, and I would roll and collapse on my back on top of the wreckage of blades and 
seeds, exhausted but exhilarated by the challenge of traversing the prairie on my bruised up little 
legs, like the wagon wheels once rolled through the West. 
There, on my back, cradled in the wild grasses that swept up like towering walls around 
me, the faded Plains sky tunneled straight from my chest and up and over my grass fortress like 
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liquid bubbling up from a fountain, the wisps of clouds like froth on the water. The cloudwork 
above mirrored the prairie field, but was an even whiter field, that blinded me with an alabaster 
sheen, and which moved and swirled with the wind in beat with my wild strands of hair. The sky 
was so far away yet the exact image of the earth, reflected, and I pondered it as if it were the 
future.  
I feel so strongly, even now as I record this, a sense of wholeness of being in that 
moment, wrapped up in a paradoxical joyful-loneliness. The plants bent up and over me to tell 
the grassy clouds, through quakes and susurrations, some deep and important prophecy and, 
being uninvited to their tête-à-tête, a strange ache began to spread across skin and in joints too 
young for arthritis. I can only suppose that it was my first feeling of learning: the ripping and 
regenerating of my perspectives evolving from a child’s to a woman’s. I understood in merely the 
faintest way then that I was changing into something incrementally more “me,” not my parents’ 
or David’s but my own self. I felt as if only I in the entire universe could feel as a stalk of Indian 
bluegrass crackling and shuddering in the wind. I was strangely comforted with my changing 
persona yet broken by it. In protest for the secrecy and empathetic pain, I too offered a telling, 
and foretold the harsh day in the fall when the mowers would cut these grasses away, and the 




Fans of the genre of nature writing are no strangers to the topic of alone-ness outdoors, 
including its many finely tuned synonyms: solitude, solitary, loneliness, retreat, remoteness, 
seclusion, isolation, loneness, distance, and desolation. Unlike Thoreau, whom we will later find 
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claims a sort of retreat in nature, a transcendental move inward by walking outward, Abbey 
embraces the dark and empty-sounding qualities of alone-ness, similar to my experience 
brooding in the vacant lot. He hears the music of the sun as distant, requiring his wanton 
studiousness to seek, and finds a nostalgic and beautifully aching philosophical lesson within that 
search. In a world where the dark qualities of depression, loneliness, fear, and shame are hidden, 
Abbey draws them forward to reflect on himself. The desert, obviously, is a great example of 
those feelings incarnate in nature, but it is not just in desert regions that we can find ourselves 
sunk into this morose position, and I posit that it is not the person him or herself that takes the 
mind and body directly to such a state. Abbey seems to recognize this too. He finds the link of 
the glaring sunlight to the incitation of these reflective feelings. Moreover, the feelings of alone-
ness, even in their darkest state, do not sink him into solipsism, because he sees a lesson on the 
horizon (97). Abbey uses this state of alone-ness to philosophize his role in the world and the 
human condition. 
Learning does not need to be a pleasant experience in the moment. Indeed, pain, labor or 
yearning often lead to transformation. And sometimes the lesson that we learn is disagreeable 
and unsettling, brutal even – especially when it is a personal critique. Abbey thinks that the 
harshest of lessons we must learn is the relationship between humans and nonhumans. “All men 
are brothers, we like to say, half-wishing sometimes in secret it were not true. But perhaps it is 
true. And is the evolutionary line from protozoan to Spinoza any less certain? That also may be 
true. We are obliged, therefore, to spread the news, painful and bitter though it may be for some 
to hear, that all living things on earth are kindred” (21).  
Even more frightening than hearing a critique of our worldview is the experience of being 
forced into such a reality with one’s whole body. It is one thing to be told something in a “safe 
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space” where we are sheltered from all other inconveniences and so have only one idea to tackle 
at a time, it is quite another experience to be fully exposed, mentally and physically to a non-
human force like the weather.  
 
Hot and tired I stop in the shade of an overhanging ledge and take a drink from 
my canteen. Resting, I listen to the deep dead stillness of the canyon. No wind or 
breeze, no birds, no running water, no sound of any kind but the stir of my own 
breathing.  
 
Alone in the silence, I understand for a moment the dread which many feel in the 
presence of primeval desert, the unconscious fear which compels them to tame, 
alter or destroy what they cannot understand, to reduce the wild and prehuman to 
human dimensions. Anything rather than confront directly the antehuman, that 
other world which frightens not through danger or hostility but in something far 
worse – its implacable indifference. 
 
Out of the shade, into the heat. I tramp on through the winding gorge, through the 
harsh brittle silence. In this arid atmosphere sounds do not fade, echo or die softly 
but are extinguished suddenly, sharply, without the slightest hint of reverberation. 
The clash of rock against rock is like a shot – abrupt, exaggerated, toneless. (191) 
 
I must agree with Abbey, that what humans fear most from the non-artificial environment is the 
pure indifference of it toward us. We are not nature’s masters, as we so often strive to be. Nor are 
we unbent by it. We like to think that we are apart from it, safe from things like the elements and 
their force, yet we make daily choices in respect to what the non-human environment dictates: in 
our clothing, in our transit plans, in our social outings, in our mood. For the most part we can 
even ignore this unintentional force it places on us, or we can curse the weather like we might 
the frustrating car in front of us in rush hour or the rain that seems to fall just as we are stepping 
out of the house. What Abbey learns in the silence is that others must feel this dread constantly, 
subconsciously, when they imagine being alone in such a place as he is. Otherness is frightening, 
especially if it exists entirely independent of humans. Being alone outdoors is fearful to us, 
because it is then that we must eventually become fully aware of the fact that we as a species 
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must acknowledge the Copernican Revolution, that we are not the center of this universe, or even 
the center of this world. Thus, the alone-ness imposes an unsettling silence that leaves us only 
with the fears voiced aloud in our heads, our own voices that aggravate us by telling us the truth 
for once. The soundlessness in the desert canyon is as abrupt as the shrill “shot of truth” in our 
minds.  
 One contextual piece of information about this passage is missing from the quote that I 
have selected. Namely, Abbey only found his way to that isolated canyon by pursuing some 
unrelated task. He was hiking to a destination at that time. Getting to the destination proved, over 
time, to matter little and eventually was remembered by Abbey only as some afterthought. The 
learning came in his aesthetic experiences along the hike in pockets of time that he had not 
planned out. The question is, how does this figure into my philosophy of learning in weather? 
How important is the ground-laying curriculum or intentional direction in this type of 
transformative learning experience? Discussions with David Hansen have given me an excellent 
answer to work with. He says, “We don’t stomp our feet up and down, staying in place.” Any 
movement, any exposure, any choice of environment begins with some sort of action on our part. 
The transformative aesthetic learning experience that Abbey has might have just as well occurred 
if he had chosen to stay with his raft on the river rather than docking for a brief hike. However, 
the point is that there is always some agency involved in human growth, and some intelligence 
needed to digest aesthetic experiences and reflect upon them as being meaningful, although they 
need not be scripted lessons. In fact, it is possible that they cannot be scripted at all, only waited 
and watched for, grasped swiftly when they do transpire. 
 Returning to the talk of “shots,” Abbey does do plenty of drinking and thinking while out 
alone at his desert post. But the drinking aside, his thinking comes back around again many times 
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to this same place, an oscillation between the fear of being alone and the comfort of alone-ness. 
In a later passage he answers our probing questions with beautiful clarity. I quote this in full, 
because it shows the important progression of his thoughts from a dark and foreboding place to 
one of peace and comfort with his human habitation in the non-human world: 
 
Once the drink is mixed, however, I always go outside, out in the light and the air 
and the space and the breeze, to enjoy it. Making the best of both worlds, that’s 
the thing. But how, you might ask, does living outdoors on the terrace enable me 
to escape that other form of isolation, the solitary confinement of the mind? For 
there are the bad moments, or were, especially in the beginning of my life here, 
when I would sit down at the table for supper inside the house trailer and discover 
with a sudden shock that I was alone. There was nobody, nobody at all, on the 
other side of the table. Alone-ness became loneliness and the sensation was strong 
enough to remind me (how could I have forgotten?) that the one thing better than 
solitude, the only thing better than solitude, is society. By society I do not mean 
the roar of city streets or the cultured and cultural talk of the schoolmen (reach for 
your revolver!) or human life in general. I mean the society of a friend or friends 
or a good, friendly woman…But taking my meal outside by the burning juniper in 
the fireplace with more desert and mountains than I could explore in a lifetime 
open to view, I was invited to contemplate a far larger world, one which extends 
into a past and into a future without any limits known to the human kind. By 
taking off my shoes and digging my toes in the sand I made contact with the 
larger world – an exhilarating feeling which leads to equanimity. Certainly I was 
still by myself, so to speak – there were no other people around and there still are 
none – but in the midst of such a grand tableau it was impossible to give full and 
serious consideration to Albuquerque. All that is human melted with the sky and 
faded out beyond the mountains and I felt, as I feel – is it a paradox? – that a man 
can never find or need better companionship than that of himself. (96, original 
emphasis) 
 
Here we can see that alone-ness is not loneliness, and that while outdoors we are forced to 
straddle the line between society and the individual, and undulate constantly in the feelings of 
fear and comfort. This is itself the perfect definition of an effective learning environment. Abbey 
does not need to feel at home outdoors, because being there and reflecting on his presence there 
is an example of the process of Abbey actively learning; it is not about the race for mankind’s 
progress or about the process of answering definitely an ancient question. Abbey is answering 
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his own questions loosely, fluidly, and meaningfully, as he waits off a sweltering noon hour or 
enjoys a nightcap with an eye on the horizon at the end of the day. Equanimity, strangely, has 
occurred to him, perhaps finally made sense to him, when there is no one else around. 
 
The Badlands 
I have one of these unsettling memories that sometimes I am convinced never happened, 
yet other times I think I must be getting the story wrong, or I am frustrated that it seems I am 
convinced it is true but that I have grasped it incompletely. Then there are days like today that it 
is perfectly vivid in its story line – I know where I went, I can remember the shapes of the rocks 
and the curves of the empty roads I walked, but I have no idea how much time passed. Or there is 
another day where all I can bring to mind is the overwhelming feeling of how real the air was, or 
the sky, or my skin, but it is like I have lost a sense in the memory – maybe scent or hearing has 
gone, another time maybe it is my eyesight. What a nebulous creature, this memory! And because 
of its shape shifting, I hesitate to try to write it. What if I get it wrong? Do I even have it right in 
the first place? I think I have concluded now that it is worthy due to the fact that it is. It is an 
incessant memory, flicking in and out of my life like light switches turned on and off. 
I have a feel today for the character of aloneness in this memory, and as it shares an 
affinity to Abbey’s Desert Solitaire, I will say more. I lived for a couple years in south central 
South Dakota, an area distinctly solitary (at least that was the feeling I interpreted from my 
experiences there). But just two or so hours west, Badlands National Park took the award for the 
most remote imaginable space. I was planning at that time to do a large section hike of the 
Appalachian Trail on the East Coast and needed some serious training days in advance of that 
trek, so I chose a stint out in the Badlands a time or two on my own. 
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I must have driven out there early that morning, but I do not remember that part. I also 
am deaf at the empty northern parking lot where the memory seems to “begin.” I put my 
itinerary and emergency numbers on the dashboard for the rangers, lock my Vibe and sling my 
waterlogged pack over my shoulder. I unfold my hiking poles and give my boots a once-over 
look. Then there is a gap in time. I somehow get to a trailhead and register so that they (who?) 
can find me if I disappear. I notice no one has taken this trail yet this spring, and I feel the usual 
wave of dread and reckoning as I realize I am the only one here. Of course, that is only rational, 
and it is the necessary step I take toward appreciating my time alone. I know what I am doing 
out there.  
             
Another gap in time and description. I am wading through a foot of icy marsh water that 
has collected on the plains after snowmelt. It makes it feel as though I am off trail, so I 
respectfully pay close attention to the 100-yard distant metal poles marking my way. Bison graze 
in a col shadowed by a sandy plateau, and the sun has already cast rust rays onto the canyons as 
if it is sunset, but I have to think it was only early afternoon by then. There is some lavender 
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blended into the rock walls that catches my eye, because it looks warm to touch against the cool 
backdrop of a wet spring day.  
           Gap. The lavender and red colors disappear and the whole canyon I am in has snapped 
into a tart green light. The air is sharply charged, and my nose hairs sting slightly, a sure sign 
that I have entered a dry front at the head of a lightning storm. It is a long, flat horizon, so I can 
see the mob rolling and curdling miles away. It is promising to be a mighty mess. There is not 
much one can do when caught in the rain, other than find comfort in being something other than 
a witch of Oz that will shrivel up in water. I was wet already from the flooded trail, so why not 
be soaked through? Worse things could happen, and most of those things could yet be prevented. 
But I would get wet, like every last dust pile pooled onto this arid rock, every exposed lizard and 
errant cow. “Phew, here it comes,” I whisper. I race to get out of the canyon and down to the 
paved road that circled the park. “I can’t get turned around out here if the lights go out.” I 
would track the road the many miles around to my car, to be safe. The ranger’s station was on 
its way, just in case, but I knew well that after 4 pm the whole park would be cleared out. The 
ranger on shift would not stay a minute past 4:15 pm. After all, why? No one is here anyway. 
I do not suppose that it ever occurred to me that I would be caught in a deluge in the one 
expanse of land named for having zero water sources. Badlands = bad land to live on = no 
water, right? Apparently not for me. I had buckets of water in my shoes, bags of water in my 
backpack, and barrels of water dumped on my head. Weirdly, it was marvelous, and I was wildly 
ecstatic in that moment. My vision became a blur, but I felt my heart still throbbing with 
excitement. Tripping my way down a rock slide cut into a valley of Indian grass, I slipped once 
and my hiking pole caught my foot as it shot out over the edge of a steep cliff. The memory cuts 
out suddenly, but I could not have blacked out. 
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When the memory comes back, it is a violent affront, and it smacks me so deeply into the 
moment that I shift into the present tense recalling it. Memory rushes back with a flush of heat 
over my body as I realize how serious a misstep like mine just that moment ago is when I am on 
my own. Now I am sweating, as saturated on the inside as the outside, and the feeling of panic 
creeps up from my esophagus and I force the rain to push it right back down my throat.  
I am trail running by the time the road comes into sight, and when my feet touch the slick 
pavement I have the strange memory of stopping and just standing there. What was I expecting, 
car on the road? A burst of applause? There is a clap of lightning that cracks right over my head 
that jolts the grin right off my face. “Serves me right!” I snort. And it is black, such a thick and 
smoky daylight without the “light.” The sky is bruised so inky violet-navy that all but the closest 
rock walls are mush under it, and the road smells like the sweat running out of its dirty rock-
locked pores. I smell no better… and it is comical to me how aware I was then of my nervous 
aura. After all, no one was there to notice. Did I imagine the rocks were judging me? 
                         
Larry McAfee, National Park Service, 2009. Public domain. 
Alone. The perfect summary of my next few miles and hours back to the parking lot. I 
ached, I cried, I laughed, I marveled, I worried. It was like I was exploding with every pop of 
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thunder. It is nothing but gaps of time in my memory – a sound here or there, a muscle twitch, a 
headache, a salty rock particle caught on my upper lip, mixed with raindrops and rolling down 
to the corners of my mouth. I do not remember returning to my car about 6pm. I do, however, 
remember being surprised to be there. I had expected to be alone forever, and my car must have 
shocked me like a wormhole above the metal bleachers in Times Square. I think I could have 
been trapped in that experience forever, yet I was racing to escape. I may still be out there. 
 
Abbey’s Haunting137 
Somnolence – a heaviness in the air, a chill in the sunlight, an oppressive stillness 
in the atmosphere that hints of much [he has learned to feel these signs] but says 
nothing. The Balanced Rock and the pinnacles stand in petrified silence – waiting. 
The wildlife has withdrawn to the night, the flies and gnats have disappeared, a 
few birds sing, and the last of the flowers of summer – the globemallow – have 
died. What is it that’s haunting me? At times I hear voices up the road, familiar 




Gretel Ehrlich and Bitter Cold 
Born in Santa Barbara, CA, and educated at liberal schools in the East, it was the 
traumatic death of a loved one and resulting twists of fate that landed Gretel Ehrlich in the rough 
and tumble Republic of Sheep Country, WY, in the 1970s. Her exploits of the region are 
described in her naturalistic autobiography The Solace of Open Spaces. What she originally 
																																																								
137 During later edits of this research I discovered that Peter Larkin says that Wordsworth 
describes the gap between something frightfully inaccessible and a reoffering of reality capable 
of contemplation as a “haunting” gap, 32-33. Wordsworth is haunted by the dichotomy of his 
natural inclination to categorize something as available or not available. In spots of time, this gap 
is hauntingly present. Christopher Hitt finds that Wordsworth’s “haunting” becomes his 
“ministry,” 1.494-495, as quoted in Hitt, 608. I am also haunted by this call to find truth in these 
ostensible gaps, these spots of time. 
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viewed as a backcountry excuse for a fine resort retreat, she later adopted as her true homeland. 
Although physically and mentally broken at that time, Ehrlich found mending through cattle and 
sheep rustling, a dirty, coarse, windy, and wickedly cold lifestyle, warmed strangely by the land 
and the “weathered” people that worked it. On the range she began a new life as a full-time 
writer, married a Wyoming man and his culture, and still lives as a rancher, and clearly, a 
transformed individual. 
What does Ehrlich attribute to her transformation in Wyoming? What was it that she 
found healing in? Not only does she cite being mentally and physically restored (p.3), she notes 
how her behavior and perspective – explicit evidence of transformative learning – have been 
molded by her experience. Ehrlich states that not only did this lifestyle reveal itself as the mere 
illusion of a retreat (not the American wilderness mindset that she thought it would offer); the 
move outdoors in her work forced a reunion between her and life. She writes: 
 
I suspect that my original motive for coming here was to “lose myself” in new 
and unpopulated territory. Instead of producing the numbness I thought I wanted, 
life on the sheep ranch woke me up. The vitality of the people I was working with 
flushed out what had become a hallucinatory rawness in me. I threw away my 
clothes and bought new ones; I cut my hair. The arid country was a clean slate. Its 
absolute indifference steadied me. (3, emphasis added) 
 
 
This is such an important point for Ehrlich to begin with. Americans can trace in the history of 
our ideas of wilderness, especially those ideas defined by the Romantic Era nature writers 
Emerson, Thoreau, Coleridge, Keats, and Wordsworth, as basically an idyllic garden for the 
mind.138 Life in the Wyoming wild would be like a romantic tour with a dashing cowboy on a 
buckskin steed. Instead of the pleasantries of a vacationing “numbness,” Ehrlich describes the 
																																																								
138 Nash, 44-66. 
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intensely jarring experience of “waking up,” being infused with “vitality,” and having a 
“hallucinatory rawness” “flushed out” of her.  
She begins to see, like Abbey, the importance of communicating her experience of the 
weather especially. In case we doubt her level of clear understanding of the value of weather in 
her learning, she states in the preface to her book: “The truest art I would strive for in any work 
would be to give the page the same qualities as earth: weather would land on it harshly; light 
would elucidate the most difficult truths; wind would sweep away obtuse padding” (x). Here we 
are getting somewhere. Wyoming itself is falling aside, and the weather is coming into focus. 
Just as Ehrlich once called her reform “Wyoming,” we environmental philosophers too make the 
mistake of attributing this learning to a place, a name, when instead it is a much broader concept 
of the aesthetic weather-rich world we are experiencing and the sense that we make of those 
experiences.     
 What I would consider to be first signs of a Maxine Greene-like “wide awakeness” to the 
political world, sparked by interaction and attention, Ehrlich interestingly takes to be a 
straightforward shot of the “absolute indifference” her new environment. Human connections did 
not “wake her up” – Wyoming did! To be more accurate, Ehrlich’s feel for the neutrality of the 
weather-saturated environment gave her the sense that an outside force of nature changed her, a 
force like the weather. This seems at first glance to be an outstanding claim. Certainly the people 
in Wyoming were her teachers, not a cold view of the arid country. But when we look closer, her 
logic unfolds steadily with her stories. “The lessons of impermanence taught me this: loss 
constitutes an odd kind of fullness; despair empties out into an unquenchable appetite for life,” 
she says, as she reasons that it is in fact the very coldness of the environment that moves her (x).  
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The very fact that the weather always changes, and yet has the static feel of 
omnipresence, is steadying for Ehrlich. The depressing loss and despair that Wyoming 
represented for her, those long days out on the nothingness of the plains, helped her to desire 
survival all the more. The “bitter cold,” as we will find is a major theme in Ehrlich, is the twinge 
across the skin that keeps the blood circulating inside. Ehrlich uses the contrast of the bitter cold 
to know the sweetness of warmth. Her experience and Abbey’s are useful companions for the 
purposes of this inquiry. 
Before we go further into the theme of the bitter cold, we must be sure we are not 
conflating impermanence, disinterestedness, purposiveness, purpose, and indifference; each term 
deserves unpacking in this context, because we are soon to see that the nature writers hit upon 
deep-seated philosophical ethical and metaphysical concerns about the circle of non-human life 
and non-living nature, as well as aesthetic conceptualizations. Kant from Chapter II and Abbey 
have already introduced disinterestedness to this research discussion, but there is so much more 
to these to say before we can continue functionally. Since these are each concepts with an 
enormous, weighty history of philosophy behind them, the tight definitions here shall suffice, 
and I will take each in kind as it appears later on. 
Impermanence. In Buddhism, impermanence is the doctrine that things in the world 
have no set soul or substance that remains forever unchanged. Likewise, in Western thought, 
Alfred North Whitehead sees reality as constantly changing, and argues that things do not have 
an essence or form to them. Dewey talks about how the only thing that is static is intransient 
nature of experience. However, the concept of impermanence does not imply that truth changes, 
only that the movements of the world are not predetermined. Impermanence is intended to 
contradict any philosophical tendency toward concrete conclusions. According to the theory of 
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impermanence, solidifying statements cannot accurately represent our constantly changing 
world.  
Indifference. Indifference (often synonymous with disinterestedness but with different 
historical conventions) is defined by the Oxford English dictionary as an absence of feeling for 
or against something. By this definition it may seem that indifference is the very antithesis of 
aesthetics, which are laden with feeling, but really it is indicating the native neutrality of an 
object and the absence of self-interest in judgments upon that object. This term has been used 
both in philosophy of metaphysics and aesthetics. 
The metaphysical idea of absolute indifference comes to us most notably from Fichte and 
Schelling, and states that Reason is the elevated point where subject and object are absolutely 
indifferent, which means more directly that subject and object are one and the same in absolute 
form. This is not to be confused with the postmodern concept of indifference in aesthetics. 
Aesthetically, and for our discussion here, indifference is the feature of human judgment that 
ascertains passive, neutral, or ironic things as being of value. This modern notion of indifference 
(think Marcel Duchamp’s “Fountain” or Moira Roth’s aesthetics of indifference in art history) is 
quite the opposite of a judgment of taste that relies on pleasure, human interest, or common 
purpose. 
Although it is similar in style to words used by Abbey and Ehrlich, indifference can also 
imply an added apathy, or a negative tone, which we cannot quite argue is or is not a part of non-
human nature, but we attribute it to nature regardless (to the chagrin of the Stoics who held 
above all things that Nature is neutral, utterly disinterested without indifference.) For example, 
Ehrlich says, “It’s May and I’ve just awakened from a nap, curled against sagebrush the way my 
dog taught me to sleep – sheltered from wind. A front is pulling the huge sky over me, and from 
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the dark a hailstone has hit me on the head” (1). The hailstone attack may mean something to 
Ehrlich – make a difference – in her life, but the sky did not throw it down upon her in a fit of 
fury. As such, the sky can appear indifferent in an ontological sense, but it is not aesthetically 
indifferent in the same way that we can judge indifference in art due to the artist that is behind 
the creation of the work, at least not unless we consider God as Nature’s artist, as we will see 
later with Wordsworth and Muir. 
Disinterestedness. Abbey says that disinterestedness is a quality of non-human nature. I 
think it is highly likely, given Abbey’s well-read and thorough training in philosophy, that he 
would mean anything less than the fullest concept of disinterestedness in his own philosophical 
musings. Kant and I would likely agree with his notes.  
While other concepts of aesthetics hold that value arises in our human creativity and 
imagination coming in contact with something in the world, leading humans to have a taste for 
the beauty of human genius, and forms in nature that reflect what we see as creationistic 
material, or products, disinterestedness implies that the opposite is of value in aesthetics. That is, 
non-human nature is important precisely because it lacks human meddling, it is of value to us 
because it is not from us; non-human nature ought to be important because it is wholly foreign 
and unique. It is inherently valuable, because we cannot recreate it or control it with our will, our 
wants, purposes, or designs. You will recall that this is slightly different from Kant’s use of 
disinterestedness in the sublime, because the Kantian aesthetic judgments locate the sublime, 
ultimately, in the human mind not the outside world.139 
 Purposiveness Without a Purpose. Kant and the German Idealists have many elaborate 
and detailed differentiations between what a purpose, purposiveness, contrapurposive, and 
																																																								
139 See Brady for a defense of Kantian disinterestedness in aesthetics and ethics, 132-142.	
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impurposiveness mean between different versions of the subjective or the formal. For our uses, 
purposiveness without a purpose is a term that originates in art aesthetics with the idea of “art for 
art’s sake” rather than art for another purpose. It is in essence a teleological discussion. For 
outdoor research and especially Ehrlich’s work, to be purposive without a purpose means to have 
a telos, a drive toward a goal for its own sake without having a declared and defined human 
purpose. Non-human nature is an excellent example of purposiveness without a purpose, as 
humans can really never access the big-picture truth of how and why natural objects exist beyond 
us (this is very Kantian, and a second of Kant’s criteria for judgments in beauty). However, that 
is not to say that these non-human things go about their existence without “purposiveness,” the 
innate force of life that makes their lives meaningful in and of themselves. As the case with 
disinterestedness, when these nature writer’s imply purposiveness, they imply an inherent value 
in non-human nature, an ethical reason for reverence and care toward otherness. This is, in many 
ways accepted as fact in environmental philosophy, although it is often the case that our human 
anthropocentric perspectives, purposes, and cultural valuations overrule these principles in 
environmental ethics. 
 
Ripe to Rot 
The term impermanence was distinguished from indifference, disinterestedness, or 
purposiveness without a purpose and defined in the previous section because it is one of the 
strongest themes in Ehrlich’s book. From the impermanence of her surrounds Ehrlich imports 
meaning. She states on p. 83, “There is nothing in nature that can’t be taken as a sign of both 
mortality and invigoration.” Death and life. Ripe to rot to ripen again. Ehrlich embraces 
paradoxical relationships like these; she makes her time in Wyoming into a study of 
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contradictions. Perhaps our best example of this is in her emphasis on the seasonality of her new 
home, the methodic turning of nature’s clock. It is with a mournful yet exciting tone that the 
earth changes hands between seasons, from the smells on the air (the iron scent, petrichor, in the 
wetness of spring and winter that we will later notice in Oliver’s experiences) to the silent, 
breath-holding breeze that ushers in a weather front. For Ehrlich, the loss, the melancholy 
feelings, in conjunction with the fresh feelings of an incoming season bent on wiping away the 
memories of the past season, are indirect lessons.  
 
All through autumn we hear a double voice: one says everything is ripe; the other 
says everything is dying. The paradox is exquisite. We feel what the Japanese call 
‘aware’ – an almost untranslatable word meaning something like ‘beauty tinged 
with sadness.’ Some days we have to shoulder against a marauding melancholy. 
Dreams have a hallucinatory effect… (127) 
 
 
“The paradox is exquisite,” Ehrlich says, but it is her self-reflective attention to the paradox that 
is exquisite. Her comment on the seasons strikes me deeply. How is it that what feels so truly 
awful about change – the dead and rotting parts of life – is at the same time incredibly attractive 
to the human spirit? I think of artist Georgia O’Keefe’s mix of giant flowers and animal skulls, 
and I think of the great number of Minnesotans that I have heard about moving back to the state 
after time away on the southern coast, in another place where the seasons are not so defined. Can 
it be the case that something that brings humans such immense melancholy is in itself beautiful, 
like a tragic story of star-crossed lovers somehow helps us believe in love all the more? If so, 
how? 
The Japanese word Ehrlich refers to is not the word ‘aware’ in English, but another 
meaning of the same spelling aware (ah-WAH-ray), or in full phrase, mono no aware, “a 
sensitivity toward the passing of things as a real aspect of life.” The Japanese describe in a 
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simple phrase the infinitely complicated concept that Ehrlich is wrestling with. But this gives us 
even further clarification on the struggles and limitations imposed upon these nature writers 
through our cultural use of English. Not only is this feeling foreign to our language, it seems also 
foreign to our logic. We recognize the experience of mono no aware as a common thread in 
growing up human, a sort of grappling with immortality that we all must endure so that we do 
not crumble with every loss. But this certainly speaks of more than the natural progression of 
aging. Ehrlich and this deep phrase aim to highlight the perspective-altering impact that holding 
the reality of life and the transience of the world in our mind and body at once is transformative. 
The lesson is a necessary one, but it is not one that all people will be able to reach, at least not in 
holding it at once in a moment in time, in a transitional period of the seasons like Ehrlich does.  
Although we can imagine that at the death of her loved one, Ehrlich might have felt mono 
no aware, yet in her writing, the seasons in Wyoming are somehow different. She does not seem 
to be reliving a memory, but rather, making a new one with the seasonal passing to winter. Take, 
for instance, this description of the last aspen leaves. “Against rimrock, tall aspens have the 
graceful bearing of giraffes, and another small grove, not yet turned, gives off a virginal 
limelight that transpierces everything heavy.”140 If we take her metaphor of the limelight and 
rephrase it for analysis, she is saying that the greenish light, pure and powerful, is able to cut 
through the thickest rock and weighty feelings of the observer. One small beam of light from a 
still-green patch of trees is more powerful than the rest of the rimrock and aspens in its youthful 
contrast to the heaviness of the scene of autumnal change. The light and its strange effect of 
being able to transfigure two mutating seasons reappears as another metaphor just a few pages 
later: 																																																								
140 Ehrlich, 127. Note the reappearance of the word “limelight” from my descriptions of the 
plains and Patagonian pampa. 
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…The morning sky looks like cheese. Its cobalt wheel has been cut down and all 
the richness of the season is at our feet. The quick-blanch of frost stings autumn’s 
rouge into a skin that is tawny. At dawn, mowed hay meadows are the color of 
pumpkins, and the willows, leafless now, are pink and silver batons conducting 
inaudible river music. When I dress for the day, my body, white and suddenly 
numb, looks like dead coral. (129) 
 
 
This time, however, the change is reflected both in the lack of color in the sky, and the projection 
of all of that missing color back onto her pale skin into ruddiness – “frost stings autumn’s rouge 
into tawny skin.” Ehrlich’s skin has become like the leaves on the ground, baked in the summer 
sun, overdone, and waiting to lose its color completely in the onslaught of winter. It is not a 
pretty sight, but it is a very realistic one, and it is sobering to see one’s skin the color of fading 
autumn. Even in Ehrlich’s talk of the landscape of Wyoming, there is the common factor not of 
earth, dirt, soil, or a U.S. state, but of elemental forces such as pure light. This is especially 
evident in her talk not of Wyoming in the winter, but the light in winter, the light on her body, 
and the light in the trees.   
Ehrlich’s metaphors come straight from the seasons, not the land. She declares it to be 
her “text:”  
 
The poet Seamus Heaney said that landscape is sacramental, to be read as text. 
Earth is instinct: perfect, irrational, semiotic. If I read winter right, it is a scroll – 
the white growing wider and wider like the sweep of an arm – and from it we gain 
a peripheral vision, a capacity for what Nabokov calls ‘those asides of spirit, those 
footnotes in the volume of life by which we know life and find it to be good.’ 
…Not unlike emotional transitions – the loss of a friend or the beginning of new 
work – the passage of the seasons is often so belabored and quixotic as to deserve 
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Ehrlich compares the “belabored and quixotic” seasonal transitions to the emotional tumult of 
the loss of a friend or acquisition of a new task. The ups and downs of life, we might say. But she 
is not saying that the winter is the “down” season of life, just that the transition of the seasons 
itself is a challenging and mystifying emotional change that we also bear. Fittingly, Ehrlich 
concludes her book with another seasonal transition. Here are her final comments: 
 
In the fall, my life, too, is timbered, an unaccountably libidinous place: damp, 
overripe, and fading. The sky’s congestion allows the eye’s iris to open wider. 
 
“Autumn teaches us that fruition is also death; that ripeness is a form of 
decay…Leaves are verbs that conjugate the seasons. 
 
Today the sky is a wafer. Placed on my tongue, it is a wholeness that has already 
disintegrated; placed under the tongue, it makes my heart beat strongly enough to 
stretch myself over the winter brilliances to come. Now I feel the tenderness to 
which this season rots. Its defenselessness can no longer be corrupted. Death is its 
purity its sweet mud. The string of storms that came across Wyoming like 
elephants tied tail to trunk falters now and bleeds into a stillness. There is neither 
sun, nor wind, nor snow falling.  
 
…The light of these autumn days, bathed in what Tennyson called ‘a mockery of 
sunshine,’ will go completely out. (130, emphasis added) 
 
And, with that, her book ends with the metaphorical and literal seasonal light going completely 
out, the weather still, and the earth essentially enjoying “death in its purity.” What was damp, 
overripe, fading, congested, “opens” her eyes. Where there is sunshine in summer, there is only a 
mockery of it in autumn, and darkness is winter to replace it. What she finds beautiful and 
meaningful is the same thing that appears useless and ugly other times, so she realizes that her 
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Melancholy, Agony and Ache 
 We cannot accuse Ehrlich of just waxing poetic; she takes the rot and the ripe and still 
goes one step further in her morose ruminations by highlighting the disturbing element of the 
cold as painful. If one has seen a winter in northern Wyoming, it is impossible to attest to the 
feelings of it without recognizing the melancholy, agony, and ache as fully defined in such a 
winter as it ever can be. She discusses the psychedelic (Abbey-like) state of the Northern Lights 
above her in a joyous, high-feeling moment but places it immediately alongside the cold ache 
accompanying a night like that, wherein frigid-regioned atmospheric phenomena can be made 
visible. Remember, though, that it was in Ehrlich’s lowest life stage, after a beloved’s death, that 
she found solace in the open plains. There was something healing about this lonely place, not 
despite, but because of its painful weather. Her theory is that the agony in our bones on a cold 
day, the ache in our lives made physical, actually softens us to the sense of warmth we might feel 
in others, emotionally and physically. Cold ache allows us to bring together our own mind and 
body, connect to the minds and bodies of others, and, neighbor-to-neighbor, we develop in the 
shared experience of a cold day a unique new avenue of communication.  
 Take, for instance, the first comment you hear from a stranger or even a friend on a cold 
day: lamentations on the weather. Shared misery! Endless things to say about something so 
simple around us, something that we are all experiencing, something that seems otherwise 
completely normal about any given winter day. It is as if we never do grow accustomed to the 
feelings that the weather gives us, especially if it is a feeling of discomfort. Of course, this 
sounds terrible to say, that we embrace the chance to agonize together, but I think that Ehrlich 
(and I for that matter) see it as a positive learning experience. Some pain is needed for growth. 
Change, melancholy, and ache – these all accompany a period of personal transition. May we 
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never be at a loss for seasons that remind us of our need for discomfort in the pursuit of making 
ourselves more comfortable! Ehrlich gives us this in a cold front rolling in, on p. 126: 
 
As the storm blows east toward the Dakotas, the blue of the sky intensifies. It inks 
dry washes and broad grasslands with quiet. In their most complete gesture of 
restraint, cottonwoods, willows, and wild rose engorge themselves with every hue 
of ruddiness – russet, puce, umber, gold, musteline – whose spectral repletion we 
know also to be an agony, riding oncoming waves of cold. 
 
 
I read these words each time with a nostalgic smile on my lips. As a northern-born Minnesotan, I 
grew up hearing so many complaints about the weather. Yet we were always out in it. When 
nothing else was a conversation point, there were poetic words spoken, like Ehrlich’s here, about 
the “storm blowing in” or the “oncoming waves of cold” expected that evening, that weekend, 
that month. It is, again, a paradox in beautiful misery. But that said, I must agree that it did 
indeed draw us closer to our neighbors, and even in New York City I see this in action. Riders on 
the subway trains make jokes about needing to wedge our larger winter coats onto the bench 
seats, and patrons visibly shake off the cold from their bodies as they enter coffee shops – what 
for, if not to communicate our shared experience of the weather? In the next section, I explore 
the theme of communication further, but it overlaps strongly with the weather-induced pain 
response Ehrlich recognizes so clearly in the bitter cold.  
 
On the winter solstice it is thirty-four degrees below zero and there is very little in 
the way of daylight. The deep ache of this audacious Arctic air is also the ache in 
our lives made physical. Patches of frostbite show up on our noses, toes, and ears. 
Skin blisters as if cold were a kind of radiation to which we’ve been exposed. It 
strips what is ornamental in us. Part of the ache we feel is also a softness growing. 
Our connections with neighbors – whether strong or tenuous, as lovers or friends 
– become too urgent to disregard. We rub the frozen toes of a stranger whose 
pickup has veered off the road; we open water gaps with a tamping bar and ax; we 
splice a friend’s frozen water pipe; we take mittens and blankets to the men who 
herd sheep. Twenty or thirty below makes the breath we exchange visible: all of 
 	 106 
mine for all of yours. It is the tacit way we express the intimacy no one talks 
about. (72) 
 
Blistered skin strips off the niceties of ease, and we have to, like I do, laugh at the absurdity of 
still having pain at all in a modern life, with all the conveniences at hand. For all our 
evolutionary and technological advances, cold is still cold. The realization of this is not a 
coldness of humanity, but rather an opportunity for us to continue to learn how to relate to each 
other and the environment without hiding from it. Sure, it is true that we do hide in winter, to 
some extent, but imagine what exposure has shown Ehrlich, taught Minnesotans and Inuits alike 
for generations, passed on with their own special language of snow and weather-speak. 
 “Winter sets up curious oppositions in us,” Ehrlich says. “Where a wall of snow can seem 
threatening, it also protects our staggering psyches. All this cold has an anesthetizing effect: the 
pulse lowers and blankets of snow induce sleep” (73). We wish to shut down in the cold, and we 
would think that our bodies would force us into hibernation, but like Abbey, our bodies react 
favorably to the challenge of the elements in many ways. We lean into the cold, and we lean into 
other warm bodies. Ehrlich continues, 
 
Though the rancher’s workload is lightened in winter because of the short days, 
the work that does need to be done requires an exhausting patience. And while 
earth’s sudden frigidity can seem to dispossess us, the teamwork on cold nights 
during calving, for instance, creates a profound camaraderie – one that’s laced 
with dark humor, an effervescent lunacy, and unexpected fits of anger and tears. 
To offset Wyoming’s Arctic seascape, a nightly flush of Northern Lights dances 
above the Big Horns, irradiating winter’s pallor and reminding us that even 
though at this time of year we veer toward our various nests and seclusions, 
nature expresses itself as a bright fuse, irrepressible and orgasmic. (73) 
 
Our bodies slow down in lower temperatures, even our blood pumps more slowly, but our minds 
stay sharp in the practice of patience and waiting, waiting out the cold, waiting out the pain, or 
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working through it to get things done when we come to the point that waiting is not enough. 
There has hardly been a culture that so thoroughly devalues patience as we modern Americans 
do. Could there be hope, oddly, in being patient with the cold? 
 Moreover, she says here that the bitter cold brings on the feeling that the earth has 
“dispossessed us.” The earth is disinterested, maybe even indifferent to our frustration, so we 
cold creatures must ban together to survive. Nature is in full force we see in the sky, so what are 
we to do about it, we must ask. It can be easy, Ehrlich says, to “suffer from snow blindness, 
selecting what we see and feel while our pain whites itself out. But where there is suffocation 
and self-imposed ignorance, there is also refreshment – snow on flushed cheeks and a pristine 
kind of thinking,” and on the iced ponds we could just as easily see a “[reflection of the mind as] 
sharp, vigilant, precise,” like skating blades across the ice of our brains; “In winter, 
consciousness looks like an etching” (74). Our thoughts are laid out as plainly as deep cuts into 
glass. 
 
Dust or Cold as Visible Air: Seeing Communication 
Despite each talking about a different polar extreme from the other, vision is as much a 
theme in Ehrlich as it is in Abbey. But for Ehrlich, light is not the focus of her discussion of 
vision; rather, moisture trapped on air is. Abbey cannot have the same experience of visible 
breath that Ehrlich refers to when she says, “Twenty or thirty below makes the breath we 
exchange visible: all of mine for all of yours. It is the tacit way we express the intimacy no one 
talks about,” because as dry as a winter day can be, water still lingers so plainly that it shows up 
at the end of our noses, right between our eyes (72). Although we typically associate 
communication with sound, in the cold, any squeak or shout is swallowed up like a minnow in a 
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whale. Yet in the bitter cold, the visual aspect of communication is magnified. Even if we do not 
make noise, the very air we share sucks the water from our throats as we exhale, and our watery 
breath remains suspended in front of us, as a reminder that we communicate still with our 
physical appearance and gestures, our very breath, even if we do not make the effort to form 
speech. 
It seems perhaps to be a frightening thing to be betrayed by the natural communication of 
our body language even without our control over our words, but like the cold, it is a bittersweet 
fact of life. Intimacy oozes from our pores with the heat and moisture that we radiate into the 
atmosphere merely by living, and our breath eventually seeps from our lips even if we attempt to 
hold onto it a bit longer. Ehrlich notices that the cold reveals us for all to see, just as the desert 
appears even (or maybe only) while the sun blinds us. These are two types of exposures, the 
former of the observer, the latter the environment, and yet neither are exposed by the traditional 
method. When communicating, we expect to use auditory senses, but in the cold communication 
is visual; when seeing, we expect vision to be activated, yet in the too-bright sun, sight comes 
instead through touch or non-visual perception. 
We often think of cold weather as closed off, imagining tightly shut windows and people 
huddled closely over fires, but for Ehrlich cold weather is social too. We will notice later that 
Thoreau also saw winter as social through the chattering of animals, preserved tracks in the snow 
used as cross-species trails to water sources, and the crackling ice. And, as furthered evidenced 
in Thoreau’s discussion of the thundering pond, which we will come to in the next chapter, this 
idea of the air as visible communication is not limited to blistering winters, either. Thoreau 
explains that even, “A field of water betrays the spirit that is in the air…” He elaborates: 
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It is continually receiving new life and motion from above. It is intermediate in its 
nature between land and sky. On land only the grass and trees wave, but the water 
itself if rippled by the wind. I see where the breeze dashes across it by the streaks 
or flakes of light. It is remarkable that we can look down on its surface. We shall, 
perhaps, look down thus on the surface of air at length, and mark where a still 
subtler spirit sweeps over it.141 
 
Dust particles suspended in the air that swirl as we move about a sunny room in the mid-
afternoon, wind that flutters the pages of a book in hand, condensation collecting on car 
windows, and the weight of humid air dragging down leaves all are examples, both human and 
non-human, of the shared language of our environment. It may not be in English or Latin, but it 
is nonetheless a sort of lingua franca. Cues are moving about just as words, stringing together a 
description of the environment at present.142  
Philosopher of education Derek Ford relates visible communication on air to schools in 
his work on the pneumatic common of the classroom. An environment may differ, but a shared 
sphere of air remains, and within that sphere a teacher might is a gauge the health of the space, 
and an expression of the “climate” of that environment. Classrooms are environments of shared 
breath, Ford argues, and I add that we can say the same in reverse: that outdoor environments are 
pneumatic commons as well, classrooms in their own right. Ford speaks of “air conditions,” as 
we associate those terms with forced air or A/C units purely metaphorically, but his work 
supports the conclusion that air conditions exist in all places, and some conditions may be more 
conducive to learning than others. We concur that the condition of the air is indeed a factor in 
quality learning.  
																																																								
141 Thoreau, Walden, 201. 
 
142 See Peters’s book Speaking Into the Air for a contemporary discussion of the air as a medium 
– media – for communication. 
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Thinking of air in relation to human interactions in the classroom reminds me again of 
the deep sociality embedded in Ehrlich’s characterization of wind. Her philosophy of wind is 
similar to the Holy Winds of the Diné (Navajo) people. For the Diné, Wind is strongly associated 
with health, life, words, language, and communication between humans and non-humans.143 
Take, for instance, her story of being sick with pneumonia as a child and needing her mother to 
support her stifled respiration with puffs of her own air (8). Ehrlich describes this moment as 
impacting her later romance with the wind. Her mother’s wind once saved her life, just as 
moving to a place where the wind is more visible to her again saves Ehrlich’s adult life.  
As with the cold, ice, and wind, Ehrlich reports that the dust lingering in the air “is the 
scalpel and the suit of armor that make westerners what they are. Dry air presses a stockman’s 
insides outward. The secret, inner self is worn not on the sleeve but in the skin. It’s an 
unlubricated condition: there’s not enough moisture in the air to keep the whole emotional 
machinery oiled and working” (78-79). This reminds me of an exact location in New York City, 
under the Flatiron Building, where drafts of wind off of the oddly shaped, wedge building force 
women’s skirts to billow up. Victorian-era men used to congregate on the park benches nearby to 
wait for glimpses of ankles and petticoats exposed by the wind.  
Abbey must have had an experience in the desert like Ehrlich’s, one wherein the people 
are reserved and emotionally revealed only in gestures. He spends very little time in Desert 
Solitaire relaying long conversations he has had with guests of the Arches or coworkers. There is 
an inner narrative to Abbey’s writing that is rarely punctuated by encounters with other people, 
but when people are there with him, talk is short and to the point. Ehrlich describes words on the 
range as sparing, like the water in the desert, “as if verbosity would create a thirst too extreme to 
																																																								
143 McNeley, 15. 
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bear,” and “sentence structure is shortened to the skin and bones of a thought… Language, so 
compressed becomes metaphorical” (79; 6). Metaphorical. Precisely as I argue the importance of 
metaphorical language in Chapter III, Ehrlich discovers the pervasiveness of metaphor in the rare 
uttered words on a dusty day. 
In dust silence becomes as crucial for communication as noise. “Instead of talking we 
seem to share one eye. Keenly observed, the world is transformed. The landscape is engorged 
with detail, every movement on it chillingly sharp” like Abbey’s desert at dusk takes on a barren 
glow (7). And it is as if mixed with the particles of dirt and the dust in the air, something else is 
swirling around like pockets of electricity or the eeriness of a fog machine at a rock concert. 
“The air between people is charged. Days unfold, bathed in their own music. Nights become 
hallucinatory; dreams, prescient” (7). Ehrlich’s description sounds like the Plains Indians’ vision 
quests, when non-human objects commune with prairie walkers as if they are all together in 
some drugged state, all under the same visual influence of the air like it is choked with fairy dust. 
When out on her own in the winter, Ehrlich returns to the role of silence of the cold in 
coming to new philosophical conclusions. Unlike on a warm day, cold air has the strange ability 
to snuff out echoes or reverberating sounds, a dampening effect. Scientifically, this could indeed 
be caused by heavy moisture content in the air carrying the sound. And, like the sound on the air, 
Ehrlich yields, “Winter looks oceanic to me. Snow swells, drops back, and hits the hulls of our 
lives with a course-bending sound” (72). But on other days, the cold brings Ehrlich to the alone-
ness felt by Abbey. “During the winter, while I was riding to find a new calf, my jeans froze to 
the saddle, and in the silence that such cold creates I felt like the first person on earth, or the last” 
(1). Again, the absence of sound but the presence of vision is momentous, a complicated 
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contraction and retraction of sensation and perception that contributes to “bending the course” of 
a human life. 
 
 
Annie Dillard and Pressure Fronts 
As I explained in Chapter II with a review of the literature on the philosophy of outdoor 
education, many accounts of outdoor learning are centered around place-based learning 
environments, or placefulness. Ed Casey explains, “To be at all—to exist in any way—is to be 
somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some kind of place.”144 In line with this nature 
writing tradition, Annie Dillard, a modern-day resident of the rolling hills and mountains of rural 
Virginia, documents in her journal the natural environment, the place around her. Like we see in 
Abbey’s Arches, Ehrlich’s Wyoming, and later in Thoreau’s Walden and Muir’s Sierras, nature 
writers are keen to cite their place for study, returning to one area repeatedly to learn its secrets 
as if lifting the Veil of Isis145 in a familiar place with aid in generalizing that knowledge to the 
rest of the world. This is a noble pursuit indeed, and one that yields significant journaling data 
from our writers. 
In fact, Dillard proclaims herself in the pursuit of a “meteorological journal of the mind” 
(13), a literal journeyer in her own wild backyard. This is the very reason she titles her book 
Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, because she is on a spiritual journey for religious truth. She seeks to 
answer if there is God in a place, in her place. The trouble with interpreting Dillard’s writing as a 
pilgrimage of a place, her local creek, is that it narrows our thought specifically to the 
																																																								
144 Casey, ix. 	
145 See Hadot’s book entitled The Veil of Isis.	
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environmental landscape, conjuring images of the “picturesque” and aesthetic tastefulness that 
requires a rigid boundary. But the non-human world does not have many actual natural 
boundaries, other than perhaps the cut of a stream through a wood, or the sudden drop off at a 
cliff’s edge. It is limiting to consider our experience outdoors as bound to a specific 
environment, although it is true that we culturally and perhaps biologically are draw to the 
simple structure of categorizing space as place.  
I am not entirely convinced that nature writers see their “places” as more than the 
location they are in, as we see that Ehrlich continually uses Wyoming to describe her home but 
we know the state of Wyoming to be only a label added to a vast ecosystem and bound by 
government lines. Wyoming itself did not always exist, nor did Dillard’s Tinker Creek. The 
environment and the weather and the aesthetic world preceded their formal names. So while it is 
useful to think in terms of “place,” I argue that placefulness in learning has its conceptual limits 
and erroneous assumptions about the lines humans draw in non-human nature, the artificial 
structures we create to make sense of the seemingly nonsensical infinity of space.  
There are hints that Dillard is attached to more than the outdoor place, and these are what 
I wish to draw upon. I want to show how, with a subtle shift in language, what appears to be a 
home-court attachment is in reality her relational method of making sense of the most familiar 
parts of her environment. She is searching a place but learning from it as more than an isolated 
location. What she is learning may be built from the Virginia woods, but it is learning applicable 
to any outdoor environmental experience. As Dillard walks her common paths, her aesthetic 
sensibilities grow sharper and stronger over time, and she becomes more capable of answering 
her grander inquiries. She explains this methodological commitment, declaring, “We must 
somehow take a wider view, look at the whole landscape, really see it, and describe what’s going 
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on here” (11). As I have explained, though, Dillard is talking of “landscape” as something much 
vaster than place. We should make note of her starting words here: “…and the shape of the air in 
the pines. And, if I try to keep my eye on quantum physics, if I try to keep up with astronomy 
and cosmology, and really believe it all, I might ultimately be able to make out the landscape of 
the universe. Why not?” (139, emphasis added). The “shape of the air” she says, and the 
landscape not of her Virginia wilds but of the universe. Air has no place, and it only has shape as 
we view it in its movements with things like blades of grass or flickering pine needles.  
It is too simple, too easy, and frankly inaccurate, to see outdoor learning as learning a 
study of architectural place. In visiting Tinker Creek, Dillard goes from the mindset of one 
casually sauntering and observing the naturally constructed environment, a “placeful” thinker, to 
a meteorological journalist, a Thoreauvian naturalist. She says, “…surely it ought to have been 
enough, more than enough. But look what happens. You open the door and all heaven and hell 
break loose” (133). What she finds is a greater complexity and depth of learning than she had 
imagined. Dillard morphs from observer to researcher, weather exposure to weather learning: “I 
am the arrow shaft, carved along my length by unexpected lights and gashes from the very sky, 
and this book is the straying trail of blood” (15). 
 
Pressure is Memorable 
When dark black clouds roll into the sky, beasts of tremendous foreboding, we notice and 
we react. Dillard describes the process of reacting to our environment early in Pilgrim at Tinker 
Creek: “…I see something, …or something sees me, some enormous power brushes me with its 
clean wing, and I resound like a beaten bell” (14). We answer to environmental pressure, 
especially air pressure. 
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These are morning matters, pictures you dream as the final wave heaves you up 
on the sand to the bright light and drying air. You remember pressure, and a 
curved sleep you rested against, soft, like a scallop in its shell. But the air hardens 
on your skin; you stand; you leave the lighted shore to explore some dim 
headland, and soon you’re lost in the leafy interior, intent, remembering nothing. 
(4) 
 
Dillard says that you remember pressure cradling you like a mollusk, but when that pressure 
shifts, or air hardens, as it most certainly will do with the chill of the morning, you are propelled 
out of your cozy nest to explore and move again. Although the pressure was your impetus for 
awakening, you later cannot remember anything at all. How, then, is pressure memorable? I 
think she is speaking here of two different forms of remembering. The former is a memory in the 
body, the latter a mental memory. After a night of witnessing wild happenings and wonders 
outdoors, Dillard reverberates with bodily memory: “I walked home in a shivering daze, up hill 
and down. Later I lay open-mouthed in bed, my arms flung wide at my sides to steady the 
whirling darkness” (23). Her experience is defined by her body’s tonal change, the muscle 
twinges that remind her learning has happened.  
 Air pressure changes are most palpable in the case of a looming weather fronts. The 
impact of atmospheric pressure on Dillard is so vital to her learning experiences outdoors that it 
is worth quoting a series of excerpts from her journal on this matter: 
 
In a dry wind like this, snow and ice can pass directly into the air as a gas without 
having first melted to water. This process is called sublimation; tonight the snow 
in the yard and the ice in the creek sublime. A breeze buffets my palm held a foot 
from the wall. A wind like this does my breathing for me; it engenders something 
quick and kicking in my lungs... A single cell quivers at a windy embrace; it 
swells and splits, it bubbles into a raspberry; a dark clot starts to throb. Soon 
something perfect is born. Something wholly new rides the wind, something fleet 
and fleeting I’m likely to miss. (54) 
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In physics, sublimation of matter directly from a solid to a gas phase requires a particular 
combination of temperature and pressure. Sublimation, the racing forward into another state, 
could also be called transformation of states. In some cases, chemists use sublimation to purify 
compounds, and historically, sublimation was thought to possibly bring about alchemy – the 
transformation of base metals into “noble metals” like pure gold. It is no coincidence, then that 
Dillard uses sublimation as a name for the feeling of change that she gets from a dry wind. And, 
like the mastery of alchemy, one must be vigilant and on point to catch that “fleeting” speck of 
gold that “rides the wind.” 
 Being outdoors is a state of preparation for sublimation, rapid change, dramatic change, 
for Dillard. “You may wake and look from the window and breathe the real air, and say, with 
satisfaction or with longing, ‘This is it.’ But if you look up the creek, if you look up the creek in 
any weather, your spirit fills, and you are saying, with an exulting rise of the lungs, ‘Here it 
comes!’" (101). Watch for it in any weather, Dillard says. Here it comes! The weather fills us 
with exuberance and readiness, it does not just tell us like peering out the window to see if it is 
raining or not, it shakes and rattles us so that we are physically prepared for it.  
 Sometimes, in humid weather, when it is not nice outside, Dillard feels the gold on the air 
with a quality of dread. We are not always ready for change, and it can feel like an approaching 
shadow. This too, is the reality of transformative learning. We may not always greet it with rosy 
glasses and open arms, and it may sneak into our lives without clamor. She writes: 
 
Still the day had an air of menace. A broken whiskey bottle by the log, the brown 
tip of a snake’s tail disappearing between two rocks on the hill at my back, the 
rabbit the dog nearly caught, the rabies I knew was in the country, the bees who 
kept unaccountably fumbling at my forehead with their furred feet… 
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I headed over to the new woods by the creek, the motorbike woods. They were 
strangely empty. The air was so steamy I could barely see…There wasn’t a breath 
of wind. (150). 
 
The absence of something expected in our environment, like wind, can take on an “air of 
menace.” I am struck immediately by the similarity of Dillard’s experience with steamy and 
smothering air and Abbey’s haunting moment expecting someone on the road with him. 
Sometimes we are truly surprised by what we find outdoors, and it unsettles us as much as it 
rights us. This too, is learning, and it is as important as the feel-good type of learning experience 
that we are most accustomed to. Maybe this disposition is even more crucial to our 
transformation. 
 
Affront of Light 
 
 Transformative learning is as risky as it is ultimately rewarding. To change, although it is 
often inevitable, is to let in something new for a while. It is vulnerability, and it is letting go to 
something old. Dillard does not mince words about the experience, like Socrates’s Allegory of 
the Cave, of looking directly into the affront of light in the real world. “Darkness appalls and 
light dazzles; the scrap of visible light that doesn’t hurt my eyes hurts my brain. What I see sets 
me swaying. Size and distance and the sudden swelling of meanings confuse me, bowl me 
over…I’m dizzy, I fall in. This looking business is risky.” This reminds me of my recent viewing 
of the partial solar eclipse from my New York apartment window. In order to view the 
phenomenon, I had to force my eyes directly in the line of the sun, feeling them water and burn 
without protective lenses for the hope of experiencing it fully from my own natural lenses. This, 
of course, was too much at once. The intensity of the sun was a blinding affront from which I 
struggled even still to look away from its dizziness. I had fallen into the sun.  
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 Dillard cites a letter written by Van Gogh, about how “’a great deal of light falls on 
everything.’ If we are blinded by darkness,” she says, “we are also blinded by light. When too 
much light falls on everything, a special terror results” (24). Dillard then proceeds to tell the 
story of the Greenland Eskimos, who fall prey to a psychological sickness in their kayaks out on 
the fjords’ waters in still weather. When a kayak hunter experiences this flat, windless day, the 
water lies so quiet that it appears to be glass. The hunter cannot flinch, or he would scare away 
the seals, his prey. After many hours like this, with the sun low and beaming off the mirror water 
into his eyes, he falls into a trace that feels very much like sinking into the water. Paralyzed by 
fear, he cannot hunt to save himself.  
Being outdoors in the weather is a risk, but a worthy one. Dillard retells another story of 
light learning, “Something broke and something opened. I filled up like a new wineskin. I 
breathed an air like light; I saw a light like water. I was the lip of a fountain the creek filled 
forever; I was ether, the leaf in the zephyr; I was flesh-flake, feather, bone” (34). She is not 
without a modicum of fear: “But I can’t go out and try to see this way. I’ll fail, I’ll go mad,” she 
worries. Dillard reminds herself then of Jacques Ellul saying, “Launch into the deep, and you 
shall see” (34). So she goes, and she takes as careful an approach outdoors as possible, fully 
aware of the risks and rewards of this exposure: 
 
Instead you must allow the muddy river to flow unheeded in the dim channels of 
consciousness; you raise your sights; you look along it, mildly, acknowledging its 
presence without real interest and gazing beyond it into the realm of the real 
where subjects and objects act and rest purely, without utterance…although it 
comes to those who wait for it, it is always, event to the most practiced and adept, 
a gift and a total surprise. (34) 
 
This theme of a “gift” from the weather, the “subjects and objects” that “act and rest purely, 
without utterance” we will recognize again in the next Chapter as an idea of Thoreau’s, who 
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strongly influenced Dillard’s nature writing. Dillard is waiting for a lesson to come, but it is still 
a surprise gift from the non-human things that do not speak a language per se, yet can pass on 
some offering to her that she will readily accept. “The secret of seeing,” or learning, Dillard says, 
“is to sail on solar wind. Hone and spread your spirit till you yourself are a sail, whetted, 
translucent, broadside to the merest puff” (34). Work with the weather, not against it, and it will 
bring you gifts. 
 I find it marvelously fascinating and affirming that Dillard is not the only one to 
philosophize about the weather like this. She reports that Stephen Graham, 
 
Startled me by describing this same gift in his antique and elegant book, The 
Gentle Art of Tramping. He wrote, “And as you sit on the hillside, or lie prone 
under the trees of the forest, or sprawl wet-legged on the shingly beach of a 
mountain stream, the great door, that does not look like a door, opens.” That great 
door opens on the present, illuminates it as with a multitude of flashing torches 
(81). 
 
Notice the connection Dillard makes, again in the philosophical tradition of the ancient Greeks, 
like Plato, to the allusion of light in learning. There is agency involved in getting outside, but the 
learning itself is as much of a gift as a ray of light on a winter day. We will return to this theme 
in greater detail when we discuss the experiences of Thoreau with apricity. For now, we 
transition from allusion to illusion, and reap the rewards of a metaphorical take on the tricks that 
light plays and how we can interpret light as learning. 
 
 
Optical Illusions as Metaphors of Life 
 
There are seven or eight categories of phenomena in the world that are worth 
talking about, and one of them is the weather. Any time you care to get in your 
car and drive across the country and over the mountains, come into our valley, 
cross Tinker Creek, drive up the road to the house, walk across the yard, knock on 
the door and ask to come in and talk about the weather, you’d be welcome. (51) 
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You are welcome, Dillard invites, to come and discuss the weather. Where does her faith and 
belief and attachment to the weather come from? In this subsection we revisit a great optical 
illusion that becomes a memorable friend throughout her life, giving her advice, embracing her 
in down times, and giving her reason to contemplate the sky. We shall call her friend by the 
phrase she uses, “The Tree With the Lights In It.” It may not be an elegant name, but it is a 
revealing one. When describing how she finds philosophy of life in her journaling and searching 
outdoors, and why she is called so loudly to that effort, she tells a story of a blind girl, newly 
restored to sight. 
 
When her doctor took her bandages off and led her into the garden, the girl who 
was no longer blind saw ‘the tree with the lights in it.’ It was for this tree I 
searched through the peach orchards of summer, in the forests of fall and down 
winter and spring for years. Then one day I was walking along Tinker Creek 
thinking of nothing at all and I saw the tree with the lights in it. I saw the 
backyard cedar where the mourning doves roost charges and transfigured, each 
cell buzzing with flame. I stood on the grass with the lights in it, grass that was 
wholly fire, utterly focused and utterly dreamed. It was less like seeing than like 
being for the first time seen, knocked breathless by a powerful glance. The flood 
of fire abated, but I’m still spending the power. Gradually the lights went out in 
the cedar, the colors died, the cells unflamed and disappeared. I was still ringing. I 
had been my whole life a bell, and never knew it until at that moment I was lifted 
and struck. I have since only very rarely seen the tree with the lights in it. The 
vision comes and goes, but I live for it, for the moment when the mountains open 
and a new light roars in spate through the crack, and the mountains slam. (36) 
 
The no-longer-blind girl, without a vocabulary yet to reference, described a backlit tree as having 
dazzling twinkle lights like a decorated Christmas tree. It was a humble and childlike 
understanding, but one, once introduced, that even Dillard could see too. And with the same 
mystification of coincidence and mutual understanding that we are flushed with when we 
suddenly hear someone else’s story in our lives as if it were happening to us and not them for the 
first time, Dillard was charmed into looking for that same optical illusion of The Tree With the 
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Lights In It. It is fascinating to find a similar line in John Muir, when he describes a tree canopy 
that “looks something like a cumulus cloud when the sunshine is pouring over it” (21).146 The 
occurrence of these common experiences is not mere coincidence at this point, as we have 
noticed, the overlaps are strong and frequent. They are evidence of a Deweyan-like shared 
experience of aesthetic learning outdoors in a weather-rich environment that we have in common 
yet find so challenging to put to equal words. Dillard does this with the case of The Tree With 
the Lights In It. She gives a label to experience, just as we will later see in Chapter VI that 
Wordsworth calls similar experiences “spots of time.” 
 Dillard’s most notable experience finding The Tree With the Lights In It is told within 
another outdoor story of “Patting the Puppy.” Dillard tells a simple tale set at a desolate gas 
station with remarkable elegance befitting the weight of the moment: 
 
I am absolutely alone. There are no other customers. The road is vacant, the 
interstate is out of sight and earshot. I have hazarded into a new corner of the 
world, an unknown spot, a Brigadoon. Before me extends a low hill trembling in 
yellow brome, and behind the hill, filling the sky, rises and enormous mountain 
ridge, forested, alive and awesome with brilliant blown lights. I have never seen 
anything so tremulous and live. Overhead, great strips and chunks of cloud dash 
to the northwest in a gold rush. At my back the sun is setting – how can I not have 
noticed before tat the sun is setting? My mind has been a blank slab of black 
asphalt for hours, but that doesn’t stop the sun’s wild wheel. I set my coffee 
beside me on the curb; I smell loam on the wind; I pat the puppy; I watch the 
mountain. 
 
My hand works automatically over the puppy’s fur, following the line of hair 
under his ears, down his neck, inside his forelegs, along his hot-skinned belly. 
Shadows lope along the mountain’s rumpled flanks...A warm purple pigment 
pools in each ruck and tuck of the rock…As the purple vaults and slides, it tricks 
out the unleafed forest and rumpled rock in gilt, in shape-shifting patches of glow. 
These gold lights veer and retract, shatter and glide in a series of dazzling 																																																								
146	Coincidentally, another “tree alight” experience is cited by Muir, 29: “…when the wind 
sways the needles all one way at a certain angle every tree becomes a tower of white quivering 
sun-fire.”		
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splashes, shrinking, leaking, exploding…the light warms and reddens…The air 
cools; the puppy’s skin is hot. I am more alive than all the world. 
 
This is it, I think, this is it, right now, the present, this empty gas station, here, this 
western wind, this tang of coffee on the tongue, and I am patting the puppy, I am 
watching the mountain. And the second I verbalize this awareness in my brain, I 
cease to see the mountain or feel the puppy. I am opaque, so much black asphalt. 
But at the same second, the second I know I’ve lost it, I also realize that the puppy 
is still squirming on his back under my hand. Nothing has changed for him…  
 
I sip my coffee. I look at the mountain, which is still doing its tricks, as you look 
at a still-beautiful face belonging to a person who was once your lover in another 
country years ago: with fond nostalgia, and recognition, but no real feeling save a 
secret astonishment that you are now strangers. Thanks. For the memories. 
 
…Catch it [the gilt light] if you can. (79-80) 
 
This compound moment of optical illusion and sensation is wiped away from her awareness as 
quickly as it came. She goes from the motion of patting the warm belly of the puppy and 
examining the light cast across the mountain, moving golden flakes over the barren trees and 
rock, to a jarring other-state as her self-consciousness cuts the umbilical cord bound to the sun, 
severing her from her aesthetic experience, she snorts, like “a bitter birthday present from 
evolution” (80). She identifies the experience she was having Patting the Puppy as an outdoor 
aesthetic one, which she prematurely broke with cognitive narrative. She allowed her mind to 
take control of the situation, although it should have been her entire self in that moment, not a 
stream of self-consciousness exercising its fabled superiority. Consciousness and presence are 
valuable, but self-consciousness it premature reflection that drives out experience (82). 
Reflection is necessary for learning, but it cannot surpass the moment of primary experience. As 
Dewey explains, reflection is secondary, not primary.147 About this cut in experiencing, she 
laments,  
																																																								
147 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 15-17. 
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...that I drew scales over my eyes between me and the mountain and gloved my 
hand between me and the puppy – is not the only point. After all, it would have 
ended anyway. I’ve never seen a sunset or felt a wind that didn’t. No, the point is 
that not only does time fly and do we die, but that in these reckless conditions we 
live at all, and are vouchsafed, for the duration of certain inexplicable moments, 
to know it (80).   
 
 
How surprising it is that “in these reckless conditions” where our mind so easily dominates with 
self-consciousness that we “live at all.” How amazing, she says, that we can experience even 
momentarily such aesthetic awareness, and approach that moment with the sense that we can 
actually grasp the reality of it. 
“What made me look at that roadside tree?” Dillard asks herself (84.) Yes, what caused 
that door to open at that time? Time is fleeting, and although transformative lessons are learned 
that stay with us forever, time does not allow us to say in the primary experience of learning for 
very long. “We tune in and out,” Dillard explains, “but moments are not lost” (86). It is not as if 
she has forgotten Patting the Puppy or The Tree With the Lights In It. At another passing 
moment she says an experience will open like a door, “And the cumulative force of the present 
you’ve forgotten sets you reeling, staggering, as if you’d been struck broadside by a plank. It all 
floods back to you” (86). When the day comes again that memory of your transformative 
experience outdoors returns to you, it is not the puppy or the tree itself that you notice, she says, 
“…This is it, this is the real weather, the lavender light fading, the full moisture in your lungs, 
the heat from the pavement on your lips and palms – not the dry orange dust form horses’ 
hooves, the salt sea, the sour Coke – but this solid air” (86). It is the real weather that you see and 
feel again. Why? The reason must be that weather is as much an original feature of the 
experience as the objects and things that its atmospheric light had illuminated. 
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Dillard coyly returns to the moment, looking directly at us her readers, and at the no-
longer-blind girl: “You have seen the tree with the lights in it, haven’t you? You must have…I 
don’t know what Pascal saw. I saw a cedar. Xerxes saw a sycamore” (89). Was mine a tree, I 
wonder, when I saw The Lights for the first time? I am thinking of Dr. Biggs, my introduction to 
this dissertation, and the classroom poll about our first meaningful moments of learning that so 
often happen to be outdoors. My answer comes to me as I review my phrasing. I no longer focus 
on the tree itself, as I have learned through reading these nature writings that there is so much 
more that permeates an experience than a single focal object. It is an atmospheric, illusionary, 
environmental flow that lights up a tree in this most memorable way. 
When we come to Dillard’s conclusion, there is a sense that her pilgrimage has indeed 
come to fruition, she has established some working understanding of a causal, God-like 
movement about her environment, and there is less of the angst of her earliest pages in her 
conclusion. She looks at what was at first a homey place as now a world anew, and I get the 
distinct sense that she has found a modicum of peace and understanding even about the parts of 
her environment that had once been brashly alien. “So I breathe,” Dillard reflects,  
 
I breathe at the open window above my desk, and a moist fragrance assails me 
from the gnawed leaves of the growing mock orange. The air is as intricate as the 
light that filters through forested mountain ridges and into my kitchen window… 
 
I cannot in all honesty call the world old when I’ve seen it new. On the other 
hand, neither will honesty permit me suddenly to invoke certain experiences of 
newness and beauty as binding, sweeping away all knowledge. But I am thinking 
now of the tree with the lights in it, the cedar in the yard by the creek I saw 
transfigured. (244) 
 
As Ehrlich spoke of breath like a fragrance upon the air, or a party phone line for humans and 
non-humans alike, Dillard takes in the air from her window as if it is light streaming in. This 
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breath of air stimulates reflection on the aesthetic experience of The Tree With the Lights In It, 
which here she refers to as the world as new. She is also reticent to declare what experiences she 
has seen as concrete answers, which I agree is a mature level of understanding. She cannot see 
beauty and newness exclusively in place of the previous knowledge she had of the earth; it is not 
as if she is brushing away world history with her latest outdoor education. Dillard deduces 
further that “knowledge does not vanquish mystery, or obscure its distant lights. I still now and 
will tomorrow steer by what happened that day, when some undeniably new spirit roared down 
the air, bowled me over, and turned on the lights” (244). As philosophers like Mooney and Sallis 
and Bugbee can attest, a new experience in nature does not erase the mystery that we crave from 
it. We can come to know something better without ever exhausting the knowledge possible to be 
gained from it.  
 Dillard recalls the experience of The Tree With the Lights In It one more time, and this 
time she is sure to compare it directly to air, “I stood on grass like air, air like lightning, coursed 
in my blood, floated my bones, swam in my teeth” (244). The moment that she spent in that 
primary experience waned, but her reflection upon it ebbs and flows continuously, and is 
reignited with the lightning, the air, when again the experience is relived in her body. It is our 
consolation, Dillard claims, that “the tree with the lights in it does not go out; that light still 
shines on an old world, now feebly, now bright” (245). And this is the note she leaves us on, a 
reflection on the impact that small aesthetic experiences, which she associates with breath, air, 
lightning, and other weather concepts. She leaves us with pressure changes and with The Tree 
With the Lights In It.  
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Chapter VI 
Learning in the Air 
 
In the previous chapter, “Articulating the Aesthetic Experience Outdoors,” the 
introduction to our seven nature writers, we see that Abbey learns from the intensity of the sun, 
Ehrlich learns from the bitter cold, and Dillard learns from pressure fronts. Each of these 
aesthetic experiences in weather-rich environments epitomizes the painfulness and grittiness of 
this type of learning. Edward Abbey is jarred awake by the sun, Gretel Ehrlich contrasts the 
frozen north with inner human warmth, and Annie Dillard struggles with the atmospheric 
pressure and storms both inside her as existential reckoning and outside of her as life and death, 
from blindness to an affront of light.  
In the present chapter, “Learning in the Air,” we explore a somewhat different data set 
from the remaining four writers: Henry David Thoreau, Mary Oliver, John Muir, and William 
Wordsworth. While Chapter V was about the struggle to articulate this complex learning 
experience investigated here, Chapter VI is the theoretical extension of direct experience to 
intelligent experiencing, or learning, now that we have some source of semi-articulation. It 
should be noted, however, that the division of these writers into two separate chapters is largely 
heuristic. Many of the themes challenge these two neat categories I have experimentally created. 
Actually, the themes overlap and flow into one another like raindrops trickling down separate 
and conjoined paths on a glass windowpane. 
Another possible distinction that can be made in this second set of experiences is a 
curious emphasis on air, sky, and heavens. I sense a “looking up” about these writers and their 
experiences; there is a tone of revelation and reverie about. The writers are not preoccupied with 
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questions of what is around them or what is happening but instead how they might document it 
for future recovery. Thoreau nods to this naturalist-learner orientation: 
 
So many autumn, ay, and winter days, spent outside the town, trying to hear what 
was in the wind, to hear and carry it express...or waiting at evening on the hill-
tops for the sky to fall, that I might catch something, though I never caught much, 
and that manna-wise, would dissolve again in the sun…my pains were their own 
reward. For many years I was self-appointed inspector of snow-storms and rain-
storms, and did my duty faithfully; surveyor, if not of highways, then of forest 
paths and all across-lot routes… (16) 	
As we have seen, Dillard also journals as a self-appointed inspector, but her written attitude 
harbors more gripping passion and frightening confusion than the quaint inquisitiveness that 
Thoreau’s exhibits. Even Thoreau’s humor casts an “airy” light on his writing. Muir and 
Wordsworth maintain a similar airiness in their lavish praise for the graces of the natural 
environment.  	 When I named this chapter, I was thinking of the phrase “love in the air.” We use those 
words ubiquitously in romantic notions of the atmosphere. But this chapter is not about feeling as 
pure romance, which we so often put at odds with rational thought. Learning is atmospheric just 
as love is, it permeates the atmosphere, and it affects our feelings and our actions. Learning, like 
love, even affects our physical bodies. Nothing is left untouched by air, and love in the air 
touches all. Learning in the air, then, is comparably omnipresent. This is the “high” experience 
of transformative learning. Like a love song, these nature writers express their experiences as 
weather ballads. 
		 128 
                                           
Henry David Thoreau and Apricity148 
Apricity is a conscious sensation of the warmth of the sun in winter. Comforting heat 
against a contrasting cold, and it comes from without, not within. This is an important factor that 
distinguishes my reading of Thoreau, I believe, as it is so common to hear the Romantic-era 
American Transcendentalists profiled as mystics or mentalists.149 In reality, they relied greatly on 
the extension of humanity as nature, or somewhat more accurately, the presence of non-human 
nature in our matured, transformed selves: the outside reaching into us. This is just what the 
weather does in philosopher-poet Henry David Thoreau’s most famous book Walden, it extends 





148 As was customary in the previous chapter, within each subsection of Chapter VI the major 
nature writer and text featured will be cited in-text, unless otherwise noted. 	
149 Mooney, “Sympathy,” 82. 
		 129 
Winter Warmth 
Ehrlich finds the tenderness of human communication in the shared breaths of cold air, 
puffs of hot condensation ballooning into a frigid atmosphere. Thoreau too finds an intimacy 
outdoors in the winter, warmth, and like Ehrlich, this is heat contrasted from bitter cold. The 
warmth of the sun in winter – apricity – is a red-hot finger pointing at us, a striking apposition 
with an otherwise icy day. However, theirs is not a heat generated from within human bodies, but 
from without. In this way, as I introduced earlier, Thoreau’s American Transcendentalist-Era 
tradition shines through his writing like a sunbeam reaching our exposed cheeks, spreading 
tingling heat to our extremities with such a delicate flush. The sun’s gift of apricity is a 
pleasantry of the social interaction of the human body with the earthly environment, as much a 
reminder of our non-human-like qualities, almost cold-blooded adaptability at times like a snake 
basking on a sunny rock, as well as our ability to commune with a non-living force like the 
energy of the heat of the sun. 
 
It appeared to me that for a like reason men remain in their present low and 
primitive condition; but if they should feel the influence of the spring of springs 
arousing them, they would of necessity rise to a higher and more ethereal life. I 
had previous seen the snakes in frosty mornings in my path with portions of their 
bodies still numb and inflexible, waiting for the sun to thaw them. (41) 
 
Thoreau craves the social life of the outdoors, which is as much cognitively enriching, as it is 
physical and emotional. Consider, for example, the experience of immense relief one feels when 
being able to finally escape the office after a long day. Breaking into the light, and the moving 
air, and the freshness of a new space is a revitalization of our tired holistic selves. I argue that we 
need this uplifting outside world as much as we need the daily slog that provides us with our 
paycheck and our groceries.   
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Thoreau not only needs reprieve outdoors to famously “suck the marrow out of life” (93), 
he needs it to see friends that bring him joy, a joy that he feels is necessary to life. Joy is 
survival; desolation kills. Educators can relate to this, because it is the joy of learning that we 
believe extends the desire for growth and knowledge beyond compulsory classrooms. It is the 
joy of wonder and subsequent discovery that drives our passion to continue to learn, although 
learning can be just as easily crushed by depressive non-receptivity. The joy for learning is 
somewhat equivalent to the traveling bug: the more new people and new places and new cultures 
one encounters, the more one wants to forever be a global citizen, a traveler. It is self-sustaining 
apricity that allows Thoreau to continue traveling outdoors, joyfully drawing him out of his 
hermitage like a spring bear from her den: 
 
I weathered some merry snow-storms, and spent some cheerful winter evenings 
by my fireside, while the snow whirled wildly without, and even the hooting of 
the owl was hushed…The elements, however, abetted me in making a path 
through the deepest snow in the woods, for when I had once gone through the 
wind blew the oak leaves into my tracks, where they ledged, and by absorbing the 
rays of the sun melted the snow, and so not only made me a bed for my feet, but 
in the night their dark line was my guide. (273) 
 
 
Only one trail cutting was needed, then the wind and the sun kept Thoreau’s footprints in the 
snow deeper yet and hollowed out the excess snowflakes, and then in the shadows of the forest 
created by the moonlight defining the little boot-made canyons, his feet could still find their way 
in the dark holes by stepping into those dark plodded holes. Again, Thoreau initiates here a novel 
philosophical position: that apricity, weather, is warmth coming into us, impacting our lives from 
without. We are not generating this heat ourselves, just like Thoreau is not post-holing trails each 
day to keep his way cleared. The weather impacts us, a sensation that our controlling sensibilities 
and understanding of human agency can sometimes struggle to accept. But agency and 
		 131 
leadership is not absent in this aesthetic experience, even if other people are not present. Thoreau 
says that he still requires a “guide” on his way at night. Even if his own feet initially trod the 
trail, he cannot retain the path and follow it without a little natural aid from the sun and the wind 
and the moon-cast shadows.  
 This raises a challenge for philosophers as we struggle to find out “who” steps into this 
role: Is it man or weather that leads this inquiry? Does apricity draw Thoreau outside, or does 
Thoreau’s walking routine get him traveling? I think the only answer can be one of greater 
complexity, that both positions are needed. We cannot assume that weather controls our paths, 
nor that mankind chooses to walk a moonlit night without regard for the aesthetic qualities that 
enticed him there. Like any relationship or interaction in the world, this is not a one-sided 
propellant, both push back, even if in resistance. And again this seems correct for educators, who 
understand that learning is a reciprocal action between giving and receiving. The challenge in 
Western thought, however, is still the tendency to see humans as the origins, humans as the 
teachers. I believe Thoreau would say this is our bias for seeing humans as the primary source of 
intelligence. He argues for the air affecting us: “We should really be fed and cheered if when we 
met a man we were sure to see that some of the qualities which I have named, which we all prize 
more than those other productions, but which are for the most part broadcast and floating in the 
air, had taken root and grown in him” (173). Instead, let us flip this bias on its head, considering 
for a bit, the role of something “floating in the air” as the lessons that take root and grow in us. 
 Edward Mooney’s 2016 article in The Concord Saunterer is a great place for us to begin 
this philosophical reimagining in Thoreau’s snowy footsteps. In the essay “Walking” Thoreau 
refers to a unique range for knowledge and intelligence that Mooney analyzes for readers. 
Instead of treating knowledge as the highest attainment for mankind, Mooney explains that 
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Thoreau sees a spectrum of different kinds of intelligences infused in the world around us and 
within us. Rather than aiming to attain one particular state of complete knowledge, Thoreau 
suggests that we are best fulfilled by reading and assuming different intelligences: “My desire for 
knowledge is intermittent but my desire to bathe my head in atmospheres unknown to my feet is 
perennial and constant. The highest we can attain to is not Knowledge but Sympathy with 
Intelligence.”150 In Walden’s “Solitude” the world is said to be “an ocean of subtle intelligences. 
They are everywhere…they environ us on all sides” (141). And in his chapter “Spring” Thoreau 
says, “There lay the transparent pond already calm and full of hope as in a summer evening, 
reflecting a summer evening sky in its bosom, though none was visible overhead, as if it had 
intelligence with some remote horizon” (332).  
 Thoreau calls this process developing “Sympathy with Intelligence” as opposed to simply 
collecting “Knowledge.”151 This is an interesting and beneficial learning outlook for teachers in 
particular, because it highlights the process of receiving and training ourselves to recognize not 
just what looks right or truthful but things that strike us as beautiful, special, and real about the 
world. It broadens our aims not to a single star in the sky but to a constellation of global features. 
Mooney also poignantly quotes Emerson from “Self-Reliance,” noting how, “We lie in the lap of 
immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth.”152 This is compatible with my 
earlier conversation in the methods section entitled “Truth in Weather Talk,” as it aligns itself 
with an epistemology that honors practice in learning and progressive connectivity with the 
world and attachment to natural reality rather than ultimately intellectualistic or supernatural 
																																																								
150 From Thoreau, “Walking,” 250. As cited in Mooney, “Sympathy,” 67. 
 
151 This is Mooney’s primary thesis in “Sympathy,” 63.		
152 Emerson, 187. As cited in Mooney, “Sympathy,” 69. 	
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attainment.  
 Consequently, learning for Thoreau is not about finding some sort of experience in 
particular but in deeply attuning one’s self to the broad spectrum of intelligences, truths utterly 
present and available to grasp like warmth in winter. Mooney describes this epistemology – what 
I cannot help but see as learning – as “registering the presence of things.” For Mooney, as for 
Thoreau, “Snowdrifts have sparkling presence, sparkling genius,” and sympathetic students are 
summoned to “exercise receptivity to incoming genius or intelligence.”153 “Although beauty and 
the wondrous have immediacy—they strike us out of nowhere—the capacity to harvest the fruits 
of such moments requires alert training,” Mooney explains.154 It is then the teacher and the 
student’s responsibility to develop a disciplined practice of recognizing and accommodating 
different intelligences. 
 The weather makes its intelligence apparent, for example, in the electric charge of the air, 
even in winter. John Burroughs in “Winter Sunshine” highlights this literal spark we can 
experience on a cold day:  
 
It [electricity] is the life of the crystal, the architect of the flake, the fire of the 
frost, the soul of the sunbeam. The crisp winter air is full of it. When I come in at 
night after an all day tramp I am charged like a Leyden jar, my hair crackles and 
snaps beneath the comb like a cat’s back, and a strange, new glow diffuses itself 
through my system.155  
 
While we are accustomed to imagining electricity to occur in weather only during lightning 
storms, Burroughs is indeed scientifically accurate in his observation. An ionic charge is always 
																																																								
153 Mooney, “Sympathy,” 81. 
 
154 Ibid., 79. 	
155 Burroughs, 14, emphasis added. 
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present in our air, our atmosphere, even when the sun is brightly shining or the day is blisteringly 
cold. It is easy to presume that our “enlivenment” upon returning indoors after a brisk walk 
outside or recess is because of physical exertion and oxygen-infusing factors alone. As 
Burroughs adds, “It is impossible not to dilate and expand under such skies. One breathes deeply 
and steps proudly, and if he have any of the eagle nature in him it comes to the surface then.”156 
But Burroughs is not speaking of our classic clique presumption that nature is healthy for our 
bodies and minds, there is much more to this. He is saying that the sunbeam has a soul. In Plato’s 
view, souls are things that have innate intelligence, a priori knowledge.  
Burroughs may be telling us that it is not our physical selves alone responding naturally 
to the energy of the sun or the charge in the air like plants react and green up to nitrogen before 
and during an onslaught of rain. Although the physiological and psychological science is indeed 
a portion of our reactionary “dilating,” he is also speaking of “expansion” and intelligent souls of 
the elements, which to me is a psalm of education. We are not simply filled up or rejuvenated by 
a jaunt outdoors. Our systems are taking on a new glow, a new persona, a new self. The 
experience in the elements, such as the experience of electric apricity, is about an expansion of 
our current selves. 
 Consider for a moment the many parallels between Thoreau’s philosophy of learning 
from the environment and Dillard’s experience of how The Tree With The Lights In It moved 
her. Dillard’s experience with the backlit tree was not an inside-only relationship, trapped in her 
intellectualist mind, but an interaction with the ways of the light that she was suddenly able to 
glimpse at that moment. She was startled by the reaction that something outside of her self could 
produce. She saw more than a pretty scene in front of her at sunset, and it was much more than a 
																																																								
156 Ibid., 11. 
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healthy dose of daylight. The light that Dillard saw did more for her than regenerate her spirit 
and energy in the moment. It changed her outlook on what she saw and felt for years to come. 
This is surely transformative learning. 
Thoreau recognizes the outward influence of the sun, just as a teacher might exert her 
energy on schooling a pupil, whether consciously or unconsciously shaping another life: 
 
In spring the sun not only exerts an influence through the increased temperature of 
the air and earth, but its heat passes through ice a foot or more thick, and is 
reflected from the bottom in shallow water, and so also warms the water and 
melts the under side of the ice, at the same time that it is melting it more directly 
above, making it uneven, and causing the air bubbles which it contains to extend 
themselves upward and downward until it is completely honeycombed, and at last 
disappears suddenly in a single spring rain. (320, emphasis added) 
 
The sun shapes and changes the ice, then lets the rain wipe it completely away, transforming it in 
form. How can we presume the sun does not do the same to us? It does – think of how our skin 
tans and becomes rough, think of skin cancer. Less physically, consider the delirium a too-bright 
sun can cause, as it does in Abbey – from the flicker of apricity to the scorching purge of a desert 
drought. 
 
“Thundering of the Pond” 
 Another prominent feature of Thoreau’s journal entries is the resonance of sound through 
air. This is exemplified in his description of the thundering of the seasonal ice on Walden pond, 
which under the strain of the sun’s rays and the opposing cold of the water beneath, he describes 
how the sheath of ice is forced to warp and twist and sends resonant booms radiating through the 
air like a pulsing beat upon a drumhead (321). Thoreau notices that even the pond is as “sensitive 
to atmospheric changes as the globule of mercury in its [a thermometer’s] tube” (322).  
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 We are like the ice on the pond, as humans, constantly changing forms inwardly and 
externally, reconfiguring with new cells every nanosecond, yet still remaining at heart the same 
general human shape. And like the water of the ice and the pond’s base, we rely on the air 
around us to resonate sounds, bouncing those wave lengths against us and other material objects 
like ping pong balls during a champion tournament. Thoreau notices this constant changing our 
matter and the sounds when the town bells ring through the woods, causing the air itself to take 
on a different tone. 
 
All sound heard at the greatest possible distance produces the same effect, a 
vibration of the universal lyre, just as the intervening atmosphere makes a distant 
ridge of earth interesting to our eyes by the azure tint it imparts to it. There came 
to me in this case a melody which the air had strained, and which had conversed 
with every leaf and needle of the wood, that portion of the sound which the 
elements had taken up and modulated and echoed from vale to vale. The echo is, 
to some extent, an original sound, and therein is the magic and charm of it. It is 
not merely a repetition of what was worth repeating in the bell, but partly the 
voice of the wood; the same trivial words and notes sung by a wood-nymph. (127-
128) 
 
It takes a keen musical ear indeed to notice such a resonance change when bells erupt or are 
silenced. Of course, we most can hear the bells themselves, but Thoreau is again highlighting the 
intelligence of the air around him, how even that air can change in an instant and mold to the 
actions around in. He does not hear the bells alone, but focuses on the reciprocal relationship of 
their sound with the natural environment. He says that “there came to him…a melody which the 
air had strained,” not that he just heard bells, but that those bells became something new in the 
air, and the air something new-sounding with those bells. He calls the echo an “original sound,” 
“partly the voice of the wood.” Like learning, the echo has materialized into something Thoreau 
has not yet known to exist. He has learned something unique about his space and how the air 
impacts his experience of it. 
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Environmental Choice 
 So much of what Thoreau argues about his outdoor experiences in Walden one could 
argue, however, is as possible indoors as it is out. We can hear beautiful sonatas, watch ice cubes 
shift in our water glasses, or notice the people around us change us into something special, 
influencing us and teaching us. I agree that all this is true. But the issue for Thoreau and me is 
not that the indoor life exists, but rather that we continue to have a choice about more than one 
life, starting with the deliberation between indoor and outdoor environments. Thoreau talks about 
this choice almost immediately in his book, about how the political and cultural environment in 
his day (and arguably in ours) preferences the most obvious luxuries of the indoors over the 
possibilities of the outdoors. Up until now with Thoreau, I have established with the aid of 
Edward Mooney, that learning outdoors is a process of training for sympathy with the 
intelligences of the elements. Put into simpler terms, this alternative to standard knowledge is 
what famous landscape artist Eric Sloane calls being “weather-wise.”157 From here, though, it is 
our work as philosophers of education to reconceive of where we ought to learn.  
 While learning in general and these particular aesthetic experiences that I reflect upon 
from nature writings are so often unsolicited, as Dewey would say “indirect” influences of the 
environment, we can indeed utilize our own intelligences to direct them into becoming more 
regular occurrence. For this reason, we must consider the issue of modern American classrooms 
being primarily indoors: if we train for indoor learning almost exclusively, how can we expect to 
make outdoor learning commonplace? Or, as Thoreau writes, “Shall I not have intelligence with 
the earth? Am I not partly leaves and vegetable mould myself?” (144). Thoreau’s two year 
excursion to Walden Pond was a choice, and a deliberate one at that, which he talks about at 																																																								
157 Sloane, 3. 
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great length in the book’s introduction. Likewise, the choice must be made explicit to educators: 
that there is more than one learning environment, and that there is power to choose to learn 
different lessons from the world. Thoreau’s perspective on our default choice is plain: “There is 
an incessant influx of novelty into the world, and yet we tolerate incredible dullness” (354). 
 It would be unfair to characterize any of our classrooms as incredibly “dull,” but we can 
imagine that children cooped up indoors must think like that at times, even in the most vivid 
indoor environment. There is so much choice in actuality, so many options, that Thoreau thinks 
perhaps we have come to narrow them down in our minds by cutting out the most challenging 
options: “When we consider what, to use the words of the catechism, is the chief end of man, and 
what are the true necessaries and means of life, it appears as if men had deliberately chosen the 
common mode of living because they preferred it to any other. Yet they honestly think there is 
no choice left. But alert and healthy natures remember that the sun rose clear” (6-7). When so 
much time has passed, culturally and historically, without a major curricular environment 
revision, it is understandable to feel that other possibilities are simply not valid.158 However, we 
can find in the literature, in the “alert and healthy natures” of others, or even in our selves as 
children running wild in our backyards or parks, that the sun rose clear.159 Other options are 
available, and they are upon us, shining brightly. 
 In Thoreau’s most characteristic bluntness, Americans, as residents of a first-world 
country are “not simply kept comfortably warm, but unnaturally hot; …they are cooked, of 
course à la mode” (12). We cannot keep cooking our students, even with a side of ice cream to 																																																								
158 “The greatest gains and values are farthest from being appreciated. We easily come to doubt 
if they exist. We soon forget them. They are the highest reality.” Thoreau, 232. 	
159 “Every child begins the world again, to some extent, and loves to stay outdoors, even in wet 
and cold. It plays house…” Ibid., 27. 	
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cool them off! There was indeed a time for choosing to build walls around us, even Thoreau 
admits (26). He is not asking us to give up shelter and basic needs, rather, to “consider first how 
slight a shelter is absolutely necessary. I have seen Penobscot Indians, in this town, living in 
tents of thin cotton cloth, while the snow was nearly a foot deep around them, and I thought that 
they would be glad to have it deeper to keep out the wind” (27-28). Thoreau is asking instead for 
us to reimagine human “richness” and “necessity” and to find that both can be equally served 
outdoors (32). He redefines what it means to be American by calling us to “grow wild according 
to thy nature, like these sedges and brakes, which will never become English bay. Let the 
thunder rumble; what if it threatens ruin to farmers’ crops? That is not its errand to thee. Take 
shelter under the cloud, while they flee to carts and sheds...” (222). 
 
Re-Valuing Weather: An Ethics of Aesthetics (Not About Mere Admiration)  
 The previous section ended with only a partial quote, but it is best not to finish there but 
instead here, in this section about the re-valuing of weather. Thoreau continues by saying, 
“…Enjoy the land but own it not” (222). Herein his tone shifts not to a call for action (“go 
outside”) but a call for thought. Again, for Thoreau, learning is not a matter of owning. We can 
learn from the sky, but we cannot own it. We can hear the ice thunder on Walden Pond, but we 
cannot claim to cause it or control it. While the last subsection spoke of environmental choice, 
here I speak of the evaluation that lies behind each choice we make. I say “evaluation” as in 
“each-one’s valuation,” an evaluation and valuation of the options before us, because humans 
insert and exude value in the choices we make. Sunlight itself does not discriminate; it sheds its 
light without reservation for all life to grow by it (74). We are the pickers. 
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 Choice is not about either-or options, and it is not about dichotomizing our world into the 
inside versus outside. For Thoreau even, a balance must be reached. He completes his ethical 
choice of living environment by returning to town – not for the purpose of never venturing 
outside ever again, but to share what he has learned from his immersive experience with other 
people and to have the best of both options. Thoreau is called to return “indoors” as much as he 
was called “outdoors” in the first place: his vocational bent is a calling to harmonious balance, 
not biased isolation. We owe our time to our selves and the non-human world to communicate 
with a world outdoors, and we owe time to society and the indoors for our safety and the 
preservation of our species and human-centric culture. Abbey, Ehrlich, Dillard, Thoreau, Oliver, 
Muir and Wordsworth – each one of them oscillates between living indoors and out. It is the 
extremes that seem ethically problematic. 
 Lives worth living must be lives of learning and growth, joy and hardship. The 
differentiation brings us fulfillment. As such, going outdoors cannot be merely a case of 
spending time out, or adventure, or recreation alone. Although elemental exposure is a part of the 
equation, ethically, it is not sufficient in itself for a life of flourishing. This is what we have so 
problematically assumed by showing with science only that one aspect of us is touched outdoors: 
either health, or aesthetics, or leisure. We must see the complete opportunities available to re-
value the non-human environment appropriately. Moreover, as I argue here, we need to add 
theorization and research that reveals the multifaceted experience of learning outdoors. Nature is 
not a drug to be swallowed and cured by; it is a holistic experience of living that we must 
recognize and explore further. As a process of social change, however, this cannot happen 




Such is oftenest the young man’s introduction to the forest, and the most original 
part of himself. He goes thither at first as a hunter and fisher, until at last, if he has 
the seeds of a better life in him, he distinguishes his proper objects, as a poet or 
naturalist it may be, and leaves the gun and fish-pole behind. The mass of men are 
still and always young in this respect…Commonly they did not think that they 
were lucky, or well paid for their time, unless they got a long string of fish, 
thought they had the opportunity of seeing the pond all the while. They might go 
there a thousand times before the sediment of fishing would sink to the bottom 
and leave their purpose pure; but no doubt such a clarifying process would be 
going on all the while. (228) 
 
 
Thoreau here likens aesthetic education to the recreational fishing making eventual outdoorsmen. 
Like slipping carrot pulp into a sugary fruit drink, we bring goodness and ethical rationale into 
an experience only once we develop a taste for it. This, again, is why the aesthetic experience of 
being present in weather is in itself a “clarifying process…going on all the while.” When the 
experienced outdoorsperson is caught under a deluge or feel the touch of apricity on their skin, it 
is impossible to end the moment with only a thought for beauty. The mind and body rolls from 
one feeling to another – from musing to musing – from pondering to intelligence.  
When we value the non-artificial environment, we cannot stop at valuing it for its beauty 
but also for its intelligence. This is the goal to be reached. In Thoreau’s words, “I went to the 
woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I 
could not learn what it had to teach” (93). Thoreau did not just say, “I went to the woods, 
because I found it to be pretty.” And he returned with much more than a “taste” for the aesthetics 
of nature. He “grew in those seasons like corn in the night, and they were far better than any 
work of the hands would have been” (116). We have the ability to do more than look, touch, or 
taste. Aesthetics are a human gateway to ethics.  
 
I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man to 
elevate life by a conscious endeavor. It is something to be able to paint a 
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particular picture, or to carve a statue, and so to make a few objects beautiful; but 
it is far more glorious to carve and paint the very atmosphere and medium through 
which we look, which morally we can do. To affect the quality of the day, that is 
the highest of the arts. (92-93) 
 
 
While I would argue further that there is value inherent in non-human nature itself, just as there 
is inherent value in art, it is indeed also worth noting Thoreau’s understanding of human agency 
as powerfully able to interpret something differently – hopefully more accurately – and shaping 
an experience from aesthetic to ethic. The human ability to choose environments, to choose 
ethically, and to dig deeper into an experience is marvelous indeed.160 
 Just a few last points about Thoreau’s ethics of environmental choice and learning 
outdoors remain. First, for Thoreau, virtue is measured by weather, as even the wind can move 
the earth: “The virtues of a superior man are like the wind; the virtues of a common man are like 
the grass – the grass, when the wind passes over it, bends” (183) We build ethical lives by 
building our selves in our element. There is no metaphor in this; Thoreau means it as he says 
it.161 Second, as was the case for Abbey, we receive answers of a sort from weather just as we 
might from a clever teacher: through subtlety and inquiry. Thoreau reveals this in his own 
experience of waking up with an eye out his window: 
 
After a still winter night I awoke with the impression that some question had been 
put to me, which I had been endeavoring in vain to answer in my sleep, as what – 
how – when – where? But there was dawning Nature, in whom all creatures live, 
looking in at my broad windows with serene and satisfied face, and no question 
on her lips. I awoke to an answered question, to Nature and daylight. The snow 
																																																								
160 Dewey, Democracy and Education,19. 
 
161 Thoreau, Walden, 114. “…We are in danger of forgetting the language which all things and 
events speak without metaphor… The rays which stream through the shutter will no longer be 
remembered when the shutter is wholly removed.” 
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lying deep on the earth dotted with young pines, and the very slope of the hill on 
which my house is placed, seemed to say, Forward! (301) 
 
Thoreau cites Nature as his interlocutor, but if we look closely, who or what is actually 
responding to him? It was the dawning light that looked into his abode: daylight. Also, in that 
daylight his answer comes from “the snow lying deep on the earth.” Weather is responding on 
behalf of Nature. 
 Lastly, I was struck by yet another common experience in reading Walden that correlates 
with my earlier subsection in the previous chapter, titled “Clarity and Drugs.” Like Abbey, 
Thoreau also was “high” on the weather, noting how he should "prefer the natural sky to an 
opium-eater’s heaven…Of all ebriosity, who does not prefer to be intoxicated by the air he 
breathes?” (232). One might conclude that many things from such a note, but I think Mooney 
brings this rumpus to order best by recalling that philosophers often struggle with how to 
“categorize” Thoreau, whether as a mystic or a field-reporter, as if either were wholly 
exclusive.162  
 As explained by Mooney, though, even “Scientists love or are stoical or defensive about 
their work and their place in the world. They wake up, as all of us do, in foul or cloudy or 
buoyant moods, with aches in their limbs or hearts, with a sense of attachment or alienation from 
others close to them and their work—sometimes attuned to natural splendors, sometimes not.”163 
Mooney offers the reminder that “reminder that valorizations of knowledge at the expense of 
sublimity, reverie, and poetry bury all hope for valuing – or understanding -- Sympathy with 
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Intelligence, and bury all hope to have worlds laced with sublimity, reverie, and poetry.”164 From 
that we might conclude that there is a tenuous tie between brilliance and metaphysical 
disassociation that should not be automatically avoided because of this risky connection, as being 
“high on life” may be a property of such high-level growth or transformation. 
 
 
Mary Oliver and Petrichor 
Mary Oliver is one of only two contemporary authors included in my data set (the other 
being Annie Dillard), and although she does not have the longevity of a nature writer dead some 
one hundred years, or made famous by a lifetime of published works, she has published an 
impressive array of nature poetry. Up to the date that I am writing this, 2018, Oliver has 
published at the rate of about one book every three years since her first poetry anthology in 1963, 
when she was just 28 years old. Maxine Kumin, former Poet Laureate Consultant to the Library 
of Congress, famously called her the “indefatigable guide to the natural world.” It is no wonder 
then that in perusing her vast collection of anthologies and poems I struggled to select only the 
few that most correlated with weather-related themes. Moreover, I specifically identified weather 
poems that spoke of learning and transformation incited by outdoor experience.  
What I found was a startling number of direct references by Mary Oliver to the outdoor 
aesthetic experience that this dissertation is most concerned with describing. Among the weather 
themes I found were notes on scents on air, vanishing into and delighting in transformative 
metamorphosis, and breaking open the hidden depth. Most commonly, these themes were 
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accompanied by a rich connection between Oliver at the fragrant earth after a stormy day, what 
botanists, naturalists, and poets call petrichor. 
 
Vanishing, Serious Delight, and Transformation 
 Out of these seven nature writers, if there were one that made a life out of noticing this 
unique aesthetic experience, it was the poet Mary Oliver. Her poetry is famous for showing her 
touch and grace with nature, and for the demonstration of the very detailed attentiveness Oliver 
took to the natural world around her. Although I expected that poetry would be the most obscure 
versions I would find of aesthetic experience – that the poetry itself would be so thick with 
metaphor that I would have to hack through the brambles to discover the learning – surprisingly, 
Oliver is arguably the most literal writer of the group. She openly recognizes her objectives when 
she writes, “Ten times a day something happens to me like this – some strengthening throb of 
amazement – some good sweet empathic ping and swell. This is the first, the wildest and the 
wisest thing I know: that the soul exists and is built entirely out of attentiveness” (“Low Tide,” 
34). This attention to phenomenological presence is immediately evident in three of her poems, 
which I share nearly in full form here for proper illustration of this point.  
The first example is from an excerpt of Oliver’s poem “Sleeping In The Forest.” She 
writes: 
…All night 
I heard the small kingdoms breathing 
around me, the insects, and the birds 
who do their work in the darkness. All night 
I rose and fell, as if in water, grappling 
with a luminous doom. By morning 
I had vanished at least a dozen times 
into something better. (Twelve Moons, 3) 
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At first she stages the outdoor setting as a time when she purportedly slept in the forest. She talks 
about the tiny insects and birds around her being awake and alive but out of sight. One can 
imagine, perhaps, how frightening this might seem, hearing something that cannot be seen in the 
dark, like specters or wild predators. Oliver, however, notices these things as “kingdoms 
breathing,” worlds alive beyond her own. She can hear the creatures at work while she is 
supposed to be asleep; she is witness to an insider’s nocturnal empire. We have come to be quite 
familiar with breath as a theme in the nature writers already examined for this research, namely 
breathing cold air as visible communication for Ehrlich, breath as the processing of reflective 
thought for Dillard, and air as the favorite intoxicating inhalant for Thoreau. It should come as no 
surprise then, that Oliver often refers to breath. 
 To “rise and fall, as if in water” as Oliver writes, could be interpreted plainly as a restless 
sleep, twisting upright and then prone again like an ocean wave, or it could be that her body 
stayed put but her memory of the night was one that sent her mind bending and waning like 
swelling water. The “luminous doom” might be the luminary sunrise on the horizon or the 
contrast she felt to the darkness and the non-human others skittering around her. One gets the 
feeling that Oliver means this to have been a long and trying night. And she awakes not to the 
same state that she came to the night outdoors, but having passed through the thick only to 
“vanish” and to reappear as something “better.”  
This experience smacks of the taste of learning. Immediately coming to mind at the word 
“vanish” is the concept of aporia – blankness, utter loss. As I have established previously, this is 
the Socratic first phase of transformative learning. Oliver’s night in the forest, sleeping in the 
darkness, privy to other non-human kingdoms turns into an experience of losing herself only to 
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find in the morning a better Mary Oliver. Like sublimation for Dillard, Oliver’s human matter 
changes shape in the night outdoors. 
 The second example is one that can only be seen in full form. In her poem “Snow 
Geese,” Oliver tells another story of a transformative outdoor experience. Although, like the last, 
this one also involves a non-human “other,” she is clearer in this poem as to the connection that 
she is making to that other, and how it, and the experience, affects her long-term. As she recalls 
this, we discover that the moment itself was very brief, but as we shall discuss in the next 
subsection, it is an aesthetic experience that physically and mentally lingers, similar to Dillard’s 
Tree With the Lights In It:   
 
Oh, to love what is lovely, and will not last! 
 What a task 
  to ask 
of anything, or anyone, 
yet it is ours, 
 and not by the century or the year, but by the hours. 
One fall day I heard 
 above me, and above the sting of the wind, a sound 
I did not know, and my look shot upward; it was 
a flock of snow geese, winging it 
 faster than the ones we usually see, 
and, being the color of snow, catching the sun 
so they were, in part at least, golden. I 
held my breath 
as we do 
 
sometimes  
to stop time 
when something wonderful 
has touched us 
 
as with a match 
which is lit, and bright, 
but does not hurt 




as if delight 
were the most serious thing 




I have never  
seen them again. 
 
Maybe I will, someday, somewhere. 
Maybe I won’t. 
It doesn’t matter.  
What matters  
 
is that, when I saw them, 
I saw them 
as through the veil, 
secretly, joyfully, clearly.  
(Why I Wake Early, 34-35, original formatting) 
 
 
The sun in Oliver’s poem has turned the white feathers of the migrating snow geese into golden 
fingers. It is so astoundingly beautiful that Oliver stops breathing to try to stop time itself, to 
freeze the geese in the air and enjoy them a bit longer. An expression of the aesthetic of beauty 
may have been her attraction to the moment, but the experience is so stunning she finds it 
sufficient in and of itself. It was a one-off wonder, which she is perfectly pleased to accept after 
her initial reluctance when the birds are still in sight. Oliver saw what she needed, although it 
might have been delightful to see it for more time. It was not only the beauty (even in its brevity) 
that touched her, but the pleasing realization that she really saw the snow geese as if they had 
just been created, so fresh and alive.165  
 A trick with Oliver’s “Snow Geese” is that is seems clear that she is having an outdoor 
aesthetic experience of beauty that affects her with some longevity, and that weather is present in 																																																								
165 I suspect she is referring to the historical Veil of Isis, the Greek God of Nature who likes to 
hide. For an illuminating philosophical discussion of this ancient history, which has already been 
referenced several times in this dissertation, see Hadot, Veil. 
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the form of the sunlight refracted off the white geese feathers, but her learning from this moment 
is not literally stated. I do not think this should be read as a conscious absence on her part. 
Learning was involved, and it was more transformative than her poem’s simple description offers 
at face value. As with any poem, the author means it to be read deeply, carefully, and vividly. 
Like Stanley Cavell argues in his book The Senses of Walden, a meticulous writer like Thoreau, 
or in this case Mary Oliver, does not mean for any meaning to be over-simplified by prose. On 
this basis of this logical and methodological stance, and in recognition that the tradition of nature 
writing is laden with metaphor, both apparent and extended, I am encouraged to look deeper for 
the learning in her moment with the geese and the light. 
 To aid in our understanding of Oliver’s overarching philosophy of outdoor aesthetic 
experience, we can look to an excerpt “Clouds” in Why I Wake Early: 
 
…a transformation, not a vision, 
not an answer, not a proof, but I put it 
there, close against my heart, where the need is, and it serves 
 
the purpose. I go on, soaked through, my hair 
slicked back; 
like corn, or wheat, shining and useful. (22) 
 
 
Being in the rain in this poem, standing exposed under the clouds, Oliver tells of how she 
undergoes a transformation, not just as vision but a proof of some philosophical truth I 
presume.166 Her language radiates with synonyms of resolve: proof, purpose, and use. Now if we 
																																																								
166 Robin Wall Kimmerer shares an incredibly similar story of being out in the rain in Braiding 
Sweetgrass, 295. “After hours in the penetrating rain, I am suddenly damp and chilled and the 
path back to the cabin is a temptation. I could so easily retreat to tea and dry clothes, but I cannot 
pull myself away. However alluring the thought of warmth, there is no substitute for standing in 
the rain to awaken every sense – senses that are muted within four walls, where my attention 
would be on me instead of all that is more than me. Inside looking out… I don’t want to just be a 
bystander to rain, passive and protected; I want to be part of the downpour, to be soaked, along 
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come to know Oliver’s language for transformational experience as characteristically calling 
upon firm and dogged words like these, a reread of “Snow Geese” can begin to shed light on 
how learning occurs in her aesthetic experiences outdoors. Oliver takes delight very seriously. 
Aesthetic experiencing and the joy that it brings her is not of insignificant value. In fact, I would 
add, delight can be much more – delight can be evidence of learning. When we take a closer look 
we find that this is indeed the case in “Snow Geese.” 
Oliver says how “something wonderful has touched her as with a match which is lit and 
bright.” Here is our trusty metaphor of light and learning again. A match is a useful thing, 
especially if it does not burn us and vibrantly lights our way. With this missing information, 
wrapped cleanly in a common metaphor of learning, we can begin to connect the three parts of 
the transformative learning puzzle: aesthetic experience, the weather, and holistic learning. 
Unfortunately, Oliver does not tell us about holistic transformation in just one experience, one 
poem. The manifold learning picture requires a collection of her moments to see how, as time 
passes, her aesthetic experiences in a weather-rich environment continue to teach her by diverse 
means. This is the uniqueness of learning outdoors; the broad spectrum of body/mind 
transformations it can deliver.  
While we can develop a comparably varied curriculum indoors, it is just as likely and 
profitable to instead challenge our base choices of school environments. Moreover, there still 
remain two reasons why a weather-rich environment may prove to be richer: first, it resists the 
anthropocentric drive for humans to build and control things, highlighting instead the 
Thoreauvian inherent intelligences of nature, and it stands to potentially change the American 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
with the dark humus that squishes underfoot. I wish that I could stand like a shaggy cedar with 
rain seeping into my bark, that water could dissolve the barrier between us. I want to feel what 
the cedars feel and know what they know.” 
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social perspective on climate change. Imagine a world where students grow up aesthetically 
learning in weather, see the value of a stable environment, and celebrate the eco-centric elements 
of our lives. We shall revisit these summative arguments in this dissertation’s final chapter. For 
now, however, we return to Oliver for those various dimensions of transformative learning that I 
alluded to in the previous paragraph. 
In the poem “Mindful,” Oliver is suddenly forthright with her philosophical 
understanding of weather as educative. Her aesthetic moments do not need to be dramatic and 
sublime, she explains. Just as Kierkegaard claims there is an “ordinary sublime” and Dewey talks 
of the importance of primary experience, so too does Oliver harken upon the common 
experiences that indirectly teach.167  
  Nor am I talking  
   about the exceptional, 
the fearful, the dreadful, 
 the very extravagant –  
  but of the ordinary, 
   the common, the very drab, 
the daily presentations. 
 Oh, good scholar, 
  I say to myself, 
   how can you help 
but grow wise 
 with such teachings 
  as these –  
   the untrimmable light 
of the world, 
 the ocean’s shine,…  
(Why I Wake Early, 58-59, original formatting) 
 
 
The unique thing about Oliver’s “ordinary sublime,” however, is how she likens these wisdom-
building teachings to “the untrimmable light of the world” and the “shine” of the ocean. Light 
																																																								
167 Much gratitude to Edward Mooney for reminding me of Kierkegaard’s reference to an 
ordinary sublime in Fear and Trembling,  
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and shining weather features are used in the form of an analogy, not a metaphor here, so she does 
not mean to use them to define the teachings. This is only a literary tool, not a truth. But where 
did these weather references come from, if they did not somehow hold some representative 
value, some natural connection to the process of “growing wise?” 
 It is prudent to also note now that if you look at a list of Oliver’s book titles, you will find 
one called House of Light. Here, again, is the metaphor of light used. Keep scanning her 
publications and another book-long poem is named The Leaf and the Cloud. This title alludes to 
Ruskin’s famous quote that “between the earth and man arose the leaf, between the heaven and 
man came the cloud.” Elsewhere, in “Wind,” Oliver collapses in the fields, exasperated by 
explanations…unless of course those explanations are delivered by the weather: 
I am tired of explanations. Unless they are spoken by the best mouth…Or the 
voice of the wind itself, flailing out of any and every quarter of the sky. 
Especially in summer. Especially in the fields, close to the ground. Listen! Let the 
high branches go on with their opera, it’s the song of the fields I wait for, when 
the sky turns orange and the wind arrives, waving his thousand arms. Or, autumn! 
I hurry out to the middle of the field and stand where the tough goldenrod, seeded 
and tasseled, is vigorously tossing – until something thankful rises from my own 
body. The goldenrod lashes back and forth, each stem on its knuckled foot. Yes! 
Yes! Yes! And then the dry earth begins to anticipate, and then I fall to my knees, 
and then the flowers cry out, and then the wind breaks open its silver countries of 
rain. (What Do We Know, 19) 
 
When the wind brings the rain, she cries out, relieved to hear it, to feel it. Yes! Yes! Yes! She is 
thankful for the weather talking to her instead. If Oliver can metaphorically say that the weather 
has explanations, then we can more easily interpret her to believe that the weather has some sort 
of innate wisdom. This may be an excellent example of Oliver holding sympathy with the 
intelligence of the wind. 
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Brief But Lingering, Like a Scent 
When Oliver talks about the wind drawing in the rain in the field, she mentions that the 
“dry earth begins to anticipate” the quenching moisture and the flowers and her welcome it too. 
In thinking of my own experience in rain, when the dry earth finally gets its long-overdue drink, 
and the flowers rehydrate, there is a scent that always accompanies that experience. The scent is 
one of rich iron minerals in the soil mixed with wet leaves and pollen, and it is known as 
petrichor.  
Like Oliver’s ordinary sublime, this scent which lingers but can only be detected briefly 
when the air rises and the humidity meets it with a delicate swirling rhythm and dance of 
fragrance, turns an everyday delight of rain into a quite extraordinary aesthetic experience. 
Oliver is a master of identifying these small eccentricities in her poetry. Take, for instance, 
“Early Snow,” which mentions both petrichor and sublimity: 
 
And I turned 
and opened the door, and still the snow poured down 
smelling of iron and the pale, vast eternal, and 
there it was, whether I was ready or now: 
the silence; the blank, white, glittering sublime. 





 One final theme from Mary Oliver that I believe stands as evidence that outdoor aesthetic 
experiences in weather can transform us in various ways, are her many poems that describe an 
experience of breaking open while outdoors. Surely, this is a thinly veiled metaphor for 
transformative learning. In “Lightning” Oliver speaks of the body’s desire to run for safety but 
also to gravitate toward the fiery danger, like the common experiences humans have at a cliff 
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edge of feeling propelled forward, as if determined to commit suicide for the surreal instant 
pleasure of flying (American Primitive, 7-9). As in Thoreau, we get a sense again of the delicate 
line between brilliance and metaphysical dissociation, or even madness in this case. But fear 
does not prevail –  “excitement shouts,” she says.  





and opened the tree – 
the way a tooth would open a flower. 
I fell down 
 
and there I will be, 
for one last moment, 
broken but burning, 
like a golden tree. 
(“Rain, Tree, Thunder and Lightning,” West Wind, 31) 
 
 
How poignant! Also, how very coincidental when viewed beside Dillard’s metaphor of The Tree 
With the Lights In It. We might deduce that there is more to these shared experiences than mere 
happenstance. And once more lightning shoots down from the sky and breaks open the body of a 
tree: 
All afternoon it rained, then 
such power came down from the clouds 
on a yellow thread, 
as authoritative as God is supposed to be. 
When it hit the tree, her body 
opened forever. 
(“Rain,” Wild Geese, 66) 
 
As is characteristic of transformative learning, a rupture, a split, an affront of light, or a shift has 
taken place in the experience described in this poem. The lightning struck the tree with such 
force that she opened up forever. Who opened? The tree opened, which is Oliver. 
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William Wordsworth and the Breath of God 
 We transition now from a contemporary poet to a classical one, and the only non-
American among the seven selected canonical nature writers: William Wordsworth. Although I 
focus in this research on an American context, there is a very particular reason for my choice of 
Wordsworth for this project. It was in reading an article about Wordsworth, suggested by David 
Hansen, that I first came upon his concept of “spots of time,” which bears an uncanny 
resemblance to the outdoor aesthetic transformative learning experience that is the subject of this 
dissertation.  
My discussion of Wordsworth is named after a combination of two phrases from The 
Prelude: first, from a line where Wordsworth dedicates his work to Nature (his original 
capitalization should be noted), “This verse is dedicate [sic] to Nature's self, …And things that 
teach as Nature teaches..." and second, Nature is introduced as the Breath of God.168 
Wordsworth’s wind theme grows throughout the poem, but is carried right from the start (46, 
1.335-340). 
 
Thoughts Steeped in Feeling 
Up until now we have discussed transformative outdoor aesthetic learning experiences 
without fully conceptualizing how aesthetic learning, beyond Brady’s Kantian conception in the 
second chapter describes the role of reason in sublime experiencing. However, as Mooney points 
out that Thoreau sees Sympathies with Intelligences rather than only one source of Knowledge in 																																																								
168162, 5.230-231. 162, 5.223. Unless otherwise stated, all Wordsworth references in this 
subsection are from The Prelude: 1805 edition. Scholars of Wordsworth will recognize that I 
choose this early version of his work, because pressure from religious affiliates led Wordsworth 
to later revise much of The Prelude, removing his many and bold allusions to pantheism, or God 
as Nature. Peter Larkin writes smartly on Wordsworth’s influences and edits. 
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the world, Wordsworth has a systematic argument in The Prelude that aesthetic feelings are 
intelligent thoughts.169 Take, for instance, Wordsworth in speaking of a child innately connected 
to Nature, “...For feeling has to him imparted strength, And -- powerful in all sentiments of grief, 
Of exultation, fear and joy-- his mind” (78, 2.263-271). This passage indicates that aesthetic 
feeling has made the child not weaker but more robust through her emotional learning. Are these 
child’s emotions, though, linked only to the feelings of the body? No, Wordsworth writes, the 
mind is also improved. Although we might understand this equally well in terms of mind/body 
dualism, I would implore us to consider that the body and the mind, feelings and thoughts, are all 
one in the same form of the broader categories of “intelligences.” A similar argument is made by 
philosopher of education Paul Standish in his article “Knowing in Feeling.” Citing Cavell, 
Standish explains that “what is at stake here is not reducible to information” because from an 
experience of feeling we receive thoughts that linger and can be easily brought to mind again, we 
feel their lessons without having to touch something concrete again and again.170 From Standish 
and Cavell the importance of knowledge learned through feeling is laid bare, so what I suggest 
here and in Chapter III is an intuition of the truth in what precisely we experience. 
Humans have the ability to use aesthetic experience just as we use thought – as sources of 
knowledge – and as such it is not out of bounds to think that Wordsworth may bind them 
																																																								
169 Wordsworth chooses the very same phrase as Thoreau, "…the sky, Never before so beautiful, 
sank down…daily were my sympathies enlarged, And thus the common range of visible things, 
Grew dear to me..." (74, 2.178-183). 	
170 Standish, 303. 	
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together as modes of learning.171 Moreover, as modes of learning, aesthetics experiences are 
privy to the same kind of earthly, serious truths discussed in Chapter III. 
 
…I transferred 
My own enjoyments, or, the power of truth 
Coming in revelation, I conversed  
With things that really are, I at this time 
Saw blessings spread around me like a sea. 
Coercing all things into sympathy… 
...and now at length 
From Nature and her overflowing soul 
I had received so much that all my thoughts 
Were steeped in feeling. I was only then 
Contented when with bliss ineffable 
I felt the sentiment of being spread  
O'er all that moves, and all that seemeth still...172  
 
From Nature, Wordsworth has transferred what he has enjoyed as “truth” or “coming in 
revelation.” In Nature he “conversed with things that really are,” which I take to be his 
description of his new truths, and from Nature he feels he has been given things, received truth, 
and received so much all his thoughts became “steeped in feeling.” All that Wordsworth had 
learned from Nature was bound with emotion, and filled a range of feeling in the metaphor of an 
English tea bag soaking in water. Notice how a main ingredient in steeping tea is water, an 
atmospheric element, and a part of the weather. He is equating his thoughts simmering in 
feelings to a bag of tea immersed in elemental liquid. It is fitting, of course, that he offers this 
metaphor in gratitude for the gifts or lessons given to him while he was himself steeped in 
Nature, in the weather. When Wordsworth mentions truth as a coming to light of “things that 																																																								
171 Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess explicitly argues that there is interplay between reason 
and feeling in learning in his chapter fittingly titled, “You Can Learn Properly Only What 
Engages Your Feelings.” 
 
172 Wordsworth, 86, 2.409-417. Emphasis added. Like Thoreau, Wordsworth further develops his 
sympathy with non-human things. 
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really are” and being in conversation with those truthful things, I am reminded of Willa Cather’s 
words in The Professor’s House: 
 
The Kansas boy who had come back to St. Peter this summer was not a scholar. 
He was a primitive. He was only interested in earth and woods and water. 
Whenever sun sunned and rain rained and snow snowed, wherever life sprouted 
and decayed, places were alike to him… He was earth, he would return to earth. 
When white clouds blew over the lake like bellying sails and when the seven 
pine-trees turned red in the declining sun, he felt satisfaction and said to himself 
merely: “That is right.” Coming upon a curly root that thrust itself across his path, 
he said: “That is it.” When the maple-leaves along the street began to turn yellow 
and waxy, and were soft to the touch, – like the skin on an old face, – he said: 
“That is true; it is time.” (241) 
 
Wordsworth’s concept of truth in Nature is like that of Cather’s Kansas boy. He observes the 
earth as it is, the weather as it shows itself, the passing of the seasons as the telling of time. This 
is truth, as I have explained in Chapter III, in a serious way. The gravity of the gravitational life 
on this planet, the reality in our experiences, as they are felt, thought, and learned. Wordsworth’s 
overlap of Nature, the weather, and basic learning principles appear in his passage: “With life 
and Nature, purifying thus, The elements of feeling and of thought, And sanctifying by such 
discipline, Both pain and fear, until we recognize, A grandeur in the beatings of the heart” (50, 
1.436-441). It is the role of life and Nature (capitalized by Wordsworth, like a teacher), to 
“purify the elements of feeling and of thought,” and through this practice Wordsworth believes 
that we find what is great about the human heart or human nature. Again, feeling and thought are 
metaphorically “elements” and we find ourselves in their clarification.  
In another of Cather’s novels, My Antonia, the narrator tells the story of a poignant 
classroom lecture on Virgil’s Aeneid, recalling that after the talk, “We left the classroom quietly, 
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conscious that we had been brushed by the wing of a great feeling.”173 This is not a foreign 
notion but a common experience shared by learners, that of being conscious of a great feeling 
that shifts and moves something within us. Transformative learning is as much a feeling as it is a 
turn of thought. 
It is especially valuable to posit feelings as the same as thoughts in education, because it 
is through aesthetic experience of Nature, Wordsworth believes, that we learn to love 
mankind.174  
 
With deep devotion, Nature, did I feel 
...what I owed to thee: 
High thoughts of God and man, and love of man, 
...For I already had been taught to love 
My fellow-beings, to such habits trained 
Among the woods and mountains, where I found 
In thee a gracious guide to lead me forth 
Beyond the bosom of my family... 
Love human to the creature in himself. 
(270, 272, 8.63-76) 
 
Above all 
Did Nature bring again this wiser mood, 
More deeply reestablished in my soul,.. 
...early tutored me  
To look with feelings of fraternal love 
Upon those unassuming things that hold 
A silent station in this beauteous world. (440, 12.45-53) 
 
Nature tutored Wordsworth in Sympathy for Intelligences, Thoreau might say (supported also by 
the previously quoted passage of The Prelude, 86, 2.409-417). How does Nature teach and what 
																																																								
173 Cather, Antonia, 198. 	
174 This is made conveniently plain in Wordsworth’s choice of title for Book Eight: "Retrospect: 
Love of Nature Leading to Love of Mankind." 
		 160 
subjects? Nature teaches aesthetically, through and about feelings of excitation and calm, 
Wordsworth clarifies: 
From Nature doth emotion come, and moods 
Of calmness equally are Nature's gift: 
...peace and excitation... 
That energy by which he seeks the truth, 
Is rouzed, aspires, grasps, struggles, wishes, craves 
From her that happy stillness of the mind 
Which fits him to receive it when unsought. (438, 12.9-14) 
 
 
What is Nature, and where is she? Nature is in the wilds of the wind, and she gives to 
Wordsworth an admiration of humanity.  
 
...like those wilds 
In which my early feelings had been nursed, 
And naked valleys full of caverns, rocks, 
And audible seclusions, dashing lakes, 
Echoes and waterfalls, and pointed crags 
That into music touch the passing wind. 
...And the result was elevating thoughts  
Of human nature. (308, 8.791-802) 
 
Through non-human Nature, silences, echoes and the voice of the wind, Wordsworth comes to 
appreciate human nature. Interestingly, Wordsworth says that Nature brings both stimulation 
(“seeking truth”) and a still mind, allowing learning to occur even if unprovoked. Like Thoreau, 
intelligence in this way is a gift we must prepare to receive even if we are not actively seeking it. 
This does not mean that learning only comes in spontaneous apparition, on windy days or in 
cavernously cold valleys, but it does honor that a particular type of learning, aesthetic learning, 
does happen in those kinds of moments. Similar experiences may happen in a museum, on the 
train, or in a formal classroom, but those are not feelings and thoughts from Nature, and they are 
not (I would argue) weather-rich. The honor of learning from non-human elements is 
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spectacular, as I have posited through these evidential nature writings, as it expands 
transformative learning experience to an outdoor space and identifies a new, direct teacher – and 
an important player in the learning experience – Nature herself. (Before I have called this 
learning from non-human others.) If Nature brings us closer to the truths of her own 
intelligences, the things Cather’s character called “what is it,” maybe she also brings us closer to 
the ethics of the world, both human nature and non-human nature, or as the boy said, “what is 
right.” There is a material truth about the world in Wordsworth’s concept of learning by Nature, 
and there is an ethical lesson to be learned as well. 
 
Nature and God 
 What is Nature? Is it Her? Him? Existence, a being, a body? In my many years of 
studying outdoor learning, I cannot seem to work out the details. As explained in my research 
methods chapters, I find this term all at once poetic, historical, and troubling, and I am not alone 
in setting it aside for the time being. While I would not choose to pursue this research solely 
from the perspective of a concept wrought with centuries of miscommunications, there is an 
important position for Nature in Wordsworth’s philosophy of outdoor aesthetic learning. 
Although I am not convinced that Wordsworth’s original 1805 poem had a singular Nature in 
mind, it becomes evident through Wordsworth’s literary critiques and subsequent revisions that 
the religious culture of England in his time did not allow for grandiose references of any sort to a 
pantheistic nature-based God, or worse yet, support for paganism from such a popular writer. For 
example, he hears the whispers in the wind: "...I would stand, Beneath some rock, listening to 
sounds that are, The ghostly language of the ancient earth, Or make their dim abode in distant 
winds...” (82, 2.326-330). Consequently, when Wordsworth returned to his poem The Prelude 
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after arduous critical review, Nature was replaced in almost exclusively with God. And as such, 
what was once Nature’s wind speaking to Wordsworth, later editions of The Prelude welcomed 
as the “breath of God” in her stead.  
 This expansive revision of what was once a naturalistic ballad then became a spiritual 
hymn. Although in words, Wordsworth may have become less brazen, the ideas of Nature and of 
Wordsworth’s Nature as communing with or even as a perfect match for God, does not decrease 
the importance of Nature for learning. In fact, knowing that Wordsworth later exchanged, or 
more accurately, supplemented Nature with God, tells us only more strongly of the pivotal role 
Nature plays in our lives and learning. The Anglican God of the British Romantic era was 
powerful and foreboding, but also a parental, filial relation. This is the same persona that Nature 
assumes in that time period: a transition from the old Renaissance Nature of fear and risk to 
Romantic safety and embrace.175 Wordsworth, between The Prelude’s different versions, flutters 
between these two dynamic identities of the human versus the other-than-human, Nature and 
Man, God and Man. When the wind blows across the fields, God breathes life into us. Even 
without a strong belief in God, this is a clearly metaphorical presentation of the hero/heroine 
Nature/God as teacher for Wordsworth, which should pique any philosophy of education’s 
interests.  
Spirituality in education is a taboo subject these days, but I say again that there is a deep 
seriousness in Wordsworth’s incomplete philosophy of Nature as God that draws attention to the 
																																																								175	Similar language is used by John Muir, a student of British Romanticism: “How fine the 
weather is! Nothing more celestial can I conceive. How gently the winds blow! Scarce can these 
tranquil air-currents be called winds. They seem the very breath of Nature, whispering peace to 
every living thing. Down in the camp dell there is no swaying of tree-tops; most of the time not a 
leaf moves. I don’t remember having seen a single lily swinging on its stalk, though they are so 
tall the least breeze would rock them,” 20. 	
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equally serious issue of how we learn in Nature, if Nature is truly an expression of the wind and 
God’s breath. As I have argued throughout, truth is cradled in a carefully chosen metaphor, much 
like it exists in the experience that very metaphor aspires to represent. Spirituality has come to be 
categorized with emotions, mysticism, transcendence, and romanticism on a shelf with other 
dusty concepts not deemed fit by modern science. But this is not the correct stack for these 
human pieces in outdoor science or in the science of holistic education.176 Folk culture and 
history may make them appear aged by technological standards, but these curiosities and the 
complexities of humanity remain firmly planted in reality.  
We are as much taught by our emotions and softer sides as we are by our facts and 
figures. Empiricism, for example, is just the expression of behavioral learning from emotional 
and physical perceptions. We touch a flame, and it burns us, and so we learn not to repeat that 
error. Our hat is blown off by the wind, and we are frustrated to lose it, so we choose to tie it on 
next time. God is teaching us through Nature, Wordsworth claims in verse: “To God who thus 
corrected my desires” (436, 11.374). This would be a predictable ode to Lord and Creator of the 
British Romantics if these unusual lines did not also follow it immediately: 
 
And afterwards the wind and sleety rain, 
And all the business [activity] of the elements, 
...The noise of wood and water, and the mist... 
(436, 11.375-380) 
 
Wordsworth talks suddenly of the weather in his love ballad addressed to God. He elaborates on 
how these were the “spectacles and sounds” that he would often return to and “drink as at a 
fountain.” He is thanking God for correcting the errors of his wants, and explains that the better 																																																								
176 See Willi Unsoeld’s “Spiritual Values in Wilderness,” Friedrich Schiller’s The Aesthetic 
Education of Man, or John P. Miller et al’s Holistic Learning and Spirituality in Education. 	
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desires are the ones of Nature, which remind him, maybe, of the aesthetic value of the outdoor 
environment. For example, he continues by saying that he suspects that later on it is the “storm 
and rain” upon his roof at night or rainfall during his daytime walks in the woods, that “unknown 
to me, the workings of my spirit thence are brought” (436, 11.385-387). Wordsworth does not 
think he will always recognize God’s impact on his life, or what we may posit is Nature’s impact 
on as well, but he does not doubt that when he senses the weather it will bring his spirit back to 
life, restore him to the life that he believes to be venerable.  
 I wonder if we might also consider that Wordsworth’s spirit, or the workings of it, are 
better understood under weather-rich conditions. I take by “spirit” Wordsworth to mean his true 
self, the transformed version, and it seems that in revisiting the aesthetic experience of the 
spectacles and sounds of the torment of a storm, he recollects his own personal learning journey. 
Either he means God to be sending the rain as a reminder of the work on Wordsworth’s self that 
has been done, or the weather is God’s guiding hand, come again to correct Wordsworth’s 
desires.  
 The Diné (Navajo) people have a related philosophy to Wordsworth’s wind as the breath 
of God. Although they do not call their deity or deities “God,” they have a word nílch'i that has 
been translated to Holy Wind, Holy Spirit, or Holy Wind Spirit that incorporates Native 
spirituality and the physical concepts of wind, air, or atmosphere.177 Like the Navajo possess the 
Holy Winds within and around them as breath, life, thought, and language, Wordsworth keeps 
God and Nature beside him as he attempts to work out some meaning or richer language for this 
experience of God as Nature or Nature from God, the mother Nature or father God as teacher, 
and the son Wordsworth as learner. 
																																																								
177 McNeley, 1. 
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Spots of Time 
Wordsworth does not rest on the laurels of metaphorical when it comes to 
conceptualizing an indefinable transformative aesthetic learning experience in weather. As I 
alluded to in my introduction to this writer, Wordsworth coins his own term for these moments. 
In the passage below, possibly the most puzzling and re-interpreted portion of The Prelude, 
Wordsworth situates experiences called “spots of time” in aesthetic moments outdoors. Although 
it is somewhat lengthy, the original location of spots of time should be brought to the forefront 
en totale so that the central subject of our discussion, the weather-rich environmental context of 
transformative learning experiences, is directly corroborated. Wordsworth sets the scene at the 
face of a cliff where he confronts a faceless fear, and from there, a tabula rasa, a Socratic aporia, 
or a just a sudden loss of words, replaced by the shuddering response of his body: 
 
[A cliff] Upreared its head... 
With trembling hands I turned...and after I had seen 
That spectacle, for many days my brain 
Worked with a dim and undetermined sense 
Of unknown modes of being. In my thoughts 
There was a darkness – call it solitude 
Or blank desertion  
(50, 1.408-423) 
 
I shook the habit off 
Entirely and for ever, and again  
In Nature's presence stood, as I stand now, 
A sensitive, and a creative soul. 
There are in our existence spots of time. 
Which with distinct preeminence retain  
A renovating virtue, whence, depressed… 
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds 
Are nourished and invisibly repaired -- 
A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced, 
That penetrates, enables us to mount 
When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen. 
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks 
Among those passages of life in which 
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We have had deepest feeling that the mind 
Is lord and master, and that outward sense 
Is but the obedient servant of her will. 
Such moments, worthy of all gratitude, 
Are scattered everywhere, taking their date 
From our first childhood --in our childhood even 
Perhaps are most conspicuous. Life with me, 
As far as memory can look back, is full 
Of this beneficent influence. (430, 11.204-228) 
 
 
If this were one of my classes, I would ask my students now to pause and digest this passage, 
then to reread it adding notes as thoughts creep in, to reread it again with one fell swoop of 
feeling and emotion, and only then we would begin to discuss. I think this method is equally 
relevant to this situation, so I ask you now to take these steps, and read these words through well. 
Rather than piece out every important note and nuance, I will then take it upon myself to 
elucidate just five details of his account here that are most fitting for this study. I am tempted, but 
adding any more details would be to overwhelm this research with literary analysis. Were I to 
complete a follow up study for further evidence and clarification, this passage would certainly be 
one to re-address. 
 The Kantian sublime (also reflecting pieces of Longinus and Edmund Burke’s ideas but 
most famously dedicated in Kant’s Third Critique) was introduced in the literature review of this 
dissertation. Recall that there are roughly three stages to an aesthetic experience of the Kantian 
sublime (which take place especially often in Nature, according to most readings of Kant). These 
stages are: (1) the experiencer’s mind in some present exposure or relationship to other non-
human objects, a state which I have referred to at times as a “priming” for learning, (2) a moment 
or instance of rupture, blankness, loss, confusion, or otherwise conflict posed to our imagination 
wherein the experiencer can no longer comprehend or “imagine” the object as it would any other 
object, and (3) a resolution is reached when the experiencer realizes that human reason is even 
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more powerful than this small hiccup of the imagination. Basically, I think of the Kantian 
sublime’s final two steps with the handy quip “imagination fails but reason prevails.”  
 Wordsworth’s spots of time inspire five observations. First, we notice in Wordsworth’s 
poem here that there is at least the second Kantian sublime stage in action. Wordsworth mentions 
the cliff coming into focus and how it disturbs him because it is unlike other objects; it cannot be 
filed away, examined from all angles, or comprehended easily.178 Like in the dialogue Alcibiades 
when the title character’s teacher Socrates stuns him like a stinging blowfish, leaving him numb, 
Wordsworth is stuck by a moment of “indetermination,” the “unknown,” shrouded in “dim” light 
or “darkness,” left in “solitude,” or in a state of “blank desertion” in his first stanza. I dare to say 
that this indicates Wordsworth’s moment of aporia; only it takes place outdoors, which makes it 
an acutely disarming aesthetic-sensory experience. Not only does his mind feel lost, his body is 
also wept along and suspended in the raging waters of disillusionment. From our anti-dualistic 
perspective the occurrence of such a rupture is even more convincing, as we can see distinctly 
how the mind and body operate necessarily in union, undivided, even in their complete and 
combined confusion.  
Second, Wordsworth’s passage here is distinctly Kantian in its third stage. Like Kant, 
Wordsworth’s moment of stated blankness – aporia – results in an uplifting conclusion that 
man’s reason or mind conquers the pseudo-object of its original conflagration. He says what 
results from blank desertion is a feeling that “lifts us up when fallen,” a feeling that, “the mind is 
lord and master, and that outward sense [our physicality] is but the obedient servant of her will.” 
Ultimately, we dominate the upsetting feeling of ignorance with another feeling that it our 																																																								
178 See a thorough review of literature on the complicated “fault-lines” of Wordsworth’s spots of 
time in Peter Larkin’s aptly titled article, “Wordsworth’s Maculate Exception: Achieving the 
‘Spots of Time,’” 1-2. 
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mental perception alone is what powers our emotions. Like the Stoics, if we only look again, in a 
new way, a satisfying perspective on the world, which can miraculously assume these 
impervious pseudo-objects of the sublime. According to Christopher Hitt, it is no surprise that 
this third stage holds sway still in the time of the British Romantics, and even lingers today.  
 
The basic structural similarity of the accounts of Kant, Wordsworth, and Emerson 
is important less as a record of literary influence (Wordsworth never read The 
Critique of Judgment, and Emerson had not yet read The Prelude) than as a sign 
of a certain consistency in the way “canonical” writers (all of course white, male, 
Euro-American, and of a particular economic class) – who have had, for better or 
worse, the strongest impact on hegemonic culture – responded to and represented 
this universal experience.179   
 
Hitt’s choice of describing sublime experiences as “universal” is particularly revealing for this 
dissertation study. The universality of sublime-like transformative learning experiences in 
weather-rich environments is one of my chief arguments herein. However, we do not always 
know this transformative aesthetic learning experience in weather-rich environments by the same 
name, as also evidenced in Chapter II. Wordsworth is an excellent example of this continuing 
difficulty in grappling with the best-suited aesthetic term for this type of experience, which I 
argue, is explicitly a type of transformative learning. Wordsworth was likely aware of the well-
circulated literature on the sublime from Longinus and Edmund Burke, as well as the colloquial 
usage of the word sublime then. Interestingly, Wordsworth is known to use “sublimity” 
																																																								
179 Hitt, 610. Hitt is referring also to Emerson’s passage in Nature: “Crossing a bare common, in 
snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky… I am glad to the brink of fear… I become a 
transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through 
me; I am part of parcel of God…in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as 
beautiful as his own nature,” 38-39. 
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throughout The Prelude (e.g., 82, 2.320; 96, 3.103; 148, 4.175), but his descriptions do not match 
the Kantian sublime as well as his spots of time do.180  
Why should Wordsworth choose to create a new term instead of drawing upon the years 
of work philosophizing the sublime? I presume this is due to a concern by Wordsworth that the 
Kantian sublime does not correctly fit the experiences he has had. Wordsworth’s spots of time 
include, as I will highlight in a minute, sensitivity to the absence of temporality that Kant does 
not extract. While the experience itself, as indicated by Hitt, is clearly universal in its similarity, 
it has evolved over time as with any other philosophy of education. I draw attention here to 
precisely that universality and the general theme, the universality itself being not only the 
weather, experience, or aesthetics, but of transformative learning that other writers have not 
publicly and explicitly discerned. We may waffle on the terms to use (which is why I avoid 
putting a name to this experience at all in this research), but the remarkable parallels remain. One 
only thing I might add is that universality of experience, as in the human ability to have and 
recognize this experience as something special and worthy of this extensive research does not 
necessarily suppose that all people do indeed eventually have these moments. A child 
sequestered in a single room without access to fresh air or wind or rain – say for example, a 
student stuck in a classroom without windows or recess breaks – may never have the opportunity 
to share this “universal” human experience, however possible it may have been if other choices 
(i.e., Thoreau’s choice of the environment outdoors) were made. I mean universality as the 
strictly Kantian notion, as I assume Hitt also does. Humans can have the feeling that we are all 
universally human, reasonable, and capable of learning without actually guaranteeing it happens 
																																																								
180 There is one exception to this rule at 154, 5.40. 	
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in practice. This missing pledge to the quality of education is as disconcerting, I think, as it is a 
real and total part of our modern, weather-barred lives. 
Third, we can also see from the Spots of Time Passage of The Prelude in contrast to 
Annie Dillard’s sublime-like experiences and those of Mary Oliver, that there are indeed 
different theoretical versions at play; the three phases of the Kantian sublime are not necessarily 
the only or the favored language of this universal experience. Hitt distinguishes, with the help of 
Keats, an “egotistical sublime” characteristic of Kant and Wordsworth as contrasted with an 
“ecological sublime” more present in contemporary nature writings.181  
The heart of Hitt’s distinction between the conventional egotistical sublime of old and the 
new-age ecological sublime is how the third phase of sublime aesthetic experiencing is defined. 
While Kant, Emerson, and Wordsworth may argue that reason ultimately prevails, Dillard, post-
modernist philosophers like Jean-François Lyotard or Herbert Marcuse, and eco-feminist 
thinkers like Val Plumwood find that the sublime results in a slightly less “uplifting” and less 
anthropocentric conclusion. For Dillard, after she is struck by the numbness of the sublime, “the 
shadows are deeper. Extravagance takes on a sinister, wastrel air.”182 For Dillard, this aesthetic 
experience is not always The Tree With the Lights In It. Simple resolutions are not always 
found; yet, Dillard is still learning from these moments. One might say instead that the modern 
versions of this transformative aesthetic learning experience in weather-rich environments are 
																																																								
181 Hitt, 608. Emily Brady would say that a revision of the Kantian sublime is not necessary, with 
proper interpretation and application to aesthetic education. 
 
182 Dillard, 183. As cited in Hitt, 610.	
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distinguished by their resulting complexity of thought and feeling rather than their simple 
solution in the human faculty of reason.183  
I think this increasing perception of nature writers not for an answer in our inner selves, 
but a deeper question to be found in the “other” of nature, the weather, symbolizes and should 
inspire a valuable turn in educational theory. Hitt finds similar significance of this new 
theorizing that still yields a heightened understanding.184 In other words, it is still obvious that 
Dillard is learning from this experience. Though unlike the egotistical sublime, the ecological 
sublime suggests a bold turn for the experiencer, the learner, to embrace the discomfort of the 
second phase of the Kantian sublime. From that discomfort, the learner comes to produce a 
tolerance for otherness and complexity that leads us to the ultimately fortifying consummation of 
the experience as having changed us into a more mature and perceptively connected human in 
our environment.  
I suggest a brave type of education is the result of this experience. We ought to see the 
third phase of this experience as a recovery and subsequent expanse of the imagination. It is not 
reason that takes us home to learning, although reason is what we use to bring imagination back 
into our awareness. Imagination is freed by these transformative aesthetic learning experiences in 
weather. I would argue that the third stage of transformative aesthetic learning experiences in 
weather-rich environments is a restoration of imagination, not a revalidation of human reason as 
omnipotent but the expanse of our ability to be able to imagine more depth, more reason, more 
unity, more chaos – in the non-human world. It is not simply recognition of our power over 																																																								
183 I do appreciate Hitt’s concern that, historically, Americans have not been keen to embrace the 
vulnerability of otherness and complexity. This is an issue that certainly warrants another 
thorough research project. 
 
184 Hitt, 611. 
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nature but a revelation of the inherent independence and value of non-human nature as a force 
that can and will change us. (We can see this has natural ethical and educational implications for 
global climate change, a point that I will return to in the final chapter of this dissertation.) Joseph 
C. Sitterson associates Wordsworth’s spots of time with a metaphorical sort of becoming, and 
Larkin explains that spots of time prepare the human psyche to be “responsive to a given-ness of 
the real.”185 Perhaps, then, spots of time involve becoming aware of reality. In these experiences, 
we receive the gift of knowledge of the real, which leads our selves to also become more real. Is 
this a gift from God or Nature? For Wordsworth, God and Nature may be one in the same. 
We find in these experiences an expanded rationale for the importance of feeling and 
living in a state of complexity and unknowing. Consider Thoreau’s famous conclusion in 
Ktaadn: The Maine Woods that the non-human environment is “no man’s garden.”186 The 
lingering feeling that haunts us about these experiences, like for Thoreau realizing on Katahdin is 
the feeling of how unfathomable the weather on this mountain is, leads us to my fourth 
supposition that these experiences described by all of our writers are, again, models of 
transformative learning. 
My fifth observation from Wordsworth’s spots of time is that they are the first instance of 
a discussion of temporality – or, more accurately, an evasion of linear time –in our discussion of 
transformative aesthetic learning experiences in weather thus far. According to Wordsworth, 
although in the moment spots of time have no actual perceptible time-sense, later they become 
distinctly attached to our understanding of the passage of time. Spots of time, over time, become 
																																																								
185 As cited in Larkin, 34. 
 
186 As cited and discussed in Hitt, 615. See also Ian Frazier’s 2017 Outside Magazine article, 
“National Parks Don’t Need Your Misty-Eyed Reverence.” 
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Wordsworth’s re-imaginings of his most memorable learning experiences, just like Dr. Bigg’s 
poll.  
The days gone by 
Come back upon me from the dawn almost 
Of life; the hiding-places of my power 
Seem open, I approach, and then they close; 
I see by glimpses now, when age comes on  
May scarcely see at all... 
affecting incidents. (432, 11.333-344)  
 
On qualities of Wordsworth’s affecting experience, fleeting yet memorable, fade into just details, 
perhaps of the lines and shapes or weather, but the reverberating educational implications 
continue to pulse in his veins. 
 
Over Glen Pass 
I have had the great privilege to hike solo in Muir Country – the High Sierra Mountains 
traversed by the 220-mile John Muir Trail. In my seventeen days above treeline, I crossed 
thirteen high altitude passes, two of which I remember because my passages were made under 
heavy afternoon hail. When I think of the course of time like Wordsworth and the cloudlands like 
Muir, crawling up to craggy and foreboding Glen Pass is what first comes to mind. It was an 
experience ascending into the clouds. 
It has now been six years since I crossed Glen Pass, and with the natural turnover of 
seasons and aging, as with Wordsworth’s spots of time, only bits and pieces of the feelings of this 
aesthetic experience remain. What has degraded most are my memories of the conversation I 
had at lunch with the Ranger over tomato soup to hide from the hail briefly, the time of day it 
was, how long it took me to race the storm, and what I did once on the other end. When I look at 
this list of missing memories, many of them are indeed about the nonlinearity of time, and some 
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others are, interestingly, aspects that we educators emphasize in our classrooms like human 
interactions, talk, and time. Mine was an affecting incident, certainly, but not in the classic way 
that taking an exam or completing an activity by a deadline might be. Actually, the more I am 
thinking of this moment and trying to hold it in my mind, the more I feel the details slipping 
away, and I find myself cognitively frustrated but mysteriously calm and resplendently nostalgic. 
I think of Muir’s words now, as I feel my body climbing up to the narrow pass again with 
the clouds crowding menacingly around me and the stark wind is so crisp that I can feel it swim 
into the bottom of my lungs with every inhale: “The night breeze is cool, for all day we have 
been climbing into the upper sky, the home of the cloud-mountains we so long have admired. 
How sweet and keen the air!” 




John Muir and Cloudland 
       John Muir, a Scottish-born immigrant with Midwestern roots, is frequently cited in 
environmental studies fields, but rarely quoted in philosophy circles, and even less often spoken 
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of by educators. His reputation, I believe, is largely due to the audiences that his writing was 
originally intended to reach. When Muir began his longest stints into the wilderness, it was after 
being blinded in a factory accident in 1867 and deciding, consequently, to abandon that work for 
botany. When he regained his vision and started walking by land from Florida to Cuba, the 
American South in the aftermath of the Civil War was a jarring sight. Families and Natives were 
displaced and scattered. Disturbed by the destruction of the landscape and its people, Muir was 
shaken into activism, although the South was already wrought.  
It was not until his first season in the High Sierras as a hired shepherd that he found a 
place untouched enough to apply his fervent conservationist spirit. After publishing an account 
of his brief herding days, My First Summer in the Sierra, Muir returned again and again to the 
mountains. As the book gained popularity, he further publicized the importance of the scenery of 
this place. Muir’s focus on place, although it earned the Sierras a reserved land hold from 
President Roosevelt, was also the crutch of his work. Muir’s waxing religious on the cathedral-
like space squarely planted his writing in the category of travelogue. While interesting, his work 
was considered careful documentation of a beautiful landscape deserving of preservation, but 
beyond that, hopelessly romantic – not the sort of material for non-naturalistic scientific study, 
and certainly not the home for a social science like education. Surely there is more to be seen in 
Muir than what popular culture has labeled as environmentalism. As with our other six nature 
writers, I look here in this final subsection on literary analysis and philosophy, for data that 
shows Muir’s lesser-known philosophy of learning from the weather in an environment. 
There were two quotes that inspired my early interest in investigating Muir’s writing for 
this research. The first is that I remembered Muir’s likening of storms as being guides as well as 
men. In my personal philosophy, I have always likened my work as a wilderness guide to my 
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work as a teacher. In many ways they are the same vocational pursuit, leading others on great 
adventures. “Anyhow,” Muir says of his own adventures, “we never know where we must go nor 
what guides we are to get, – men, storms, guardian angels, or sheep. Perhaps almost everybody 
in the least natural is guided more than he is ever aware of” (136). Of course, in Muir’s list he 
does not end with men and storms as teachers (he gives the same powers to angels and sheep), 
which one could argue is just as good as saying anything teaches. Although this may very well 
be true for the minor lessons of life, Muir has a particularly high-level learning commitment in 
mind. He continues, “All the wilderness seems to be full of tricks and plans to drive and draw us 
up into God’s Light” (136). God’s Light – for a religious man, can there be a greater educational 
aim than to learn to live in the light of God? Moreover, the wilderness is not only leading us to 
God, but into his light, a theme we know well from Abbey, Dillard, and others. Muir’s recurring 
attention to weather phenomena cannot be slighted. Connecting this quote to Muir’s most famous 
nickname for the High Sierras, still used today, as the “Range of Light,” it is consequently worth 





187 The High Sierra Mountain Range became known as the “Range of Light” because of this 
remark in Muir’s book: “Probably more free sunshine falls on this majestic range than on any 
other in the world I‘ve ever seen or heard of. It has the brightest weather, …more star-shine, 
moon shine, and perhaps more crystal-shine than any other mountain chain, and its countless 
mirror lakes, having more light poured onto them, glow and spangle most. And how glorious the 
shining after the short summer showers and after frosty nights when the morning sunbeams are 
pouring through the crystals on the grass and pine needles, and how ineffably spiritually fine is 
the morning-glow on the mountain-tops and the alpenglow of evening. Well may the Sierra be 
named, not the Snowy Range, but the Range of Light,” 129. See also 146. From this we can see 
that he is referring to light through multiple atmospheric phenomena, not light as a biblical trope. 	
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The Error of “Landscapes” 
 
 In the review of the literature on philosophy of education in the outdoors, Chapter II, the 
thesis that learning outdoors is about place or placefulness was presented. However, as I 
explained then, this common idea of highlighting place-based, space-centric, and landscape-
focused learning perpetuates an unfortunate bias for a person’s own home, which must then 
somehow be taught to generalize to others’ homes as equally valuable. It also raises an issue for 
places or landscapes that are not “home” to anyone or anything: Do abandoned locales still have 
inherent value of place? The idea of place as aesthetic landscape could show some promise for 
aesthetic learning outdoors, but it also has the limitation of being bound-like to one spot, 
although no boundaries do actually exist. While we like to think, and I believe often do think 
unconsciously, of the outdoors as a landscape, this heuristic cultural concept has been 
inappropriately preferred in outdoor research. As I presented in Chapter II, there is significant 
need for a label, a term, or more accurately a strong philosophical conception of outdoor space 
that resists dualisms and artificial boundaries. The weather, which flows unhindered from region 
to region, knows no country, follows no government, and is owned by no land, no man, is better 
suited to theorize our relationship to learning about a planetary environment. Although place will 
always shape our perception of objects, and cultures will always mark their homes by their 
landscape or cityscape, it is an error to rest on this arbitrary feature to describe the commonality, 
the universality (again, in the Kantian sense), of our outdoor learning experiences. 
 Muir is as guilty as we all are of loving places, but he does not succumb absolutely to 
their fancies. If we look at his words verbatim, as with the other six nature writers, weather 
permeates his consciousness, even as “landscape” is harkened throughout: 
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Gazing, awe-stricken, I might have left everything for it [the landscape]. Glad, 
endless work would then be mine tracing the forces that have brought forth its 
features, its rocks and plants and animals and glorious weather…for the colors 
and lines and expression of this divine landscape-countenance are so burned into 
my mind and heart they surely can never grow dim. (7-8) 
 
He might have left everything for the landscape, but that landscape is what it is because of the 
“forces that have brought forth its features,” like its “glorious weather,” and its brilliant never-
dimming light. Muir makes an even more striking connection between landscape and weather by 
fashioning descriptions for what he calls at first “landscapes of the sky” (10) before settling in as 
his most-employed term “cloudlands” (e.g., 96). Of the seven nature writers featured in this 
research, I can attest that Muir easily wins the prize for the greatest number count of weather 
words. There is hardly a page without a “cloud” or a “dew drop” on it, and some pages were so 
riddled with weather talk that I found myself selecting great chunks of passages to quote, with 
hardly any breathing room for my own thoughts to surface. The excerpts here are highly 
compressed samples from what is, essentially, his book-length study of weather. 
  
Daily Weather Reporting as Askesis  
 Cloudlands lend themselves to cirrus striations, fluffy cumulous shapes, and in poor 
spirits, cloudbursts and subsequent flooding (26), and Muir faithfully registers each and every 
move. His constant references to weather are a hint that he must find something precious in it 
beyond its mechanical processes and visual appeal. There is significance in his meticulous study. 
He begins journaling in an almost comically regimented form, where every new entry begins 
with a daily reporting of the weather at that present time, and he even gives the amount of clouds 
in the sky a standard decimal percentage, such as “clouds about .05” or “clouds .20” (94, 117). 
Here are a few examples of his structured weather rating system: 
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Heard a few peals of thunder from the upper Sierra, and saw firm white bossy 
cumuli rising back of the pines. This was about noon. (19) 
 
June 18. – Another inspiring morning, nothing better in any world can be 
conceived. No description of Heaven that I have ever heard or read of seems half 
so fine. At noon the clouds occupied about .05 of the sky, white filmy touches 
drawn delicately on the azure. (32) 
 
July 31. – Another glorious day, the air as delicious to the lungs as nectar to the 
tongue; indeed the body seems one palate, and tingles equally throughout. 
Cloudiness about .05, but our ordinary shower has not yet reached us, though I 
hear thunder in the distance. (95) 
 
The sky-scenery has changed but little so far with the change in elevation. Clouds 
about .05. Glorious pearly cumuli tinted with purple of ineffable fineness of tone. 
(113) 
 




What stands out about the sheer number and familiar form of these meteorological reports in his 
journal are that they are ritualized, disciplined, and devised by Muir into a daily custom. They 
are ultimately examples of Muir’s practice of weather reporting. The reports are not only about 
the weather but also about maintaining a record of the environmental happenings around him. 
This practice might be compared to the ancient philosophical spiritual exercises of askesis 
introduced in Chapter III through the idea of the “truthfulness” of weather reporting as a process 
of meaning making. As explained previously, the practice of journaling and asking philosophical 
questions about the environment, constantly documenting and using that empirical record to 
adjust and correct our perspectives on the world, dates back to the traditions of the Stoics.  
 According to philosopher Michel Foucault, this practice is defined by the recognition of 
the writer that “human and divine reason share a common function together,” and this realization 
“is not brought about in the form of the recollection of the soul looking at itself” as it is in Plato’s 
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philosophy or the Kantian sublime’s egotistical transcendence, “but rather through the movement 
of the mind’s curiosity exploring the order of the world.”188 This is a conclusion that rests in a 
ecological understanding like Hitt’s, rather than a transformation of the self purely for the self’s 
sake. It is a form of learning that could easily translate to an ethical responsibility toward others 
through a subsequent understanding of one’s self. 
The unique feature of Stoic askesis is that “there is absolutely no passage to another 
world here.”189 As mystical and otherworldly as Muir may come across in his references to 
heaven and shimmering cloudlands, his observational mindset stems from his fervent 
understanding that he is experiencing the environment to come to know, to learn, the 
environment. The more he practices these spiritual, philosophical, exercises of noticing and 
documenting the clouds, the more he senses their own type of innate reason (not the dominion of 
human reason over chaotic Nature, as it is for Kant in the sublime), the weather’s own 
Thoreauvian intelligences, the cloudland’s own divine seal. And we see similar askesis in 
Thoreau’s Walden, and also in Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek.  
Muir is not over-romanticizing the human at the cost of the other, the non-human; he is 
practicing how to relate to the otherness of the non-living weather through regular meditation. 
This is in many ways a pragmatic, constructivist learning philosophy, in that eventually meaning 
is pieced together and positively applied, with growth as an end in itself. Muir states, “The 
clouds of noon on the high Sierra seem yet more marvelously, indescribably beautiful from day 
to day as one becomes more wakeful to see them” (42). Over time Muir further recognizes the 
value of the cloudlands he watches, explaining how, “these fleeting sky mountains are as 
																																																								
188 Foucault, 281-282. 
 
189 Ibid., 282. 
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substantial and significant as the more lasting upheavals of granite beneath them” (emphasis 
added, 80). Muir’s careful askesis allows him to discover the importance of even the most 
obscure, distant mysteries of the environment like the clouds and the movement of the weather 
that can impact the world without living or breathing as we do. He is able to see value in intricate 
and bold change alike. This is again similar to how Foucault unfolds Seneca’s askesis: “You can 
see that the great exploration of nature is not used to tear us from the world, but to enable us to 
grasp ourselves again here where we are.”190 Foucault continues, settling upon the conclusion 
that “Knowledge of the self and knowledge of nature are not alternatives, therefore; they are 
absolutely linked to each other.” Thus, learning about our environment through the 
documentation of weather is a process of learning about our selves and our “punctual existence,” 
as Foucault calls it, grounded, as humans are, in the punctuality of time and space, in our 
environment. 
 
Simple Allure to Complex Extravagance 
One issue in Muir’s writing remains to be answered. We may learn of our punctual 
existence through clouds, but how are we transformed by that knowledge? How do we know that 
there is a degree of transformative perspective shift present, more so than learning that happens 
indirectly and subtly but not provocatively or memorably through the environment? That is, why 
should we pay attention to the learning experiences Muir cites? The learning experiences Muir 
has in his time in cloudland demonstrate the holistic activation of all four dimensions of 
transformative learning (which we recall are behavioral, psychological, convictional, and 
																																																								
190 Foucault, 277. He writes this in contrast to Plato’s philosophical Allegory of the Cave, the 
philosophy of learning that has thoroughly influenced our modern public education system and 
our traditional conception of transformative learning.  
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aesethetic). While Muir finds himself in cloudland through a simple allure: “How near they [the 
mountain peaks] seem and how clear their outlines on the blue air, or rather in the blue air; for 
they seem to be saturated with it. How consuming strong the invitation they extend!” but he 
quickly finds the attraction to be compulsive. He realizes that the sky offers him a transformative 
“conversion” that is so “complete and wholesome” (or holistic), that he finds he cannot imagine 
life without it (9). 
The allure of cloudland is indeed mighty and persistent, and Muir is not the first to have 
felt it. Surely something strong and meaningful must be occurring in the clouds that thousands of 
Appalachian Trail through-hikers leave their homes and jobs each year to attempt more time in 
the mountains, nearest the sky. Many of these hikers I have spoken to believe that the experience 
is not only enticing because of the beauty of the environment, but because there is something 
holistically refreshing – perhaps transformative – about their time outdoors. Muir highlights the 
somaesthetic quality of his experiences in this weather-rich environment: 
 
The whole body seems to feel beauty when exposed to it as it feels the camp-fire 
or sunshine, entering not by the eyes alone, but equally through all one’s flesh like 
radiant heat, making a passionate ecstatic pleasure-glow not explainable. One’s 
body seems homogeneous throughout, sound as a crystal. (71) 
 
 
These experiences, he is sure to point out, are not only pleasurable but centered on learning and 
the pursuit of higher knowledge. 
 
…A glory day of admission into a new realm of wonders as if Nature had 
wooingly whispered, ‘Come higher.’ What questions I asked, and how little I 
know of all the vast show, and how eagerly, tremulously hopeful of some day 
knowing more, learning the meaning of these divine symbols crowded together on 
this wondrous page. (82, emphasis added) 
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Muir is seeking not just a pretty landscape to view, but learning and knowledge. He expects the 
truth to unfold as “divine symbols crowded together.” This idea reappears frequently as Muir 
expressing the “extravagance” of the weather and of the knowledge he gains from being in it, 
and the even abundance of truth he has yet to learn (e.g., 33, 52, 63, 68-69, 118).191 He declares 
the sunrises and sunsets in the Sierras “divine, enduring, unwastable wealth,” whoever rests in 
cloudland shall, throughout life, “stormy or calm,” be “rich forever” (46-47; 34). For Muir, the 
richness and wealth of cloudland is about quality, depth, dimensionality, and fruitfulness, not 
money. He is describing a profound type of learning in weather, not a superficial experience. 
 Muir’s conviction that these aesthetic experiences in weather are transformative grows 
increasingly throughout his book. He perceives rich change in himself on September 2. After 
noting the unusually overloaded colors and atmospheric minutiae of the day, which draws his 
attention, “A grand, red, rosy, crimson day, – a perfect glory of a day. What it means I don’t 
know…” (133). No details were spared, and the environment displayed “no trace of economy,” 
which guides him to ponder the philosophical ramifications, the possible reasons for such an 
atmospheric excess. He looks back in his mind’s storage of cloud recordings, and finds that the 
common denominator is utter complexity, and the infinite beauty of learning about the 
extravagance of our non-artificial environment. 
 
One is constantly reminded of the infinite lavishness and fertility of Nature – 
inexhaustible abundance amid what seems enormous waste. And yet when we 
look into any of her operations that lie within reach of our minds, we learn that no 
particle of her material is wasted or worn out. It is eternally flowing from use to 
use, beauty to yet higher beauty; and we soon cease to lament waste and death, 
and rather rejoice and exult in the imperishable, unsuspendable wealth of the 
universe, and faithfully watch and wait the reappearance of everything that melts 
																																																								
191	Thoreau calls extravagance “extra-vagant,” Walden, 345.  	
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and fades and dies about us, feeling sure that its next appearance will be better 
and more beautiful than the last. (134) 
 
 
Muir here leaves us with a bittersweet conclusion. The transformative aesthetic learning 
experience in cloudland is very much a holistic perspective change of realizing that there is much 
more to our universe to discover, and that the otherness of weather is inherently rich and 
extravagant. Dillard shares a similar conclusion that “…occasionally the mountains part. The tree 
with the lights in it appears, the mockingbird falls, and time unfurls across space like an 
oriflamme. Now we rejoice. The news, after all, is not that muskrats are wary, bit that they can 
be seen” (208). We still gain, grow, learn, and are transformed by ironic or unexpectedly 
unsettling lessons. The point is that the ecological experience in weather, this kind of 
transformative aesthetic learning experience, yields recognition, sympathy for, and appreciation 







What man needs is not just the persistent posing of ultimate questions,  
but the sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now.  
The philosopher, of all people, must, I think, be aware of the tension between  
what he claims to achieve and the reality in which he finds himself.  

















The research presented in this dissertation investigated, through weather metaphors in 
nature writing, how outdoor learning can be transformative. Although we have a robust history 
of books, essays, and poetry about experiences in a weather-rich environment, education as a 
theoretical and applied field has lacked a philosophical foundation upon which to meaningfully 
improve and expand outdoor pedagogy. Rather than proposing that the hermeneutical study of 
weather metaphors leads to prescriptive lessons outdoors, these chapters have begun to uncover 
the philosophy of transformative learning that already exists in our experiences. 
With an increased philosophical understanding of the aesthetically transformative 
dimensions of outdoor experience, when our senses are most exposed, educators may take the 
next step of exploring how these experiences impact change-oriented attitudes toward 
environmental conservation and how to incorporate valuable weather exposure in an otherwise 
highly standardized school day. This aesthetic-educational research also implies a pioneering and 
original philosophical argument for the inherent value of the natural environment. I discuss some 
implications for ethics and classrooms in the subsections of this chapter, my conclusion. 
As explained in the second through fourth chapters, it was essential to take an 
interdisciplinary approach to investigating the aesthetic-educational ramifications of outdoor 
experience, drawing principally upon the fields of environmental studies, philosophy, and 
educational theory. Chapters I and II demonstrated that a reasonable literature base exists to 
support this new research. We have Mezirow’s learning theory to begin to imagine how 
transformative learning can have multiple dimensions, Dewey, Clark, Joldersma, Shusterman 
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and others who form a strong foundational argument for embodied aesthetic experience, Lakoff 
and Johnson, Buell, Rolston, Cavell, Zwicky, and others have crafted successful projects 
showing that language can be explored as a philosophical method, and international educators 
like Tagore or Masschelein for models of how outdoor learning in the future might look. None of 
these scholars, however, has gone in the direction of investigating nature writings both for their 
apparent philosophies of education and their demonstration of a transformative aesthetic learning 
experience outdoors. By searching for these philosophies and experiences, I have found that the 
common thread of aesthetic outdoor experience is humanity’s interaction with a weather-rich 
environment. 
This chapter revisits the whys of this research, explicitly naming five central concerns 
about our environment today and American public schools that shall impress future pedagogical 
reform. (A) We have environmental problems facing us – the issues of global climate change and 
ecological destruction. (B) There is widespread denial of scientific climate research in this 
country. (C) Generally, American students do not learn atmospheric natural phenomena from 
experience because they are not significantly exposed to weather in their daily lives. (D) 
American educators make culturally ingrained choices on learning environments every day. 
Often we make these choices so deftly that we fail to recognize that there are other options. (E) 
Holistic learning through all of the dimensions of transformation is not always served by lessons 
placed in an indoor classroom. For these reasons, primarily, this dissertation has sought to 
identify and build the foundations for expanded theory on how we learn outdoors, in weather. 
Through this study, and from the data presented in Chapters V and VI, I believe we can at 
least conclude that transformative aesthetic learning experiences in weather-rich environments 
do indeed occur. Although we know these learning experiences by many names, the universal 
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reality of their existence is a basic starting point for philosophy of education. Other observational 
notes about these experiences discussed in the aforementioned chapters are that they involve 
aesthetic feeling, are unbound by yet occur in fractions of time, involve mind/body experiencing, 
challenge the human desire to categorize and dissect understanding by promoting ontological 
complexity, can be social, encourage awareness of others, are not always beautiful in a 
traditional sense, and elude conclusions. 
Philosophers of education have established that transformative learning can occur in 
effective classrooms under the guidance of expert teachers. What is compelling about the 
research that I have presented in this dissertation, though, is that transformative learning can take 
place without so many of the seemingly indispensible conditions of an efficacious indoor 
learning environment. Moreover, some common outdoor conditions even resist components 




There’s a Change in the Weather 
 Despite making notable progress conceptualizing outdoor learning, scholars have not yet 
synthesized their arguments with the environmental literature and outdoor experiences of 
historically marginalized groups. Most published environmental literature, especially in the 
nature-writing genre, illustrates a white male experience. Without studying other perspectives, 
we inadvertently narrow the audience for our research and risk promoting a one-sided theory of 
environmental education. I am keen to deepen this research into how, for those not raised in or 
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near “the outdoors,” the modes of environmental education I envision can promote genuinely 
formative aesthetic-educational experience.  
I believe the next step would be to juxtapose my first inquiries with further research into 
perspectives from indigenous communities regarding ‘organic’ relationships with the natural 
environment and investigate systematically minoritized and female voices in the environmental 
literature – or, perhaps more precisely, voices that have yet to be incorporated in this ever-
dynamic literature. Additional texts might include the edited poetry selections in Camille 
Dungy’s Black Nature: Four Centuries of African American Nature Poetry, Appalachian Elegy 
by bell hooks, At Home on This Earth edited by Lorraine Anderson and Thomas Edwards, 
Rooted in the Earth by Dianne Glave, Dust Tracks on a Road by Zora Neale Hurston, Mexican 
Americans and the Environment: Tierra y Vida by Devon Peña, or Feminism and the Mastery of 
Nature by Val Plumwood.  
Producing further research on the metaphorical descriptors of aesthetic learning 
experience from varied perspectives would allow the expansion of this initial study to a much 
broader audience and determine whether the same conclusions reached in this dissertation can be 
validated or rebuked in light of a more diverse data set. For example, how is the experience of a 
Native American elder in weather similar or different to that of a trained naturalist like John 
Muir? Do minority writers also recognize the aesthetic presence of weather in transformative 
learning moments, or do they cite other primary influences? How does culture play a role in our 
perceptive and sensual interpretations of weather?  
From preliminary research, I can say already that there is indeed folk literature to add. In 
fact, we might say that a “climate change” in the environmental literature is coming. Moreover, 
these underappreciated nature writers have foretold the literal and metaphorical climate changes 
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long before they became a matter for national discussion. For instance, in Billy Higgin’s 1921 
song, “There’ll Be Some Changes Made” (famously first recorded by Ethel Waters) the chorus 
recites the lyrics, 
 
Why, there's a change in the weather, there's a change in the sea,  
So from now on there'll be a change in me,  
Why, my walk will be different, and my talk, and my name,  
Nothing about me gonna be the same.192 
 
 
African American jazz tells a story of sensitivity to “changes in the weather” as leading to 
changes in the self, a two-fold indicator of a change in the cultural environment, as in social 
change or a demand for civil rights, and an empowering change in Black self-identity as a result 
of these changes in the weather. This is only a hint of the many works by African American 
writers that utilize weather metaphor for describing transformative experience.  
Other examples resembling transformative aesthetic learning experience in weather 
appear in Native American nature writing. Luther Standing Bear explained the Oglala Lakota’s 
understanding of weather as teacher, saying,  
 
Knowledge was inherent in all things. The world was a library and its books were 
the stones, leaves, grass, brooks, and the birds and animals that shared, alike with 
us, the storms and blessings of earth. We learned to do what only the student of 
nature learns, and that was to feel beauty. We never railed at the storms, the 
furious winds, and the biting frosts and snows.193 		
Standing Bear’s people did not fight to control the weather but rather saw it as teeming with 
lessons for life. Likewise, philosopher Bruce Wilshire retells Black Elk’s vision as a boy of the 
Six Grandfathers foretelling his life’s role while the clouds and thunder rumbled. Wilshire 																																																								
192 As cited in Jacques, 13-14. 	
193 Standing Bear, 194-195. 
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insists, as I do, that we cannot banish this story as magical folktale. “Take the common practice 
of many North American indigenous peoples to sing the sun up at dawn… But for us the sun 
now is only a globe of gas, and, of course, as such, it does not need our efforts to rise in the sky. 
But this patent truth obscures another older, broader one: that our lives, evolved over millions of 
years in Nature, have taken shape with the sun, and that if we are to rise with the power of its 
rising we must celebrate that rising.”194 As we can see already from these few short examples, 
further research that diversifies the data of this dissertation shows promise for yielding fruitful 
discourse. Much existing philosophy remains to be highlighted and possibly linked to 
transformative aesthetic learning experiences in weather. 
 
 
Baked Frogs and School Climate Ethics 
I used to spend my summers on Deer Lake, Minnesota, where my grandparents had built 
a beautiful house and hosted weeklong parties for family and friends. My family and I would 
float on inflated tire tubes down the slow and meandering river, swim off of the dock, or sit in 
under the shaded porch awning with an expansive view of the neighbor’s houses and the activity 
far out on the lake. One of my favorite pastimes was wriggling my legs through the wrought iron 
railing bars and dangling them over the porch edge. These painted black metal bars were always 
hot under the sun, and they often attracted charming little cold-blooded critters for me to 
observe, like dragonflies or small green climbing tree frogs.  
There was one morning that I remember best. It was balmy and humid by dawn and 
showing all signs of being a scorcher. I had recently acquired a butterfly catching kit with a small 
																																																								
194 Wilshire, 17-18. 
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plastic crate for housing my quarry, and I put it to use for a very delicate tree frog I had found on 
the railing that morning. I distinctly remember my mom warning me to release my poor little 
captive before the afternoon sun kicked in, but I was young, irresponsible and easily distracted. 
At mid-afternoon I remembered the frog had been left out in the blistering sun for hours. What I 
found was the melted remains of my tenant – still clinging to the little plastic cage door – and I 
burst into tears of guilt and grief. There was so much power casually exercised in what I had 
done, what I had chosen to do first through wrongful action, then through neglect. I had trapped 
something, without its consent, in an artificial, confined place. I wonder if that is how some 
students feel in their classrooms these days as their eyes wander to the closed windows. We 
make an analogous choice in our larger environment, too. It is morning and we are closing the 
door above us, waiting for the afternoon furnace to fire up. 
We live in an era where climate change is tangibly evident yet often irresponsibly denied 
by social practice and policy. Modern American life is disconnected from our natural 
environment in such a way that it further perpetuates misunderstandings about environmental 
forces like the weather. This is a cultural and educational problem – but at its core, a 
philosophical problem. Historian William B. Meyer discovered from his study of Americans and 
their weather, in a book by the same title, that humans choose whatever value we wish to place 
on our weather, weather’s current “goodness” or “badness” (regardless of any inherent value it 
may independently hold).195 Hence, when it seems that we are having good weather one day, the 
same exact temperature and conditions ten years from now may be regarded as poor. My point 
behind this is that all weather descriptors are value choices. Swedes often say that “there is no 




own value judgments onto environments, making indirect choices everyday of what we like or 
dislike. Like beauty and other aesthetics, weather is as much a matter of taste as it is a matter of 
scientific fact. And like other aesthetics, any judgment we make has an ethical import. What we 
fear or dislike gets evaluated by us as distasteful and horrific, even if those qualities are not in 
the subject itself. The connection to education becomes visible here as well. If we teach students 
to incorrectly value the environment and its impact, we are attaching ethical implications to our 
lessons.196 We ought to wish for an education that embraces and learns to correctly interpret the 
environment and its weather, with proper perspective like the Stoics practiced toward Nature, 
acknowledging what is true and real about the weather as an end in itself, not only what we deem 
pleasing or useful about it. Aesthetics are not tools for viewing life but factual descriptors of the 
lives that we lead and the objects and movements we perceive around us. 
Our current American education system poses significant concerns for the next 
generation. Students sit inside walled and climate-controlled classrooms. By curbing natural 
elements like the weather and other non-human things, we remove important disturbances that 
act and evolve into learning stimuli and other environmental factors that allow students to 
transform. As a result, students lose the “feel” of nature, the aesthetic sensibility we can have 
toward our environment that characterizes aesthetic experience. Instead, students (and often 
teachers) model their lives on the structure of the manufactured world versus the living ebb and 
flow of wider, nonhuman creation. Aesthetic experiencing and its companion lyric philosophy 
offer theory and method to dissolve this fabricated line between inside and outside, indoors and 
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outdoors.197 The semantics relate directly to the actions we take and our treatment of the non-
artificial environment. 
In other words, this dissertation’s picture of outdoor learning as aesthetic transformation 
in weather can be contrasted with mechanical, rigid, or strict intellectualist forms of teaching. 
After reviewing this picture, perhaps general classroom educators might reconceive how we 
holistically teach children, reach more students with transformative experience, better understand 
some students’ desire for alternative learning, fight unnecessary philosophical dualisms like 
mind/body or human/nature in the classroom, present a language for reconnecting students to the 
outdoors, and ultimately, open up new possibilities for learning activities and spaces. This is the 
discussion to come in the next subsection. 
On ethical matters, environmental philosophers have published endless versions of 
arguments, many to great practical success in policy, but so much work remains to do. I 
appreciate the list that the book Moral Ground: Ethical Action for a Planet in Peril gives us of 
all of the reasons that we might advocate of an ethics of climate care, beginning with the 
sentence starter, “We have a moral obligation to act…” and filled in with the following list. 
Although not comprehensive, I think it provides us with a starting point and a sense of what has 
already been argued in the literature. 
We have a moral obligation to act… 
...for the survival of mankind. 
...for the sake of the children. 
...for the sake of the Earth itself. 
...for the sake of all life-forms on the planet. 																																																								
197 See Quay and Seaman for a detailed discussion of the problems of the indoor/outdoor 
dualism. 
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...to honor our duties of gratitude and reciprocity. 
...for the full expression of human virtue. 
...because flourishing is mutual. 
...for the stewardship of God’s creation. 
...because compassion requires it. 
...because justice demands it. 
...because the world is beautiful. 
...because we love the world. 
...to honor and celebrate Earth’s systems. 
 ...because moral integrity requires it.198 
 
A reader of this dissertation research will recognize that I have borrowed from several common 
environmental ethics arguments, but that I arrange them in a matter that offers something novel 
to the conversation. My primary position is twofold. We have a moral obligation to act in 
response to climate change because weather has inherent value or intelligence, and we can and 
are transformed as learners by it and thus should protect it for the sake of our human pursuit of 
truth/knowledge/wisdom. 
 I argue that we make a critical error when we discourage discussions of elemental forces 
like the weather, for example, by assuming that weather is a banal topic. Really, weather has 
been of crucial value to mankind and non-human nature since its creation. Without weather in 
our environment, change is stagnated, and death is inevitable. However, weather change in the 
magnitude that we are seeing it in the world today is as disconcerting as the image of a weather-
less planet. We live in a delicate equilibrium with our environment, and by taking its value for 																																																								
198 Moore and Nelson, vii-xii. 
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granted, and failing to mold culture in the direction of embracing weather exposure, we fail to 
keep it at the forefront where it belongs. Climate change or global warming is only threatening if 
we claim it exists. Unfortunately, only a portion of the American population has reached this 
conclusion that a generation of researchers have predicted.	199 If we do not care for our 
environment, we lose it. If we lose our environment and have nowhere to exist, we cease to exist. 
We die. The consequences themselves are as plain as they are plainly undesirable. 
 If the argument that weather is valuable in and of itself is remains unconvincing, there is 
another particular stance that may be deduced from this research. The seven nature writers 
profiled here agree on one point clearly. Weather teaches. It transforms. If we destroy weather, if 
we alter the climate beyond recognition or recovery, we rob ourselves of its educative potential. 
Although this anthropocentric angle is not my preferred position, its straightforward logic ought 
to be convincing to readers that more readily comply with the United States’ capitalistic 
principles.  
Consider the issue this way: If we prove that transformative aesthetic learning 
experiences in weather-rich environments exist, as this dissertation research posits, then weather 
is required for some types of transformative learning experiences. If we remove our bodies and 
minds from exposure to the weather, then we subsequently remove our opportunity to learn from 
it in this way. If we damage the weather irrevocably, then we forever change the dynamic 
learning outcomes we may experience, possibly permanently altering our relationship with the 
weather, a relationship that we now know informs learning. 
																																																								
199 According to a Pew research survey published in The Guardian October 6, 2016, only 48% of 
Americans believe in human-caused climate change. 
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With the recent headlines of injustice in New Orleans after certain parts of Black 
neighborhoods were impacted by Hurricane Katrina’s flooding more than others, the multitude 
of school shootings where students are not able to escape their classrooms, and my personal 
experience working with students in the Bronx who tell me that their classrooms are stiflingly 
hot in the fall, because their schools are strapped for funding properly ventilated school 
buildings, weather issues are social issues that cannot be ignored. There was an article in the New 
York Times on December 9, 2015, following health threat levels of high pollution that kept 
Beijing schoolchildren at home and indoors for several days, one parent worried that the 
environmental damage could give his son a “very negative view of nature.” This news story 
indicates that we have to also worry about how we may be indirectly teaching students to fear 
outdoor environments. 
In a different ethical appeal to human responsibility and duty, we might consider the non-
artificial environment to have independent status. Nature writers who have spent a majority of 
their lives studying the Earth understand it to hold inherent value. That value is intelligent value; 
most specifically here, weather is intelligent. Not necessarily in its particular design or one 
object’s grasp of truth, but in parts that each belong to the bigger picture of a better 
understanding and maintenance of our necessary environment. These parts include the elemental 
features of weather. To destroy the weather is to destroy a type of knowledge embedded in those 






Class Beyond Classrooms 
Edward Abbey was notorious the Monkey Wrench Gang, 1960s extremists who took 
environmentalism to the edge and infringed on human rights in order to protect the place, the 
space, or aesthetic experience they personally desired. This research does not advocate these 
measures. Instead, there is respectful ethical action we can take to mitigate climate change 
impact and further damage to the weather that we should recognize as both valuable in itself and 
valuable for humans as learners. The two-fold solution lies, first, in public education’s enduring 
power to choose its environment, and second, in teachers’ ability to guide student experiencing. I 
call this first point the liberty to create “class beyond classrooms,” although it is far from being a 
new invention, nor my singular recommendation for practicing a philosophy of learning in 
weather. Schools and educators can choose to create class beyond the traditional classroom 
structure and beyond buildings, in weather-rich environments. 
This research has suggested that being in weather-rich environments has the potential to 
prime or lead to transformative aesthetic learning experiences. But how do we teach for 
transformative aesthetic learning experiences in weather-rich environments? One can see there is 
much work yet to do conceiving what it can mean to “take a classroom outdoors.” What classes 
are able to do this? Is the embodied experience compromised by the very attempt to “create” it as 
educators? What are the ecological effects of seeing the environment anew as an implicit place 
of learning? These are some questions among many that future research must address. 
I have come to a few thoughts, however, on how we might begin to encourage more of 
these special learning experiences. It seems that the right place to start would be the same 
method I have taken in this research: Draw philosophical theory, evidence of, and awareness for 
these experiences into the public light. It is hard to teach what we cannot or do not first 
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conceptualize. I take this research to be launching this project for the field of philosophy of 
education. The other method I have following in this study is the hermeneutical tracing of 
metaphorical weather talk. I believe that for the same reasons that de Beistegui, Zwicky, many 
others, and I see truthfulness and seriousness in weather talk, we might also mobilize our use of 
poetic language to bring students into greater communication with their aesthetic experiences in 
weather. This would also involve a necessary re-evaluation of how we speak about the weather 
around students. Lastly, for the same reason that a teacher can lead a horse to water but cannot 
force it to drink, we might consider our role as educators to be that of a wilderness guide.  
This research only scratches the surface of the theory educators really need, but without a 
solid idea of what the outdoors offers us pedagogically, even educators who already believe in 
the learning potential of outdoor experiences run the risk of theorizing concepts and justifying 
“outdoor activities” that bear no resemblance to the holistically transformative learning we hope 
to inspire. It is my sincere hope that this research actively works to offer budding theory for 
pedagogical practice. The aesthetic experience discussed here does not oppose current outdoor, 
experiential, or adventure education work, but it should deepen outdoor educators’ philosophical 
rationale. It can help them to resist the demand to pre-package their work with students, or to 
over-emphasize curriculum over the holistic, mind/body development of the learner, especially 
since I argue that it is not the planned activity itself so much as the active, aesthetic experiencing, 
contextualized in our choice of environment and reactions to that environment, that leads to 
transformative learning. 
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Urban Eclipse 
 On February 15, 2018, the day of the partial solar eclipse, I witnessed New Yorkers 
across the city emerging from their offices in the middle of busy workdays, donning special 
sunglasses, and waiting for the big moment to arrive. From my apartment building I could see 
the light dimming as the clouds moved in, creating fantastic aural light beams and blackening the 
surrounding buildings. The temperature dropped drastically, and the streets fell miraculously 
quiet. Down in Midtown at the same time, a similar picture unfolded, and thousands gathering 
stopped traffic to catch a better look. The impact that this atmospheric event had on millions of 
urbanites was unbelievable, and I see it as a hopeful sign for humanity eventually coming to 
terms with the weather’s impact on our lives. What better way to begin this ethical and cultural 
process of environmental response than to initiate a deeper discussion of the value of weather for 
transformative learning? 
My final note is a call to teachers. We might try first to simply let the light in, pull back 
the shades. Open a window. Then open a door. 
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